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method；　all　of　positive　affirmation；　without　disclosing　the　true
motives　and　proofs　of　their　opinions；　or　free　confessing　their
ignorance　or　doubts；　except　it　be　now　and　then　for　a　grace；　and　in
cunning　to　win　the　more　credit　in　the　rest；　and　not　in　good　faith。
That　although　men　be　free　from　these　errors　and　incumbrances　in　the
will　and　affection；　yet　it　is　not　a　thing　so　easy　as　is　conceived　to
convey　the　conceit　of　one　man's　mind　into　the　mind　of　another　without
loss　or　mistaking；　specially　in　notions　new　and　differing　from　those
that　are　received。　　That　never　any　knowledge　was　delivered　in　the
same　order　it　was　invented；　no　not　in　the　mathematic；　though　it
should　seem　otherwise　in　regard　that　the　propositions　placed　last　do
use　the　propositions　or　grants　placed　first　for　their　proof　and
demonstration。　　That　there　are　forms　and　methods　of　tradition　wholly
distinct　and　differing；　according　to　their　ends　whereto　they　are
directed。　　That　there　are　two　ends　of　tradition　of　knowledge；　the　one
to　teach　and　instruct　for　use　and　practice；　the　other　to　impart　or
intimate　for　re…examination　and　progression。　　That　the　former　of
these　ends　requireth　a　method　not　the　same　whereby　it　was　invented
and　induced；　but　such　as　is　most　compendious　and　ready　whereby　it　may
be　used　and　applied。　　That　the　latter　of　the　ends；　which　is　where　a
knowledge　is　delivered　to　be　continued　and　spun　on　by　a　succession　of
labours；　requireth　a　method　whereby　it　may　be　transposed　to　another
in　the　same　manner　as　it　was　collected；　to　the　end　it　may　be
discerned　both　where　the　work　is　weak；　and　where　it　breaketh　off。
That　this　latter　method　is　not　only　unfit　for　the　former　end；　but
also　impossible　for　all　knowledge　gathered　and　insinuated　by
Anticipations；　because　the　mind　working　inwardly　of　itself；　no　man
can　give　a　just　account　how　he　came　to　that　knowledge　which　he　hath
received；　and　that　therefore　this　method　is　peculiar　for　knowledge
gathered　by　interpretation。　　That　the　discretion　anciently　observed；
though　by　the　precedent　of　many　vain　persons　and　deceivers　disgraced；
of　publishing　part；　and　reserving　part　to　a　private　succession；　and
of　publishing　in　a　manner　whereby　it　shall　not　be　to　the　capacity　nor
taste　of　all；　but　shall　as　it　were　single　and　adopt　his　reader；　is
not　to　be　laid　aside；　both　for　the　avoiding　of　abuse　in　the　excluded；
and　the　stregthening　of　affection　in　the　admitted。　　That　there　are
other　virtues　of　tradition；　as　that　there　be　no　occasion　given　to
error；　and　that　it　carry　a　vigour　to　root　and　spread　against　the
vanity　of　wits　and　injuries　of　time；　all　which　if　they　were　ever　due
to　any　knowledge　delivered；　or　if　they　were　never　due　to　any　human
knowledge　heretofore　delivered；　yet　are　now　due　to　the　knowledge
propounded。




