memoirs of napoleon bonaparte, v11-第17部分

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　　　　　'Moniteur'　dictated　by　the　First　ConsulThe　Protocol　of　the
　　　　　Congress　of　ChatillonConversations　with　Davoust　at　Hamburg
　　　　　Promise　of　the　Viceroyalty　of　PolandHope　and　disappointment　of　the
　　　　　PolesInfluence　of　illusion　on　BonaparteThe　French　in　Moscow
　　　　　Disasters　of　the　retreatMallet's　conspiracyIntelligence　of　the
　　　　　affair　communicated　to　Napoleon　at　SmolenskoCircumstances　detailed
　　　　　by　RappReal　motives　of　Napoleon's　return　to　ParisMurat；　Ney；　and
　　　　　EugenePower　of　the　Italians　to　endure　coldNapoleon's　exertions
　　　　　to　repair　his　lossesDefection　of　General　YorkConvocation　of　a
　　　　　Privy　CouncilWar　resolved　onWavering　of　the　PopeUseless
　　　　　negotiations　with　ViennaMaria　Louisa　appointed　Regent。

It　may　now　he　asked　whether　Bonaparte；　previous　to　entering　upon　the　last
campaign；　had　resolved　on　restoring　Poland　to　independence。　　The　fact　is
that　Bonaparte；　as　Emperor；　never　entertained　any　positive　wish　to
reestablish　the　old　Kingdom　of　Poland；　though　at　a　previous　period　he　was
strongly　inclined　to　that　re…establishment；　of　which　he　felt　the
necessity。　　He　may　have　said　that　he　would　re…establish　the　Kingdom　of
Poland；　but　I　beg　leave　to　say　that　that　is　no　reason　for　believing　that
he　entertained　any　such　design。　　He　had　said；　and　even　sworn；　that　he
would　never　aggrandise　the　territory　of　the　Empire！　　The　changeableness
of　Bonaparte's　ideas；　plans；　and　projects　renders　it　difficult　to　master
them；　but　they　may　be　best　understood　when　it　is　considered　that　all
Napoleon's　plans　and　conceptions　varied　with　his　fortunes。　　Thus；　it　is
not　unlikely　that　he　might　at　one　time　have　considered　the
reestablishment　of　Poland　as　essential　to　European　policy；　and　afterwards
have　regarded　it　as　adverse　to　the　development　of　his　ambition。　　Who　can
venture　to　guess　what　passed　in　his　mind　when　dazzled　by　his　glory　at
Dresden；　and　whether　in　one　of　his　dreams　he　might　not　have　regarded　the
Empire　of　the　Jagellons　as　another　gem　in　the　Imperial　diadem？　　The　truth
is　that　Bonaparte；　when　General…in…Chief　of　the　army　of　Egypt　and　First
Consul；　had　deeply　at　heart　the　avenging　the　dismemberment　of　Poland；　and
I　have　often　conversed　with　him　on　this　most　interesting　subject；　upon
which　we　entirely　concurred　in　opinion。　　But　times　and　circumstances　were
changed　since　we　walked　together　on　the　terrace　of　Cairo　and　mutually
deplored　the　death　of　young　Sulkowski。　　Had　Sulkowski　lived　Napoleon's
favourable　intentions　with　respect　to　Poland　might　perhaps　have　been
confirmed。　　A　fact　which　explains　to　me　the　coolness；　I　may　almost　say
the　indifference；　of　Bonaparte　to　the　resurrection　of　Poland　is　that　the
commencement　of　the　Consulate　was　the　period　at　which　that　measure
particularly　occupied　his　attention。　　How　often　did　he　converse　on　the
subject　with　me　and　other　persons　who　may　yet　recollect　his　sentiments！
It　was　the　topic　on　which　he　most　loved　to　converse；　and　on　which　he
spoke　with　feeling　and　enthusiasm。　　In　the　'Moniteur'　of　the　period　here
alluded　to　I　could　point　out　more　than　one　article　without　signature　or
official　character　which　Napoleon　dictated　to　me；　and　the　insertion　of
which　in　that　journal；　considering　the　energy　of　certain　expressions；
sufficiently　proves　that　they　could　have　emanated　from　none　but
Bonaparte。　　It　was　usually　in　the　evening　that　he　dictated　to　me　these
articles。　　Then；　when　the　affairs　of　the　day　were　over；　he　would　launch
into　the　future；　and　give　free　scope　to　his　vast　projects。　　Some　of　these
articles　were　characterised　by　so　little　moderation　that　the　First　Consul
would　very　often　destroy　them　in　the　morning；　smiling　at　the　violent
ebullitions　of　the　preceding　night。　　At　other　times　I　took　the　liberty　of
not　sending　them　to　the　'Moniteur'　on　the　night　on　which　they　were
dictated；　and　though　he　might　earnestly　wish　their　insertion　I　adduced
reasons　good　or　bad；　to　account　for　the　delay。　　He　would　then　read　over
the　article　in　question；　and　approve　of　my　conduct；　but　he　would
sometimes　add；　〃It　is　nevertheless　true　that　with　an　independent　Kingdom
of　Poland；　and　150；000　disposable　troops　in　the　east　of　France；　I　should
always　be　master　of　Russia；　Prussia；　and　Austria。〃〃General；〃　I　would
reply；〃　I　am　entirely　of　your　opinion；　but　wherefore　awaken　the
suspicions　of　the　interested　parties。　　Leave　all　to　time　and
circumstances。〃

