the ethics(part v)-第2部分

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Proof。…　That；　which　constitutes　the　reality　of　love　or　hatred；　is　pleasure



or　pain；　accompanied　by　the　idea　of　an　external　cause　（Def。　of　the



Emotions：vi。；&vii。）；　wherefore；　when　this　cause　is　removed；　the　reality　of



love　or　hatred　is　removed　with　it；　therefore　these　emotions　and　those



which　arise　therefrom　are　destroyed。　Q。E。D。











Prop。III。　An　emotion；　which　is　a　passion；　ceases　to　be　a



passion；　as　soon　as　we　form　a　clear　and　distinct　idea　thereof。







Proof。…　An　emotion；　which　is　a　passion；　is　a　confused　idea　（by　the　general



Def。　of　the　Emotions）。　If；　therefore；　we　form　a　clear　and　distinct　idea　of　a



given　emotion；　that　idea　will　only　be　distinguished　from　the　emotion；　in　so



far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　mind　only；　by　reason　（II：xxi。；&Note）；　therefore



（III：iii。）；　the　emotion　will　cease　to　be　a　passion。　Q。E。D。







Corollary。…　An　emotion　therefore　becomes　more　under　our　control；　and　the



mind　is　less　passive　in　respect　to　it；　in　proportion　as　it　is　more　known　to



us。











Prop。IV。　There　is　no　modification　of　the　body；　whereof　we



cannot　form　some　clear　and　distinct　conception。







Proof。…　Properties　which　are　common　to　all　things　can　only　be　conceived



adequately　（II：xxxviii。）；　therefore　（II：xii。and　Lemma。　ii。　after　II：xiii。）



there　is　no　modification　of　the　body；　whereof　we　cannot　form　some　clear　and



distinct　conception。　Q。E。D。







Corollary。…　Hence　it　follows　that　there　is　no　emotion；　whereof　we　cannot



form　some　clear　and　distinct　conception。　For　an　emotion　is　the　idea　of　a



modification　of　the　body　（by　the　general　Def。　of　the　Emotions）；　and　must



therefore　（by　the　preceding　Prop。）　involve　some　clear　and　distinct



conception。







Note。…　Seeing　that　there　is　nothing　which　is　not　followed　　by　an　effect



（I：xxxvi。）；　and　that　we　clearly　and　distinctly　understand　whatever



follows　from　an　idea；　which　in　us　is　adequate　（II：xl。）；　it　follows　that



everyone　has　the　power　of　clearly　and　distinctly　understanding　himself　and



his　emotions；　if　not　absolutely；　at　any　rate　in　part；　and　consequently　of



bringing　it　about；　that　he　should　become　less　subject　to　them。　To　attain



this　result；　therefore；　we　must　chiefly　direct　our　efforts　to　acquiring；　as



far　as　possible；　a　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　of　every　emotion；　in　order