CAP。　19。


Of　the　impediments　which　have　been　in　the　affections；　the　principle
whereof　hath　been　despair　or　diffidence；　and　the　strong　apprehension
of　the　difficulty；　obscurity；　and　infiniteness　which　belongeth　to　the
invention　of　knowledge；　and　that　men　have　not　known　their　own
strength；　and　that　the　supposed　difficulties　and　vastness　of　the　work
is　rather　in　shew　and　muster　than　in　state　or　substance　where　the
true　way　is　taken。　　That　this　diffidence　hath　moved　and　caused　some
never　to　enter　into　search；　and　others　when　they　have　been　entered
either　to　give　over　or　to　seek　a　more　compendious　course　than　can
stand　with　the　nature　of　true　search。　　That　of　those　that　have
refused　and　prejudged　inquiry；　the　more　sober　and　grave　sort　of　wits
have　depended　upon　authors　and　traditions；　and　the　more　vain　and
credulous　resorted　to　revelation　and　intelligence　with　spirits　and
higher　natures。　　That　of　those　that　have　entered　into　search；　some
having　fallen　upon　some　conceits　which　they　after　consider　to　be　the
same　which　they　have　found　in　former　authors；　have　suddenly　taken　a
persuasion　that　a　man　shall　but　with　much　labour　incur　and　light　upon
the　same　inventions　which　he　might　with　ease　receive　from　others；　and
that　it　is　but　a　vanity　and　self…pleasing　of　the　wit　to　go　about
again；　as　one　that　would　rather　have　a　flower　of　his　own　gathering；
than　much　better　gathered　to　his　hand。　　That　the　same　humour　of　sloth
and　diffidence　suggesteth　that　a　man　shall　but　revive　some　ancient
opinion；　which　was　long　ago　propounded；　examined；　and　rejected。　　And
that　it　is　easy　to　err　in　conceit　that　a　man's　observation　or　notion
is　the　same　with　a　former　opinion；　both　because　new　conceits　must　of
necessity　be　uttered　in　old　words；　and　because　upon　true　and
erroneous　grounds　men　may　meet　in　consequence　or　conclusion；　as
several　lines　or　circles　that　cut　in　some　one　point。　　That　the
greatest　part　of　those　that　have　descended　into　search　have　chosen
for　the　most　artificial　and　compendious　course　to　induce　principles
out　of　particulars；　and　to　reduce　all　other　propositions　unto
principles；　and　so　instead　of　the　nearest　way；　have　been　led　to　no
way　or　a　mere　labyrinth。　　That　the　two　contemplative　ways　have　some
resemblance　with　the　old　parable　of　the　two　moral　ways；　the　one
beginning　with　incertainty　and　difficulty；　and　ending　in　plainness
and　certainty；　and　the　other　beginning　with　shew　of　plainness　and
certainty；　and　ending　in　difficulty　and　incertainty。　　Of　the　great
and　manifest　error　and　untrue　conceit　or　estimation　of　the
infiniteness　of　particulars；　whereas　indeed　all　prolixity　is　in
discourse　and　derivations；　and　of　the　infinite　and　most　laborious
expense　of　wit　that　hath　been　employed　upon　toys　and　matters　of　no
fruit　or　value。　　That　although　the　period　of　one　age　cannot　advance
men　to　the　furthest　point　of　interpretation　of　nature；　（except　the
work　should　be　undertaken　with　greater　helps　than　can　be　expected）；
yet　it　cannot　fail　in　much　less　space　of　time　to　make　return　of　many
singular　commodities　towards　the　state　and　occasions　of　man's　life。
That　there　is　less　reason　of　distrust　in　the　course　of　interpretation
now　propounded　than　in　any　knowledge　formerly　delivered；　because　this
course　doth　in　sort　equal　men's　wits；　and　leaveth　no　great　advantage
or　preeminence　to　the　perfect　and　excellent　motions　of　the　spirit。
That　to　draw　a　straight　line　or　to　make　a　circle　perfect　round　by　aim
of　hand　only；　there　must　be　a　great　difference　between　an　unsteady
and　unpractised　hand　and　a　steady　and　practised；　but　to　do　it　by　rule
or　compass　it　is　much　alike。




CAP。　21。


Of　the　impediments　which　have　been　in　the　two　extreme　humours　of
admiration　of　antiquity　and　love　of　novelty；　and　again　of
over…servile　reverence　or　over…light　scorn　of　the　opinions　of　others。