The　reader　may　have　to　learn；　and　not；　perhaps；　without　some　surprise；
that　in　the　protocol　of　the　sittings　of　the　Congress　of　Chatillon
Napoleon　put　forward　the　spoliation　of　Poland　by　the　three　principal
powers　allied　against　him　as　a　claim　to　a　more　advantageous　peace；　and　to
territorial　indemnities　for　France。　　In　policy　he　was　right；　but　the
report　of　foreign　cannon　was　already　loud　enough　to　drown　the　best　of
arguments。

After　the　ill…timed　and　useless　union　of　the　Hanse　Towns　to　France　I
returned　to　Hamburg　in　the　spring　of　1811　to　convey　my　family　to　France。
I　then　had　some　conversation　with　Davoust。　　On　one　occasion　I　said　to　him
that　if　his　hopes　were　realised；　and　my　sad　predictions　respecting　the
war　with　Russia　overthrown；　I　hoped　to　see　the　restoration　of　the　Kingdom
of　Poland。　　Davoust　replied　that　that　event　was　probable；　since　he　had
Napoleon's　promise　of　the　Viceroyalty　of　that　Kingdom；　and　as　several　of
his　comrades　had　been　promised　starosties。　　Davoust　made　no　secret　of
this；　and　it　was　generally　known　throughout　Hamburg　and　the　north　of
Germany。

But　notwithstanding　what　Davoust　said　respecting。　　Napoleon's　intentions
I　considered　that　these　promises　had　been　conditional　rather　than
positive。

On　Napoleon's　arrival　in　Poland　the　Diet　of　Warsaw；　assured；　as　there
seemed　reason　to　be；　of　the　Emperor's　sentiments；　declared　the　Kingdom
free　and　independent。　　The　different　treaties　of　dismemberment　were
pronounced　to　be　null；　and　certainly　the　Diet　had　a　right　so　to　act；　for
it　calculated　upon　his　support。　　But　the　address　of　the　Diet　to　Napoleon；
in　which　these　principles　were　declared；　was　ill　received。　　His　answer
was　full　of　doubt　and　indecision；　the　motive　of　which　could　not　be
blamed。　　To　secure　the　alliance　of　Austria　against　Russia　he　had　just
guaranteed　to　his　father…in…law　the　integrity　of　his　dominions。　　Napoleon
therefore　declared　that　he　could　take　no　part　in　any　movement　or
resolution　which　might　disturb　Austria　in　the　possession　of　the　Polish
provinces　forming　a　part　of　her　Empire。　　To　act　otherwise；　he　said；　would
be　to　separate　himself　from　his　alliance　with　Austria；　and　to　throw　her
into　the　arms　of　Russia。　　But　with　regard　to　the　Polish…Russian
provinces；　Napoleon　declared　he　would　see　what　he　could　do；　should
Providence　favour　the　good　cause。　　These　vague　and　obscure　expressions
did　not　define　what　he　intended　to　do　for　the　Poles　in　the　event　of
success　crowning　his　vast　enterprises。　　They　excited　the　distrust　of　the
Poles；　and　had　no　other　result。　　On　this　subject；　however；　an　observation
occurs　which　is　of　some　force　as　an　apology　for　Napoleon。　　Poland　was
successively　divided　between　three　powers；　Russia；　Austria；　and　Prussia；
with　each　of　which　Napoleon　had　been　at　war；　but　never　with　all　three　at
once。　　He　had　therefore　never　been　able　to　take　advantage　of　his
victories　to　re…establish　Poland　without　injuring　the　interests　of
neutral　powers　or　of　his　allies。　　Hence　it　may　be　concluded　not　only　that
he　never　had　the　positive　will　which　would　have　triumphed　over　all
obstacles；　but　also　that　there　never　was　a　possibility　of　realising　those
dreams　and　projects　of　revenge　in　which　he　had　indulged　on　the　banks　of
the　Nile；　as　it　were　to　console　the　departed　spirit　of　Sulkowski。

