a discourse on method-第4部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！


t　of　truth；　and　to　a　distaste　for　all　such　reasonings　as　were　unsound。　　But　I　had　no　intention　on　that　account　of　attempting　to　master　all　the　particular　sciences　commonly　denominated　mathematics：　　but　observing　that；　however　different　their　objects；　they　all　agree　in　considering　only　the　various　relations　or　proportions　subsisting　among　those　objects；　I　thought　it　best　for　my　purpose　to　consider　these　proportions　in　the　most　general　form　possible；　without　referring　them　to　any　objects　in　particular；　except　such　as　would　most　facilitate　the　knowledge　of　them；　and　without　by　any　means　restricting　them　to　these；　that　afterwards　I　might　thus　be　the　better　able　to　apply　them　to　every　other　class　of　objects　to　which　they　are　legitimately　applicable。　　Perceiving　further；　that　in　order　to　understand　these　relations　I　should　sometimes　have　to　consider　them　one　by　one　and　sometimes　only　to　bear　them　in　mind；　or　embrace　them　in　the　aggregate；　I　thought　that；　in　order　the　better　to　consider　them　individually；　I　should　view　them　as　subsisting　between　straight　lines；　than　which　I　could　find　no　objects　more　simple；　or　capable　of　being　more　distinctly　represented　to　my　imagination　and　senses；　and　on　the　other　hand；　that　in　order　to　retain　them　in　the　memory　or　embrace　an　aggregate　of　many；　I　should　express　them　by　certain　characters　the　briefest　possible。　　In　this　way　I　believed　that　I　could　borrow　all　that　was　best　both　in　geometrical　analysis　and　in　algebra；　and　correct　all　the　defects　of　the　one　by　help　of　the　other。

And；　in　point　of　fact；　the　accurate　observance　of　these　few　precepts　gave　me；　I　take　the　liberty　of　saying；　such　ease　in　unraveling　all　the　questions　embraced　in　these　two　sciences；　that　in　the　two　or　three　months　I　devoted　to　their　examination；　not　only　did　I　reach　solutions　of　questions　I　had　formerly　deemed　exceedingly　difficult　but　even　as　regards　questions　of　the　solution　of　which　I　continued　ignorant；　I　was　enabled；　as　it　appeared　to　me；　to　determine　the　means　whereby；　and　the　extent　to　which　a　solution　was　possible；　results　attributable　to　the　circumstance　that　I　commenced　with　the　simplest　and　most　general　truths；　and　that　thus　each　truth　discovered　was　a　rule　available　in　the　discovery　of　subsequent　ones　Nor　in　this　perhaps　shall　I　appear　too　vain；　if　it　be　considered　that；　as　the　truth　on　any　particular　point　is　one　whoever　apprehends　the　truth；　knows　all　that　on　that　　point　can　be　known。　　The　child；　for　example；　who　has　been　instructed　in　the　elements　of　arithmetic；　and　has　made　a　particular　addition；　according　to　rule；　may　be　assured　that　he　has　found；　with　respect　to　the　sum　of　the　numbers　before　him；　and　that　in　this　instance　is　within　the　reach　of　human　genius。　　Now；　in　conclusion；　the　method　which　teaches　adherence　to　the　true　order；　and　an　exact　enumeration　of　all　the　conditions　of　the　thing　。sought　includes　all　that　gives　certitude　to　the　rules　of　arithmetic。

