meditations on first philosophy-第12部分

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　is　more　powerful；　or　a　natural　light　which　is　stronger　than　that　which　I　have　received　from　Him；　since　it　is　proper　to　the　finite　understanding　not　to　comprehend　a　multitude　of　things；　and　it　is　proper　to　a　created　understanding　to　be　finite；　on　the　contrary；　I　have　every　reason　to　render　thanks　to　God　who　owes　me　nothing　and　who　has　given　me　all　the　perfections　I　possess；　and　I　should　be　far　from　charging　Him　with　injustice；　and　with　having　deprived　me　of；　or　wrongfully　withheld　from　me；　these　perfections　which　He　has　not　bestowed　upon　me。　　　　　　I　have　further　no　reason　to　complain　that　He　has　given　me　a　will　more　ample　than　my　understanding；　for　since　the　will　consists　only　of　one　single　element；　and　is　so　to　speak　indivisible；　it　appears　that　its　nature　is　such　that　nothing　can　be　abstracted　from　it　＇without　destroying　it＇；　and　certainly　the　more　comprehensive　it　is　found　to　be；　the　more　reason　I　have　to　render　gratitude　to　the　giver。　　　　　　And；　finally；　I　must　also　not　complain　that　God　concurs　with　me　in　forming　the　acts　of　the　will；　that　is　the　judgment　in　which　I　go　astray；　because　these　acts　are　entirely　true　and　good；　inasmuch　as　they　depend　on　God；　and　in　a　certain　sense　more　perfection　accrues　to　my　nature　from　the　fact　that　I　can　form　them；　than　if　I　could　not　do　so。　　As　to　the　privation　in　which　alone　the　formal　reason　of　error　or　sin　consists；　it　has　no　need　of　any　concurrence　from　God；　since　it　is　not　a　thing　＇or　an　existence＇；　and　since　it　is　not　related　to　God　as　to　a　cause；　but　should　be　termed　merely　a　negation　＇according　to　the　significance　given　to　these　words　in　the　Schools＇。　　For　in　fact　it　is　not　an　imperfection　in　God　that　He　has　given　me　the　liberty　to　give　or　withhold　my　assent　from　certain　things　as　to　which　He　has　not　placed　a　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　in　my　understanding；　but　it　is　without　doubt　an　imperfection　in　me　not　to　make　a　good　use　of　my　freedom；　and　to　give　my　judgment　readily　on　matters　which　I　only　understand　obscurely。　I　nevertheless　perceive　that　God　could　easily　have　created　me　so　that　I　never　should　err；　although　I　still　remained　free；　and　endowed　with　a　limited　knowledge；　viz。　by　giving　to　my　understanding　a　clear　and　distinct　intelligence　of　all　things　as　to　which　I　should　ever　have　to　deliberate；　or　simply　by　His　engraving　deeply　in　my　memory　the　resolution　never　to　form　a　judgment　on　anything　without　having　a　clear　and　distinct　understanding　of　it；　so　that　I　could　never　forget　it。　　And　it　is　easy　for　me　to　understand　that；　in　so　far　as　I　consider　myself　alone；　and　as　if　there　were　only　myself　in　the　world；　I　should　have　been　much　more　perfect　than　I　am；　if　God　had　created　me　so　that　I　could　never　err。　　Nevertheless　I　cannot　deny　that　in　some　sense　it　is　a　greater　perfection　in　the　whole　universe　that　certain　parts　should　not　be　exempt　from　error　as　others　are　than　that　all　parts　should　be　exactly　similar。　　And　I　have　no　right　to　complain　if　God；　having　placed　me　in　the　world；　has　not　called　upon　me　to　play　a　part　that　excels　all　others　in　distinction　and　perfection。　　　　　　