gorgias-第8部分

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　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　now　injustice　and　all　evil　in　the　soul　has　been　admitted　by　to　be　most　disgraceful？　　　Pol。　It　has　been　admitted。　　　Soc。　And　most　disgraceful　either　because　most　painful　and　causing　excessive　pain；　or　most　hurtful；　or　both？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　therefore　to　be　unjust　and　intemperate；　and　cowardly　and　ignorant；　is　more　painful　than　to　be　poor　and　sick？　　　Pol。　Nay；　Socrates；　the　painfulness　does　not　appear　to　me　to　follow　from　your　premises。　　　Soc。　Then；　if；　as　you　would　argue；　not　more　painful；　the　evil　of　the　soul　is　of　all　evils　the　most　disgraceful；　and　the　excess　of　disgrace　must　be　caused　by　some　preternatural　greatness；　or　extraordinary　hurtfulness　of　the　evil。　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　And　that　which　exceeds　most　in　hurtfulness　will　be　the　greatest　of　evils？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　injustice　and　intemperance；　and　in　general　the　depravity　of　the　soul；　are　the　greatest　of　evils！　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　Now；　what　art　is　there　which　delivers　us　from　poverty？　Does　not　the　art　of　making　money？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　what　art　frees　us　from　disease？　Does　not　the　art　of　medicine？　　　Pol。　Very　true。　　　Soc。　And　what　from　vice　and　injustice？　If　you　are　not　able　to　answer　at　once；　ask　yourself　whither　we　go　with　the　sick；　and　to　whom　we　take　them。　　　Pol。　To　the　physicians；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　And　to　whom　do　we　go　with　the　unjust　and　intemperate？　　　Pol。　To　the　judges；　you　mean。　　　Soc。　…Who　are　to　punish　them？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　do　not　those　who　rightly　punish　others；　punish　them　in　accordance　with　a　certain　rule　of　justice？　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　Then　the　art　of　money…making　frees　a　man　from　poverty；　medicine　from　disease；　and　justice　from　intemperance　and　injustice？　　　Pol。　That　is　evident。　　　Soc。　Which；　then；　is　the　best　of　these　three？　　　Pol。　Will　you　enumerate　them？　　　Soc。　Money…making；　medicine；　and　justice。　　　Pol。　Justice；　Socrates；　far　excels　the　two　others。　　　Soc。　And　justice；　if　the　best；　gives　the　greatest　pleasure　or　advantage　or　both？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　is　the　being　healed　a　pleasant　thing；　and　are　those　who　are　being　healed　pleased？　　　Pol。　I　think　not。　　　Soc。　A　useful　thing；　then？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Yes；　because　the　patient　is　delivered　from　a　great　evil；　and　this　is　the　advantage　of　enduring　the　pain…that　you　get　well？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　would　he　be　the　happier　man　in　his　bodily　condition；　who　is　healed；　or　who　never　was　out　of　health？　　　Pol。　Clearly　he　who　was　never　out　of　health。　　　Soc。　Yes；　for　happiness　surely　does　not　consist　in　being　delivered　from　evils；　but　in　never　having　had　them。　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　suppose　the　case　of　two　persons　who　have　some　evil　in　their　bodies；　and　that　one　of　them　is　healed　and　delivered　from　evil；　and　another　is　not　healed；　but　retains　the　evil…which　of　them　is　the　most　miserable？　　　Pol。　Clearly　he　who　is　not　healed。　　　Soc。　And　was　not　punishment　said　by　us　to　be　a　deliverance　from　the　greatest　of　evils；　which　is　vice？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　justice　punishes　us；　and　makes　us　more　just；　and　is　the　medicine　of　our　vice？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　He；　then；　has　the　first　place　in　the　scale　of　happiness　who　has　never　had　vice　in　his　soul；　for　this　has　been　shown　to　be　the　greatest　of　evils。　　　