But　the　chief　ground　of　my　satisfaction　with　thus　method；　was　the　assurance　I　had　of　thereby　exercising　my　reason　in　all　matters；　if　not　with　absolute　perfection；　at　least　with　the　greatest　attainable　by　me：　besides；　I　was　conscious　that　by　its　use　my　mind　was　becoming　gradually　habituated　to　clearer　and　more　distinct　conceptions　of　its　objects；　and　I　hoped　also；　from　not　having　restricted　this　method　to　any　particular　matter；　to　apply　it　to　the　difficulties　of　the　other　sciences；　with　not　less　success　than　to　those　of　algebra。　　I　should　not；　however；　on　this　account　have　ventured　at　once　on　the　examination　of　all　the　difficulties　of　the　sciences　which　presented　themselves　to　me；　for　this　would　have　been　contrary　to　the　order　prescribed　in　the　method；　but　observing　that　the　knowledge　of　such　is　dependent　on　principles　borrowed　from　philosophy；　in　which　I　found　nothing　certain；　I　thought　it　necessary　first　of　all　to　endeavor　to　establish　its　principles。　　。And　because　I　observed；　besides；　that　an　inquiry　of　this　kind　was　of　all　others　of　the　greatest　moment；　and　one　in　which　precipitancy　and　anticipation　in　judgment　were　most　to　be　dreaded；　I　thought　that　I　ought　not　to　approach　it　till　I　had　reached　a　more　mature　age　（being　at　that　time　but　twenty…three）；　and　had　first　of　all　employed　much　of　my　time　in　preparation　for　the　work；　as　well　by　eradicating　from　my　mind　all　the　erroneous　opinions　I　had　up　to　that　moment　accepted；　as　by　amassing　variety　of　experience　to　afford　materials　for　my　reasonings；　and　by　continually　exercising　myself　in　my　chosen　method　with　a　view　to　increased　skill　in　its　application。



PART　III

And　finally；　as　it　is　not　enough；　before　commencing　to　rebuild　the　house　in　which　we　live；　that　it　be　pulled　down；　and　materials　and　builders　provided；　or　that　we　engage　in　the　work　ourselves；　according　to　a　plan　which　we　have　beforehand　carefully　drawn　out；　but　as　it　is　likewise　necessary　that　we　be　furnished　with　some　other　house　in　which　we　may　live　commodiously　during　the　operations；　so　that　I　might　not　remain　irresolute　in　my　actions；　while　my　reason　compelled　me　to　suspend　my　judgement；　and　that　I　might　not　be　prevented　from　living　thenceforward　in　the　greatest　possible　felicity；　I　formed　a　provisory　code　of　morals；　composed　of　three　or　four　maxims；　with　which　I　am　desirous　to　make　you　acquainted。

The　first　was　to　obey　the　laws　and　customs　of　my　country；　adhering　firmly　to　the　faith　in　which；　by　the　grace　of　God；　I　had　been　educated　from　my　childhood　and　regulating　my　conduct　in　every　other　matter　according　to　the　most　moderate　opinions；　and　the　farthest　removed　from　extremes；　which　should　happen　to　be　adopted　in　practice　with　general　consent　of　the　most　judicious　of　those　among　whom　I　might　be　living。　　For　as　I　had　from　that　time　begun　to　hold　my　own　opinions　for　nought　because　I　wished　to　subject　them　all　to　examination；　I　was　convinced　that　I　could　not　do　better　than　follow　in　the　meantime　the　opinions　of　the　most　judicious；　and　although　there　are　some　perhaps　among　the　Persians　and　Chinese　as　judicious　as　among　ourselves；　expediency　seemed　to　dictate　that　I　should　regulate　my　practice　conformably　to　the　opinions　of　those　with　whom　I　should　have　to　live；　and　it　appeared　to　me　that；　in　order　to　ascertain　the　real　opinions　of　such；　I　ought　rather　to　take　cognizance　of　what　they　practised　than　of　what　they　said；　not　only　because；　in　the　corruption　of　our　manners；　there　are　few　disposed　to　speak　exactly　as　they　believe；　but　also　because　very　many　are　not　aware　of　what　it　is　that　they　really　believe；　for；　as　the　act　of　mind　by　which　a　thing　is　believed　is　different　from　that　by　which　we　know　that　we　believe　it；　the　one　act　is　often　found　without　the　other。　Also；　amid　many　opinions　held　in　equal　repute；　I　chose　always　the　most　moderate；　as　much　for　the　reason　that　these　are　always　the　most　convenient　for　practice；　and　probably　the　best　（for　all　excess　is　generally　vicious）；　as　that；　in　the　event　of　my　falling　into　error；　I　might　be　at　less　distance　from　the　truth　than　if；　having　chosen　one　of　the　extremes；　it　should　turn　out　to　be　the　other　which　I　ought　to　have　adopted。　　And　I　placed　in　the　class　of　extremes　especially　all　promises　by　which　somewhat　of　our　freedom　is　abridged；　not　that　I　disapproved　of　the　laws　which；　to　provide　against　the　instability　of　men　of　feeble　resolution；　when　what　is　sought　to　be　accomplished　is　some　good；　permit　engagements　by　vows　and　contracts　binding　the　parties　to　persevere　in　it；　or　even；　for　the　security　of　commerce；　sanction　similar　engagements　where　the　purpose　sought　to　be　realized　is　indifferent：　　but　because　I　did　not　find　anything　on　earth　which　was　wholly　superior　to　change；　and　because；　for　myself　in　particular；　I　hoped　gradually　to　perfect　my　judgments；　and　not　to　suffer　them　to　deteriorate；　I　would　have　deemed　it　a　grave　sin　against　good　sense；　if；　for　the　reason　that　I　approved　of　something　at　a　particular　time；　I　therefore　bound　myself　to　hold　it　for　good　at　a　subsequent　time；　when　perhaps　it　had　ceased　to　be　so；　or　I　had　ceased　to　esteem　it　such。