And　further　I　have　reason　to　be　glad　on　the　ground　that　if　He　has　not　given　me　the　power　of　never　going　astray　by　the　first　means　pointed　out　above；　which　depends　on　a　clear　and　evident　knowledge　of　all　the　things　regarding　which　I　can　deliberate；　He　has　at　least　left　within　my　power　the　other　means；　which　is　firmly　to　adhere　to　the　resolution　never　to　give　judgment　on　matters　whose　truth　is　not　clearly　known　to　me；　for　although　I　notice　a　certain　weakness　in　my　nature　in　that　I　cannot　continually　concentrate　my　mind　on　one　single　thought；　I　can　yet；　by　attentive　and　frequently　repeated　meditation；　impress　it　so　forcibly　on　my　memory　that　I　shall　never　fail　to　recollect　it　whenever　I　have　need　of　it；　and　thus　acquire　the　habit　of　never　going　astray。　　　　　　And　inasmuch　as　it　is　in　this　that　the　greatest　and　principal　perfection　of　man　consists；　it　seems　to　me　that　I　have　not　gained　little　by　this　day's　Meditation；　since　I　have　discovered　the　source　of　falsity　and　error。　　And　certainly　there　can　be　no　other　source　than　that　which　I　have　explained；　for　as　often　as　I　so　restrain　my　will　within　the　limits　of　my　knowledge　that　it　forms　no　judgment　except　on　matters　which　are　clearly　and　distinctly　represented　to　it　by　the　understanding；　I　can　never　be　deceived；　for　every　clear　and　distinct　conception20　is　without　doubt　something；　and　hence　cannot　derive　its　origin　from　what　is　nought；　but　must　of　necessity　have　God　as　its　author￥God；　I　say；　who　being　supremely　perfect；　cannot　be　the　cause　of　any　error；　and　consequently　we　must　conclude　that　such　a　conception　＇or　such　a　judgment＇　is　true。　　Nor　have　I　only　learned　to…day　what　I　should　avoid　in　order　that　I　may　not　err；　but　also　how　I　should　act　in　order　to　arrive　at　a　knowledge　of　the　truth；　for　without　doubt　I　shall　arrive　at　this　end　if　I　devote　my　attention　sufficiently　to　those　things　which　I　perfectly　understand；　and　if　I　separate　from　these　that　which　I　only　understand　confusedly　and　with　obscurity。　　To　these　I　shall　henceforth　diligently　give　heed。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　V。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　essence　of　material　things；　and；　again；　of　God；　that　He　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　exists。

　　　　　Many　other　matters　respecting　the　attributes　of　God　and　my　own　nature　or　mind　remain　for　consideration；　but　I　shall　possibly　on　another　occasion　resume　the　investigation　of　these。　　Now　（after　first　noting　what　must　be　done　or　avoided；　in　order　to　arrive　at　a　knowledge　of　the　truth）　my　principal　task　is　to　endeavour　to　emerge　from　the　state　of　doubt　into　which　I　have　these　last　days　fallen；　and　to　see　whether　nothing　certain　can　be　known　regarding　material　things。　　　　　　But　before　examining　whether　any　such　objects　as　I　conceive　exist　outside　of　me；　I　must　consider　the　ideas　of　them　in　so　far　as　they　are　in　my　thought；　and　see　which　of　them　are　distinct　and　which　confused。　　　　　　In　the　first　place；　I　am　able　distinctly　to　imagine　that　quantity　which　philosophers　commonly　call　continuous；　or　the　extension　in　length；　breadth；　or　depth；　that　is　in　this　quantity；　or　rather　in　the　object　to　which　it　is　attributed。　Further；　I　can　number　in　it　many　different　parts；　and　attribute　to　each　of　its　parts　many　sorts　of　size；　figure；　situation　and　local　movement；　and；　finally；　I　can　assign　to　each　of　these　movements　all　degrees　of　duration。　　　　　　And　not　only　do　I　know　these　things　with　distinctness　when　I　consider　them　in　general；　but；　likewise　＇however　little　I　apply　my　attention　to　the　matter＇；　I　discover　an　infinitude　of　particulars　respecting　numbers；　figures；　movements；　and　other　such　things；　whose　truth　is　so　manifest；　and　so　well　accords　with　my　nature；　that　when　I　begin　to　discover　them；　it　seems　to　me　that　I　learn　nothing　new；　or　recollect　what　I　formerly　knew￥that　is　to　say；　that　I　for　the　first　time　perceive　things　which　were　already　present　to　my　mind；　although　I　had　not　as　yet　applied　my　mind　to　them。　　　　　　