three dialogues-第3部分

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secure　the　reality　of　external　things。

　　　　　。　But　what　will　you　say；　Hylas；　if　it　shall　appear
that　the　case　is　the　same　with　regard　to　all　other　sensible
qualities；　and　that　they　can　no　more　be　supposed　to　exist　without
the　mind；　than　heat　and　cold？

　　　　　。　Then　indeed　you　will　have　done　something　to　the
purpose；　but　that　is　what　I　despair　of　seeing　proved。

　　　　　。　Let　us　examine　them　in　order。　What　think　you　of
；　do　they　exist　without　the　mind；　or　no？

　　　　　。　Can　any　man　in　his　senses　doubt　whether　sugar　is
sweet；　or　wormwood　bitter？

　　　　　。　Inform　me；　Hylas。　Is　a　sweet　taste　a　particular　kind
of　pleasure　or　pleasant　sensation；　or　is　it　not？　｛180｝

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　And　is　not　bitterness　some　kind　of　uneasiness　or
pain？

　　　　　。　I　grant　it。

　　　　　。　If　therefore　sugar　and　wormwood　are　unthinking
corporeal　substances　existing　without　the　mind；　how　can　sweetness
and　bitterness；　that　is；　Pleasure　and　pain；　agree　to　them？

　　　　　。　Hold；　Philonous；　I　now　see　what　it　was　delude　time。
You　asked　whether　heat　and　cold；　sweetness　at　were　not　particular
sorts　of　pleasure　and　pain；　to　which　simply；　that　they　were。
Whereas　I　should　have　thus　distinguished：　those　qualities；　as
perceived　by　us；　are　pleasures　or　pair　existing　in　the　external
objects。　We　must　not　therefore　conclude　absolutely；　that　there　is
no　heat　in　the　fire；　or　sweetness　in　the　sugar；　but　only　that
heat　or　sweetness；　as　perceived　by　us；　are　not　in　the　fire　or
sugar。　What　say　you　to　this？

　　　　　。　I　say　it　is　nothing　to　the　purpose。　Our　discourse
proceeded　altogether　concerning　sensible　things；　which　you
defined　to　be；　。　Whatever　other　qualities；　therefore；　you　speak　of　as
distinct　from　these；　I　know　nothing　of　them；　neither　do　they　at
all　belong　to　the　point　in　dispute。　You　may；　indeed；　pretend　to
have　discovered　certain　qualities　which　you　do　not　perceive；　and
assert　those　insensible　qualities　exist　in　fire　and　sugar。　But
what　use　can　be　made　of　this　to　your　present　purpose；　I　am　at　a
loss　to　conceive。　Tell　me　then　once　more；　do　you　acknowledge　that
heat　and　cold；　sweetness　and　bitterness　（meaning　those　qualities
which　are　perceived　by　the　senses）；　do　not　exist　without　the
mind？

　　　　　。　I　see　it　is　to　no　purpose　to　hold　out；　so　I　give　up
the　cause　as　to　those　mentioned　qualities。　Though　I　profess　it
sounds　oddly；　to　say　that　sugar　is　not　sweet。

　　　　　。　But；　for　your　farther　satisfaction；　take　this　along
with　you：　that　which　at　other　times　seems　sweet；　shall；　to　a
distempered　palate；　appear　bitter。　And；　nothing　can　be　plainer
than　that　divers　persons　perceive　different　tastes　in　the　same
food；　since　that　which　one　man　delights　in；　another　abhors。　And
how　could　this　be；　if　the　taste　was　something　really　inherent　in
the　food？

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　I　know　not　how。

　　　　　。　In　the　next　place；　　are　to　be　considered。
And；　with　regard　to　these；　I　would　fain　know　whether　what　hath
｛181｝　been　said　of　tastes　doth　not　exactly　agree　to　them？　Are
they　not　so　many　pleasing　or　displeasing　sensations？

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　Can　you　then　conceive　it　possible　that　they　should
exist　in　an　unperceiving　thing？