My　second　maxim　was　to　be　as　firm　and　resolute　in　my　actions　as　I　was　able；　and　not　to　adhere　less　steadfastly　to　the　most　doubtful　opinions；　when　once　adopted；　than　if　they　had　been　highly　certain；　imitating　in　this　the　example　of　travelers　who；　when　they　have　lost　their　way　in　a　forest；　ought　not　to　wander　from　side　to　side；　far　less　remain　in　one　place；　but　proceed　constantly　towards　the　same　side　in　as　straight　a　line　as　possible；　without　changing　their　direction　for　slight　reasons；　although　perhaps　it　might　be　chance　alone　which　at　first　determined　the　selection；　for　in　this　way；　if　they　do　not　exactly　reach　the　point　they　desire；　they　will　come　at　least　in　the　end　to　some　place　that　will　probably　be　preferable　to　the　middle　of　a　forest。　　In　the　same　way；　since　in　action　it　frequently　happens　that　no　delay　is　permissible；　it　is　very　certain　that；　when　it　is　not　in　our　power　to　determine　what　is　true；　we　ought　to　act　according　to　what　is　most　probable；　and　even　although　we　should　not　remark　a　greater　probability　in　one　opinion　than　in　another；　we　ought　notwithstanding　to　choose　one　or　the　other；　and　afterwards　consider　it；　in　so　far　as　it　relates　to　practice；　as　no　longer　dubious；　but　manifestly　true　and　certain；　　since　the　reason　by　which　our　choice　has　been　determined　　is　itself　possessed　of　these　qualities。　　This　principle　was　sufficient　thenceforward　to　rid　me　of　all　those　repentings　and　pangs　of　remorse　that　usually　disturb　the　consciences　of　such　feeble　and　uncertain　minds　as；　destitute　of　any　clear　and　determinate　principle　of　choice；　allow　themselves　one　day　to　adopt　a　course　of　action　as　the　best；　which　they　abandon　the　next；　as　the　opposite。

My　third　maxim　was　to　endeavor　always　to　conquer　myself　rather　than　fortune；　and　change　my　desires　rather　than　the　order　of　the　world；　and　in　general；　accustom　　myself　to　the　persuasion　that；　except　our　own　thoughts；　there　is　nothing　absolutely　in　our　power；　so　that　when　we　have　done　our　best　in　things　external　to　us；　all　wherein　we　fail　of　success　is　to　be　held；　as　regards　us；　absolutely　impossible：　　and　this　single　principle　seemed　to　me　sufficient　to　prevent　me　from　desiring　for　the　future　anything　which　I　could　not　obtain；　and　thus　render　me　contented；　for　since　our　will　naturally　seeks　th