And　what　I　here　find　to　be　most　important　is　that　I　discover　in　myself　an　infinitude　of　ideas　of　certain　things　which　cannot　be　esteemed　as　pure　negations；　although　they　may　possibly　have　no　existence　outside　of　my　thought；　and　which　are　not　framed　by　me；　although　it　is　within　my　power　either　to　think　or　not　to　think　them；　but　which　possess　natures　which　are　true　and　immutable。　　For　example；　when　I　imagine　a　triangle；　although　there　may　nowhere　in　the　world　be　such　a　figure　outside　my　thought；　or　ever　have　been；　there　is　nevertheless　in　this　figure　a　certain　determinate　nature；　form；　or　essence；　which　is　immutable　and　eternal；　which　I　have　not　invented；　and　which　in　no　wise　depends　on　my　mind；　as　appears　from　the　fact　that　diverse　properties　of　that　triangle　can　be　demonstrated；　viz。　that　its　three　angles　are　equal　to　two　right　angles；　that　the　greatest　side　is　subtended　by　the　greatest　angle；　and　the　like；　which　now；　whether　I　wish　it　or　do　not　wish　it；　I　recognise　very　clearly　as　pertaining　to　it；　although　I　never　thought　of　the　matter　at　all　when　I　imagined　a　triangle　for　the　first　time；　and　which　therefore　cannot　be　said　to　have　been　invented　by　me。　　　　　　Nor　does　the　objection　hold　good　that　possibly　this　idea　of　a　triangle　has　reached　my　mind　through　the　medium　of　my　senses；　since　I　have　sometimes　seen　bodies　triangular　in　shape；　because　I　can　form　in　my　mind　an　infinitude　of　other　figures　regarding　which　we　cannot　have　the　least　conception　of　their　ever　having　been　objects　of　sense；　and　I　can　nevertheless　demonstrate　various　properties　pertaining　to　their　nature　as　well　as　to　that　of　the　triangle；　and　these　must　certainly　all　be　true　since　I　conceive　them　clearly。　Hence　they　are　something；　and　not　pure　negation；　for　it　is　perfectly　clear　that　all　that　is　true　is　something；　and　I　have　already　fully　demonstrated　that　all　that　I　know　clearly　is　true。　　And　even　although　I　had　not　demonstrated　this；　the　nature　of　my　mind　is　such　that　I　could　not　prevent　myself　from　holding　them　to　be　true　so　long　as　I　conceive　them　clearly；　and　I　recollect　that　even　when　I　was　still　strongly　attached　to　the　objects　of　sense；　I　counted　as　the　most　certain　those　truths　which　I　conceived　clearly　as　regards　figures；　numbers；　and　the　other　matters　which　pertain　to　arithmetic　and　geometry；　and；　in　general；　to　pure　and　abstract　mathematics。　　　　　　But　now；　if　just　because　I　can　draw　the　idea　of　something　from　my　thought；　it　follows　that　all　which　I　know　clearly　and　distinctly　as　pertaining　to　this　object　does　really　belong　to　it；　may　I　not　derive　from　this　an　argument　demonstrating　the　existence　of　God？　　It　is　certain　that　I　no　less　find　the　idea　of　God；　that　is　to　say；　the　idea　of　a　supremely　perfect　Being；　in　me；　than　that　of　any　figure　or　number　whatever　it　is；　and　I　do　not　know　any　less　clearly　and　distinctly　that　an　＇actual　and＇　eternal　existence　pertains　to　this　nature　than　I　know　that　all　that　which　I　am　able　to　demonstrate　of　some　figure　or　number　truly　pertains　to　the　nature　of　this　figure　or　number；　and　therefore；　although　all　that　I　concluded　in　the　preceding　Meditations　were　found　to　be　false；　the　existence　of　God　would　pass　with　me　as　at　least　as　certain　as　I　have　ever　held　the　truths　of　mathematics　（which　concern　only　numbers　and　figures）　to　be。　　　　　　This　indeed　i