that　the　mind　may　thus；　through　emotion；　be　determined　to　think　of　those



things　which　it　clearly　and　distinctly　perceives；　and　wherein　it　fully



acquiesces：　and　thus　that　the　emotion　itself　may　be　separated　from　the



thought　of　an　external　cause；　and　may　be　associated　with　true　thoughts；



whence　it　will　come　to　pass；　not　only　that　love；　hatred；　&c。　will　be



destroyed　（V：ii。）；　but　also　that　the　appetites　or　desires；　which　are　wont　to



arise　from　such　emotion；　will　become　incapable　of　being　excessive　（IV：lxi。）。



For　it　must　be　especially　remarked；　that　the　appetite　through　which　a　man　is



said　to　be　active；　and　that　through　which　he　is　said　to　be　passive　is　one



and　the　same。　For　instance；　we　have　shown　that　human　nature　is　so



constituted；　that　everyone　desires　his　fellow…men　to　live　after　his　own



fashion　（III：xxxi。Note）；　in　a　man；　who　is　not　guided　by　reason；　this



appetite　is　a　passion　which　is　called　ambition；　and　does　not　greatly　differ



from　pride；　whereas　in　a　man；　who　lives　by　the　dictates　of　reason；　it　is　an



activity　or　virtue　which　is　called　piety　（IV：xxxvii。Note。i。　and　second



proof）。　In　like　manner　all　appetites　or　desires　are　only　passions；　in　so　far



as　they　spring　from　inadequate　ideas；　the　same　results　are　accredited　to



virtue；　when　they　are　aroused　or　generated　by　adequate　ideas。　For　all



desires；　whereby　we　are　determined　to　any　given　action；　may　arise　as　much



from　adequate　as　from　inadequate　ideas　（IV：lix。）。　Than　this　remedy　for　the



emotions　（to　return　to　the　point　from　which　I　started）；　which　consists　in　a



true　knowledge　thereof；　nothing　more　excellent；　being　within　our　power；　can



be　devised。　For　the　mind　has　no　other　power　save　that　of　thinking　and　of



forming；　adequate　ideas；　as　we　have　shown　above　（III：iii。）。











Prop。V。　An　emotion　towards　a　thing；　which　we　conceive



simply；　and　not　as　necessary；　or　as　contingent；　or　as　possible；　is；



other　conditions　being　equal；　greater　than　any　other　emotion。







Proof。…　An　emotion　towards　a　thing；　which　we　conceive　to　be　free；　is　greater



than　one　towards　what　we　conceive　to　be　necessary　（III：xlix。）；　and；



consequently；　still　greater　than　one　towards　what　we　conceive　as　possible；



or　contingent　（IV：xi。）。　But　to　conceive　a　thing　as　free　can　be　nothing　else



than　to　conceive　it　simply；　while　we　are　in　ignorance　of　the　causes　whereby



it　has　been　determined　to　action　（II：xxxv。Note）；　therefore；　an　emotion



towards　a　thing　which　we　conceive　simply　is；　other　conditions　being　equal；



greater　than　one；　which　we　feel　towards　what　is　necessary；　possible；　or



contingent；　and；　consequently；　it　is　the　greatest　of　all。　Q。E。D。











Prop。VI。　The　mind　has　greater　power　over　the　emotions　and　is



less　subject　thereto；　in　so　far　as　it　understands　all　things　as



necessary。







Proof。…　The　mind　understands　all　things　to　be　necessary　（I：xxix。）　and　to　be



determined　to　existence　and　operation　by　an　infinite　chain　of　causes；



therefore　（by　the　foregoing　Proposition）；　it　thus　far　brings　it　about；　that



it　is　less　subject　to　the　emotions　arising　therefrom；　and　（III：xlviii。）



feels　less　emotion　towards　the　things　themselves。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　The　more　this　knowledge；　that　things　are　necessary；　is　applied　to