　　　　　。　I　cannot。

　　　　　。　Or；　can　you　imagine　that　filth　and　ordure　affect
those　brute　animals　that　feed　on　them　out　of　choice；　with　the
same　smells　which　we　perceive　in　them？

　　　　　。　By　no　means。

　　　　　。　May　we　not　therefore　conclude　of　smells；　as　of　the
other　forementioned　qualities；　that　they　cannot　exist　in　any　but
a　perceiving　substance　or　mind？

　　　　　。　I　think　so。

　　　　　。　Then　as　to　；　what　must　we　think　of　them：　are
they　accidents　really　inherent　in　external　bodies；　or　not？

　　　　　。　That　they　inhere　not　in　the　sonorous　bodies　is　plain
from　hence：　because　a　bell　struck　in　the　exhausted　receiver　of　an
air…pump　sends　forth　no　sound。　The　air；　therefore；　must　be
thought　the　subject　of　sound。

　　　　　。　What　reason　is　there　for　that；　Hylas？

　　　　　。　Because；　when　any　motion　is　raised　in　the　air；　we
perceive　a　sound　greater　or　lesser；　according　to　the　air's
motion；　but　without　some　motion　in　the　air；　we　never　hear　any
sound　at　all。

　　　　　。　And　granting　that　we　never　hear　a　sound　but　when
some　motion　is　produced　in　the　air；　yet　I　do　not　see　how　you　can
infer　from　thence；　that　the　sound　itself　is　in　the　air。

　　　　　。　It　is　this　very　motion　in　the　external　air　that
produces　in　the　mind　the　sensation　of　。　For；　striking　on
the　drum　of　the　ear；　it　causeth　a　vibration；　which　by　the
auditory　nerves　being　communicated　to　the　brain；　the　soul　is
thereupon　affected　with　the　sensation　called　。

　　　　　。　What！　is　sound　then　a　sensation？

　　　　　。　I　tell　you；　as　perceived　by　us；　it　is　a　particular
sensation　in　the　mind。

　　　　　。　And　can　any　sensation　exist　without　the　mind？

　　　　　。　No；　certainly。

　　　　　。　How　then　can　sound；　being　a　sensation；　exist　in　the
air；　if　by　the　　you　mean　a　senseless　substance　existing
without　the　mind？

　　　　　。　You　must　distinguish；　Philonous；　between　sound　as　it
is　｛182｝　perceived　by　us；　and　as　it　is　in　itself；　or　（which　is
the　same　thing）　between　the　sound　we　immediately　perceive；　and
that　which　exists　without　us。　The　former；　indeed；　is　a　particular
kind　of　sensation；　but　the　latter　is　merely　a　vibrative　or
undulatory　motion　the　air。

　　　　　。　I　thought　I　had　already　obviated　that　distinction；
by　answer　I　gave　when　you　were　applying　it　in　a　like　case　before。
But；　to　say　no　more　of　that；　are　you　sure　then　that　sound　is
really　nothing　but　motion？

　　　　　。　I　am。

　　　　　。　Whatever　therefore　agrees　to　real　sound；　may　with
truth　be　attributed　to　motion？

　　　　　。　It　may。

　　　　　。　It　is　then　good　sense　to　speak　of　　as　of　a
thing　that　is　；　；　；　。

　　　　　。　　see　you　are　resolved　not　to　understand　me。　Is　it
not　evident　those　accidents　or　modes　belong　only　to　sensible
sound；　or　　the　common　acceptation　of　the　word；　but　not
to　　in　the　real　and　philosophic　sense；　which；　as　I　just
now　told　you；　is　nothing　but　a　certain　motion　of　the　air？

　　　　　。　It　seems　then　there　are　two　sorts　of　sound　　the
one　vulgar；　or　that　which　is　heard；　the　other　philosophical　and
real？

　　　　　。　Even　so。

　　　　　。　And　the　latter　consists　in　motion？

　　　　　。　I　told　you　so　before。

　　　　　。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　to　which　of　the　senses；　think　you；
the　idea　of　motion　belongs？　to　the　hearing？