Pol。　Clearly。　　　Soc。　And　he　has　the　second　place；　who　is　delivered　from　vice？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　That　is　to　say；　he　who　receives　admonition　and　rebuke　and　punishment？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　Then　he　lives　worst；　who；　having　been　unjust；　has　no　deliverance　from　injustice？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　That　is；　he　lives　worst　who　commits　the　greatest　crimes；　and　who；　being　the　most　unjust　of　men；　succeeds　in　escaping　rebuke　or　correction　or　punishment；　and　this；　as　you　say；　has　been　accomplished　by　Archelaus　and　other　tyrants　and　rhetoricians　and　potentates？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　May　not　their　way　of　proceeding；　my　friend；　be　compared　to　the　conduct　of　a　person　who　is　afflicted　with　the　worst　of　diseases　and　yet　contrives　not　to　pay　the　penalty　to　the　physician　for　his　sins　against　his　constitution；　and　will　not　be　cured；　because；　like　a　child；　he　is　afraid　of　the　pain　of　being　burned　or　cut：…Is　not　that　a　parallel　case？　　　Pol。　Yes；　truly。　　　Soc。　He　would　seem　as　if　he　did　not　know　the　nature　of　health　and　bodily　vigour；　and　if　we　are　right；　Polus；　in　our　previous　conclusions；　they　are　in　a　like　case　who　strive　to　evade　justice；　which　they　see　to　be　painful；　but　are　blind　to　the　advantage　which　ensues　from　it；　not　knowing　how　far　more　miserable　a　companion　a　diseased　soul　is　than　a　diseased　body；　a　soul；　I　say；　which　is　corrupt　and　unrighteous　and　unholy。　And　hence　they　do　all　that　they　can　to　avoid　punishment　and　to　avoid　being　released　from　the　greatest　of　evils；　they　provide　themselves　with　money　and　friends；　and　cultivate　to　the　utmost　their　powers　of　persuasion。　But　if　we；　Polus；　are　right；　do　you　see　what　follows；　or　shall　we　draw　out　the　consequences　in　form？　　　Pol。　If　you　please。　　　Soc。　Is　it　not　a　fact　that　injustice；　and　the　doing　of　injustice；　is　the　greatest　of　evils？　　　Pol。　That　is　quite　clear。　　　Soc。　And　further；　that　to　suffer　punishment　is　the　way　to　be　released　from　this　evil？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　not　to　suffer；　is　to　perpetuate　the　evil？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　To　do　wrong；　then；　is　second　only　in　the　scale　of　evils；　but　to　do　wrong　and　not　to　be　punished；　is　first　and　greatest　of　all？　　　Pol。　That　is　true。　　　Soc。　Well；　and　was　not　this　the　point　in　dispute；　my　friend？　You　deemed　Archelaus　happy；　because　he　was　a　very　great　criminal　and　unpunished：　I；　on　the　other　hand；　maintained　that　he　or　any　other　who　like　him　has　done　wrong　and　has　not　been　punished；　is；　and　ought　to　be；　the　most　miserable　of　all　men；　and　that　the　doer　of　injustice　is　more　miserable　than　the　sufferer；　and　he　who　escapes　punishment；　more　miserable　than　he　who　suffers。…Was　not　that　what　I　said？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　it　has　been　proved　to　be　true？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Well；　Polus；　but　if　this　is　true；　where　is　the　great　use　of　rhetoric？　If　we　admit　what　has　been　just　now　said；　every　man　ought　in　every　way　to　guard　himself　against　doing　wrong；　for　he　will　thereby　suffer　great　evil？　　　Pol。　True。　　　Soc。　And　if　he；　or　any　one　about　whom　he　cares；　does　wrong；　he　ought　of　his　own　accord　to　go　where　he　will　be　immediately　punished；　he　will　run　to　the　judge；　as　he　would　to　the　physician；　in　order　that　the　disease　of　injustice　may　not　be　rendered　chronic　and　become　the　incurable　cancer　of　the　soul；　must　we　not　allow　this　consequence；　Polus；　if　our　former　admissions　are　to　stand：…is　any　other　inference　consistent　with　them？　　　Pol。　To　that；　Socrates；　there　can　be　but　one　answer。　　　