particular　things；　which　we　conceive　more　distinctly　and　vividly；　the



greater　is　the　power　of　the　mind　over　the　emotions；　as　experience　also



testifies。　For　we　see；　that　the　pain　arising　from　the　loss　of　any　good　is



mitigated；　as　soon　as　the　man　who　has　lost　it　perceives；　that　it　could　not



by　any　means　have　been　preserved。　So　also　we　see　that　no　one　pities　an



infant；　because　it　cannot　speak；　walk；　or　reason；　or　lastly；　because　it



passes　so　many　years；　as　it　were；　in　unconsciousness。　Whereas；　if　most



people　were　born　full…grown　and　only　one　here　and　there　as　an　infant；



everyone　would　pity　the　infants；　because　infancy　would　not　then　be　looked　on



as　a　state　natural　and　necessary；　but　as　a　fault　or　delinquency　in　Nature；



and　we　may　note　several　other　instances　of　the　same　sort。











Prop。VII。　Emotions　which　are　aroused　or　spring　from　reason；　if



we　take　account　of　time；　are　stronger　than　those；　which　are



attributable　to　particular　objects　that　we　regard　as　absent。







Proof。…　We　do　not　regard　a　thing　as　absent；　by　reason　of　the　emotion



wherewith　we　conceive　it；　but　by　reason　of　the　body；　being　affected　by



another　emotion　excluding　the　existence　of　the　said　thing　（II：xvii。）。



Wherefore；　the　emotion；　which　is　referred　to　the　thing　which　we　regard　as



absent；　is　not　of　a　nature　to　overcome　the　rest　of　a　man's　activities　and



power　（IV：vi。）；　but　is；　on　the　contrary；　of　a　nature　to　be　in　some　sort



controlled　by　the　emotions；　which　exclude　the　existence　of　its　external



cause　（IV：ix。）。　But　an　emotion　which　springs　from　reason　is　necessarily



referred　to　the　common　properties　of　things　（see　the　def。　of　reason　in



II：xl。Note。ii。）；　which　we　always　regard　as　present　（for　there　can　be　nothing



to　exclude　their　present　existence）；　and　which　we　always　conceive　in　the



same　manner　（II：xxxviii。）。　Wherefore　an　emotion　of　this　kind　always　remains



the　same；　and　consequently　（V：Ax。i。）　emotions；　which　are　contrary　thereto



and　are　not　kept　going　by　their　external　causes；　will　be　obliged　to　adapt



themselves　to　it　more　and　more；　until　they　are　no　longer　contrary　to　it；　to



this　extent　the　emotion　which　springs　from　reason　is　more　powerful。　Q。E。D。











Prop。VIII。　An　emotion　is　stronger　in　proportion　to　the　number　of



simultaneous　concurrent　causes　whereby　it　is　aroused。







Proof。…　Many　simultaneous　causes　are　more　powerful　than　a　few　（III：vii。）：



therefore　（IV：v。）；　in　proportion　to　the　increased　number　of　simultaneous



causes　whereby　it　is　aroused；　an　emotion　becomes　stronger。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　This　proposition　is　also　evident　from　V：Ax。ii。







Prop。IX。　An　emotion；　which　is　attributable　to　many　and　diverse



causes　which　the　mind　regards　as　simultaneous　with　the　emotion



itself；　is　less　hurtful；　and　we　are　less　subject　thereto　and　less



affected　towards　each　of　its　causes；　than　if　it　were　a　different　and



equally　powerful　emotion　attributable　to　fewer　causes　or　to　a



single　cause。







Proof…。　An　emotion　is　only　bad　or　hurtful；　in　so　far　as　it　hinders　the　mind



from　being　able　to　think　（IV：xxvi。；　IV：xxvii。）；　therefore；　an　emotion；



whereby　the　mind　is　determined　to　the　contemplation　of　several　things　at



once；　is　less　hurtful　than　another　equally　powerful　emotion；　which　so



engrosses　the　mind　in　the　single　contemplation　of　a　few　objects　or　of　one；



that　it　is　unable　to　think　of　anything　else；　this　was　our　first　point。



Again；　as　the　mind's　essence；　in　other　words；　its　power　（III：vii。）；　consists



solely　in　thought　（II：xi。）；　the　mind　is　less　passive　in　respect　to　an



emotion；　which　causes　it　to　think　of　several　things　at　once；　than　in　regard



to　an　equally　strong　emotion；　which　keeps　it　engrossed　in　the　contemplation



of　a　few　or　of　a　single　object：　this　was　our　second　point。　Lastly；　this



emotion　（III：xlviii。）；　in　so　far　as　it　is　attributable　to　several　causes；　is



less　powerful　in　regard　to　each　of　them。　Q。E。D。











Prop。X。　So　long　as　we　are　not　assailed　by　emotions　contrary　to



our　nature；　we　have　the　power　of　arranging　and　associating　the



modifications　of　our　body　according　to　the　intellectual　order。







Proof。…　The　emotions；　which　are　contrary　to　our　nature；　that　is　（IV：xxx。）；



which　are　bad；　are　bad　in　so　far　as　they　impede　the　mind　from　und