　　　　　。　No；　certainly；　but　to　the　sight　and　touch。

　　　　　。　It　should　follow　then；　that；　according　to　you；　real
sounds　may　possibly　be　；　but　never　。

　　　　　。　Look　you；　Philonous；　you　may；　if　you　please；　make　a
jest　of　my　opinion；　but　that　will　not　alter　the　truth　of　things。
I　own；　indeed；　the　inferences　you　draw　me　into　sound　something
oddly；　but　common　language；　you　know；　is　framed　by；　and　for　the
use　of　the　vulgar：　we　must　not　therefore　wonder　if　expressions
adapted　to　exact　philosophic　notions　seem　uncouth　and　out　of　the
way。

　　　　　。　Is　it　come　to　that？　I　assure　you；　I　imagine　myself
to　have　gained　no　small　point；　since　you　make　so　light　of
departing　from　common　phrases　and　opinions；　it　being　a　main　part
of　our　inquiry；　to　examine　whose　notions　are　widest　of　the　｛183｝
common　road；　and　most　repugnant　to　the　general　sense　of　the
world。　But；　can　you　think　it　no　more　than　a　philosophical
paradox；　to　say　that　；　and　that　the
idea　of　them　is　obtained　by　some　other　sense？　And　is　there
nothing　in　this　contrary　to　nature　and　the　truth　of　things？

　　　　　。　To　deal　ingenuously；　I　do　not　like　it。　And；　after　the
concessions　already　made；　I　had　as　well　grant　that　sounds　too
have　no　real　being　without　the　mind。

　　　　　。　And　I　hope　you　will　make　no　difficulty　to
acknowledge　the　same　of　。

　　　　　。　Pardon　me：　the　case　of　colours　is　very　different。　Can
anything　be　plainer　than　that　we　see　them　on　the　objects？

　　　　　。　The　objects　you　speak　of　are；　I　suppose；　corporeal
Substances　existing　without　the　mind？

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　And　have　true　and　real　colours　inhering　in　them？

　　　　　。　Each　visible　object　hath　that　colour　which　we　see　in
it。

　　　　　。　How！　is　there　anything　visible　but　what　we　perceive
by　sight？

　　　　　。　There　is　not。

　　　　　。　And；　do　we　perceive　anything　by　sense　which　we　do
not　perceive　immediately？

　　　　　。　How　often　must　I　be　obliged　to　repeat　the　same　thing？
I　tell　you；　we　do　not。

　　　　　。　Have　patience；　good　Hylas；　and　tell　me　once　more；
whether　there　is　anything　immediately　perceived　by　the　senses；
except　sensible　qualities。　I　know　you　asserted　there　was　not；　but
I　would　now　be　informed；　whether　you　still　persist　in　the　same
opinion。

　　　　　。　I　do。

　　　　　。　Pray；　is　your　corporeal　substance　either　a　sensible
quality；　or　made　up　of　sensible　qualities？

　　　　　。　What　a　question　that　is！　who　ever　thought　it　was？

　　　　　。　My　reason　for　asking　was；　because　in　saying；　；　you　make
visible　objects　to　be　corporeal　substances；　which　implies　either
that　corporeal　substances　are　sensible　qualities；　or　else　that
there　is　something　besides　sensible　qualities　perceived　by　sight：
but；　as　this　point　was　formerly　agreed　between　us；　and　is　still
maintained　by　you；　it　is　a　clear　consequence；　that　your
　is　nothing　distinct　from　。　｛184｝

　　　　　。　You　may　draw　as　many　absurd　consequences　as　you
please；　and　endeavour　to　perplex　the　plainest　things；　but　you
shall　never　persuade　me　out　of　my　senses。　I　clearly　understand　my
own　meaning。

　　　　　。　I　wish　you　would　make　me　understand　it　too。　But；
since　you　are　unwilling　to　have　your　notion　of　corporeal
substance　examined；　I　shall　urge　that　point　no　farther。　Only　be
pleased　to　let　me　know；　whether　the　same　colours　which　we　see
exist　in　external　bodies；　or