Bonaparte's　character　presents　many　unaccountable　incongruities。
Although　the　most　positive　man　that　perhaps　ever　existed；　yet　there　never
was　one　who　more　readily　yielded　to　the　charm　of　illusion。　　In　many
circumstances　the　wish　and　the　reality　were　to　him　one　and　the　same
thing。　　He　never　indulged　in　greater　illusions　than　at　the　beginning　of
the　campaign　of　Moscow。　　Even　before　the　approach　of　the　disasters　which
accompanied　the　most　fatal　retreat　recorded　in　history；　all　sensible
persons　concurred　in　the　opinion　that　the　Emperor　ought　to　have　passed
the　winter　of　1812…13　in　Poland；　and　have　resumed　his　vast　enterprises　in
the　spring。　　But　his　natural　impatience　impelled　him　forward　as　it　were
unconsciously；　and　he　seemed　to　be　under　the　influence　of　an　invisible
demon　stronger　than　even　his　own　strong　will。　　This　demon　was　ambition。
He　who　knew　so　well　the　value　of　time；　never　sufficiently　understood　its
power；　and　how　much　is　sometimes　gained　by　delay。　　Yet　Caesar's
Commentaries；　which　were　his　favourite　study；　ought　to　have　shown　him
that　Caesar　did　not　conquer　Gaul　in　one　campaign。　　Another　illusion　by
which　Napoleon　was　misled　during　the　campaign　of　Moscow；　and　perhaps　past
experience　rendered　it　very　excusable；　was　the　belief　that　the　Emperor
Alexander　would　propose　peace　when　he　saw　him　at　the　head　of　his　army　on
the　Russian　territory。　　The　prolonged　stay　of　Bonaparte　at　Moscow　can
indeed　be　accounted　for　in　no　other　way　than　by　supposing　that　he
expected　the　Russian　Cabinet　would　change　its　opinion　and　consent　to
treat　for　peace。　　However；　whatever　might　have　been　the　reason；　after　his
long　and　useless　stay　in　Moscow　Napoleon　left　that　city　with　the　design
of　taking　up　his　winter　quarters　in　Poland；　but　Fate　now　frowned　upon
Napoleon；　and　in　that　dreadful　retreat　the　elements　seemed　leagued　with
the　Russians　to　destroy　the　most　formidable　army　ever　commanded　by　one
chief。　　To　find　a　catastrophe　in　history　comparable　to　that　of　the
Beresina　we　must　go　back　to　the　destruction　of　the　legions　of　Varus。

Notwithstanding　the　general　dismay　which　prevailed　in　Paris　that　capital
continued　tranquil；　when　by　a　singular　chance；　on　the　very　day　on　which
Napoleon　evacuated　the　burning　city　of　Moscow；　Mallet　attempted　his
extraordinary　enterprise。　　This　General；　who　had　always　professed
Republican　principles；　and　was　a　man　of　bold　decided　character；　after
having　been　imprisoned　for　some　time；　obtained　the　permission　of
Government　to　live　in　Paris　in　a　hospital　house　situated　near　the
Barriere　de　Trove。　　Of　Mallet's；　cons