CAP。　22。


Of　the　impediments　which　have　been　in　the　affection　of　pride；
specially　of　one　kind；　which　is　the　disdain　of　dwelling　and　being
conversant　much　in　experiences　and　particulars；　specially　such　as　are
vulgar　in　occurrency；　and　base　and　ignoble　in　use。　　That　besides
certain　higher　mysteries　of　pride；　generalities　seem　to　have　a
dignity　and　solemnity；　in　that　they　do　not　put　men　in　mind　of　their
familiar　actions；　in　that　they　have　less　affinity　with　arts
mechanical　and　illiberal；　in　that　they　are　not　so　subject　to　be
controlled　by　persons　of　mean　observation；　in　that　they　seem　to　teach
men　that　they　know　not；　and　not　to　refer　them　to　that　they　know。　　All
which　conditions　directly　feeding　the　humour　of　pride；　particulars　do
want。　　That　the　majesty　of　generalities；　and　the　divine　nature　of　the
mind　in　taking　them　（if　they　be　truly　collected；　and　be　indeed　the
direct　reflexions　of　things；）　cannot　be　too　much　magnified。　　And　that
it　is　true　that　interpretation　is　the　very　natural　and　direct
intention；　action；　and　progression　of　the　understanding　delivered
from　impediments。　　And　that　all　Anticipation　is　but　a　deflexion　or
declination　by　accident。




CAP。　25。


Of　the　impediments　which　have　been　in　the　state　of　heathen　religion
and　other　superstitions　and　errors　of　religion。　　And　that　in　the　true
religion　there　hath　not　nor　is　any　impediment；　except　it　be　by
accident　or　intermixture　of　humour。　　That　a　religion　which　consisteth
in　rites　and　forms　of　adoration；　and　not　in　confessions　and　beliefs；
is　adverse　to　knowledge；　because　men　having　liberty　to　inquire　and
discourse　of　Theology　at　pleasure；　it　cometh　to　pass　that　all
inquisition　of　nature　endeth　and　limiteth　itself　in　such　metaphysical
or　theological　discourse；　whereas　if　men's　wits　be　shut　out　of　that
port；　it　turneth　them　again　to　discover；　and　so　to　seek　reason　of
reason　more　deeply。　　And　that　such　was　the　religion　of　the　Heathen。
That　a　religion　that　is　jealous　of　the　variety　of　learning；　discourse；
opinions；　and　sects；　（as　misdoubting　it　may　shake　the　foundations；）
or　that　cherisheth　devotion　upon　simplicity　and　ignorance；　as
ascribing　ordinary　effects　to　the　immediate　working　of　God；　is
adverse　to　knowledge。　　That　such　is　the　religion　of　the　Turk；　and
such　hath　been　the　abuse　of　Christian　religion　at　some　several　times；
and　in　some　several　factions。　　And　of　the　singular　advantage　which
the　Christian　religion　hath　towards　the　furtherance　of　true　knowledge；
in　that　it　excludeth　and　interdicteth　human　reason；　whether　by
interpretation　or　anticipation；　from　examining　or　discussing　of　the
mysteries　and　principles　of　faith。




CAP。　26。


Of　the　impediments　which　have　been　in　the　nature　of　society　and　the
policies　of　state。　　That　there　is　no　composition　of　estate　or　society；
nor　order　or　quality　of　persons；　which　have　not　some　point　of
contrariety　towards　true　knowledge。　　That　monarchies　incline　wits　to
profit　and　pleasure；　and　commonwealths　to　glory　and　vanity。　　That
universities　incline　wits　to　sophistry　and　affectation；　cloisters　to
fables　and　unprofitable　subtilty；　study　at　large　to　variety；　and　that
it　is　hard　to　say；　whether　mixture　of　contemplations　with　an　active
life；　or　retiring　wholly　to　contemplations；　do　disable　and　hinder　the
mind　more。




（Back　Cover。）


Philosophy。
Line　1：　see　commentary
Line　2：　libri　dimidium　est；　pagina　34
Line　3：　pagellarum　numeri　veri



Writing　on　the　Back　Cover　of　VALERIUS　TERMINUS


The　writing　in　the　original　is　on　the　outside　of　the　last　leaf；　which
is　in　fact　the　cover。　　The　front　cover；　if　there　ever　wa