Soc。　Then　rhetoric　is　of　no　use　to　us；　Polus；　in　helping　a　man　to　excuse　his　own　injustice；　that　of　his　parents　or　friends；　or　children　or　country；　but　may　be　of　use　to　any　one　who　holds　that　instead　of　excusing　he　ought　to　accuse…himself　above　all；　and　in　the　next　degree　his　family　or　any　of　his　friends　who　may　be　doing　wrong；　he　should　bring　to　light　the　iniquity　and　not　conceal　it；　that　so　the　wrong…doer　may　suffer　and　be　made　whole；　and　he　should　even　force　himself　and　others　not　to　shrink；　but　with　closed　eyes　like　brave　men　to　let　the　physician　operate　with　knife　or　searing　iron；　not　regarding　the　pain；　in　the　hope　of　attaining　the　good　and　the　honourable；　let　him　who　has　done　things　worthy　of　stripes；　allow　himself　to　be　scourged；　if　of　bonds；　to　be　bound；　if　of　a　fine；　to　be　fined；　if　of　exile；　to　be　exiled；　if　of　death；　to　die；　himself　being　the　first　to　accuse　himself　and　his　relations；　and　using　rhetoric　to　this　end；　that　his　and　their　unjust　actions　may　be　made　manifest；　and　that　they　themselves　may　be　delivered　from　injustice；　which　is　the　greatest　evil。　Then；　Polus；　rhetoric　would　indeed　be　useful。　Do　you　say　〃Yes〃　or　〃No〃　to　that？　　　Pol。　To　me；　Socrates；　what　you　are　saying　appears　very　strange；　though　probably　in　agreement　with　your　premises。　　　Soc。　Is　not　this　the　conclusion；　if　the　premises　are　not　disproven？　　　Pol。　Yes；　it　certainly　is。　　　Soc。　And　from　the　opposite　point　of　view；　if　indeed　it　be　our　duty　to　harm　another；　whether　an　enemy　or　not…I　except　the　case　of　self…defence…then　I　have　to　be　upon　my　guard…but　if　my　enemy　injures　a　third　person；　then　in　every　sort　of　way；　by　word　as　well　as　deed；　I　should　try　to　prevent　his　being　punished；　or　appearing　before　the　judge；　and　if　he　appears；　I　should　contrive　that　he　should　escape；　and　not　suffer　punishment：　if　he　has　stolen　a　sum　of　money；　let　him　keep　what　he　has　stolen　and　spend　it　on　him　and　his；　regardless　of　religion　and　justice；　and　if　he　has　done　things　worthy　of　death；　let　him　not　die；　but　rather　be　immortal　in　his　wickedness；　or；　if　this　is　not　possible；　let　him　at　any　rate　be　allowed　to　live　as　long　as　he　can。　For　such　purposes；　Polus；　rhetoric　may　be　useful；　but　is　of　small　if　of　any　use　to　him　who　is　not　intending　to　commit　injustice；　at　least；　there　was　no　such　use　discovered　by　us　in　the　previous　discussion。　　　Cal。　Tell　me；　Chaerephon；　is　Socrates　in　earnest；　or　is　he　joking？　　　Chaer。　I　should　say；　Callicles；　that　he　is　in　most　profound　earnest；　but　you　may　well　ask　him　　　Cal。　By　the　gods；　and　I　will。　Tell　me；　Socrates；　are　you　in　earnest；　or　only　in　jest？　For　if　you　are　in　earnest；　and　what　you　say　is　true；　is　not　the　whole　of　human　life　turned　upside　down；　and　are　we　not　doing；　as　would　appear；　in　everything　the　opposite　of　what　we　ought　to　be　doing？　　　Soc。　O　Callicles；　if　there　were　not　some　community　of　feelings　among　mankind；　however　varying　in　different　persons…I　mean　to　say；　if　every　man's　feelings　were　peculiar　to　himself　and　were　not　shared　by　the　rest　of　his　species…I　do　not　see　how　we　could　ever　communicate　our　impressions　to　one　another。　I　make　this　remark　because　I　perceive　that　you　and　I　have　a　common　feeling。　For　we　are　lovers　both；　and　both　of　us　have　two　loves　apiece：…I　am　the　lover　of　Alcibiades；　the　son　of　Cleinias…I　and　of　philosophy；　and　you　of　the　Athenian　Demus；　and　of　Demus　the　son　of　Pyrilampes。　Now；　I　observe　that　you；　with　all　your　cleverness；　do　not　venture　to　contradict　your　favourite　in　any　word　or　opinion　of　his；　but　as　he　changes　you　change；　backwards　and　forwards。　When　the　Athenian　Demus　denies　anything　that　you　are　saying　in　the　assembly；　you　go　over　to　his　opinion；　and　you　do　the　same　with　Demus；　the　fair　youn