the ethics(part v)-第4部分

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that　God；　whom　he　loves；　should　not　be　God；　and　consequently　he　would　desire



to　feel　pain　（III：xix。）；　which　is　absurd　（III：xxviii。）。　Therefore；　he　who



loves　God；　&c。　Q。E。D。











Prop。　XX。　This　love　towards　God　cannot　be　stained　by　the



emotion　of　envy　or　jealousy：　contrariwise；　it　is　the　more　fostered；



in　proportion　as　we　conceive　a　greater　number　of　men　to　be



joined　to　God　by　the　same　bond　of　love。







Proof。…　This　love　towards　God　is　the　highest　good　which　we　can　seek　for



under　the　guidance　of　reason　（IV：xxviii。）；　it　is　common　to　all　men



（IV：xxxvi）；and　we　desire　that　all　should　rejoice　therein　（IV：xxxvii。）；



therefore　（Def。　of　the　Emotions：xxiii）；　it　cannot　be　stained　by　the



emotion　envy　nor　by；　the　emotion　of　jealousy；　（V：xviii。　see　definition　of



Jealousy；　（III：xxxv。　Note）；　but；　contrariwise；　it　must　needs　be　the　more



fostered；　in　proportion　as　we　conceive　a　greater　number　of　men　to　rejoice



therein。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　We　can　in　the　same　way；　show；　that　there　is　no　emotion　directly



contrary　to　this　love；　whereby　this　love　can　be　destroyed；　therefore　we　may



conclude；　that　this　love　towards　God　is　the　most　constant　of　all　the



emotions；　and　that；　in　so　far　as　it　is　referred　to　the　body；　it　cannot　be



destroyed；　unless　the　body　be　destroyed　also。　As　to　its　nature；　in　so　far　as



it　is　referred　to　the　mind　only；　we　shall　presently　inquire。



　　　　I　have　now　gone　through　all　the　remedies　against　the　emotions；　or　all



that　the　mind；　considered　in　itself　alone；　can　do　against　them。　Whence　it



appears　that　the　mind's　power　over　the　emotions　consists：…







　　I。　In　the　actual　knowledge　of　the　emotions　（V：iv。Note）。







　　II。　In　the　fact　that　it　separates　the　emotions　from　the　thought　of　an



external　cause；　which　we　conceive　confusedly　（V：ii。　and　V：iv。Note）。







　　III。　In　the　fact；　that；　in　respect　to　time；　the　emotions　referred　to



things；　which　we　distinctly　understand；　surpass　those　referred　to　what　we



conceive　in　a　confused　and　fragmentary　manner　（V：vii。）。







　　IV。　In　the　number　of　causes　whereby　those　modifications　（Affectiones。



Camerer　reads　affectus　…　emotions）；　are　fostered；　which　have　regard　to　the



common　properties　of　things　or　to　God　（V：ix。；　V：xi。）。







　　V。　Lastly；　in　the　order　wherein　the　mind　can　arrange　and　associate；　one



with　another；　its　own　emotions　（V：x。Note　and　V：xii。；　V：xiii。；　V：xiv。）。







But；　in　order　that　this　power　of　the　mind　over　the　emotions　may　be　better



understood；　it　should　be　specially　observed　that　the　emotions　are　called　by



us　strong；　when　we　compare　the　emotion　of　one　man　with　the　emotion　of



another；　and　see　that　one　man　is　more　troubled　than　another　by　the　same



emotion；　or　when　we　are　comparing　the　various　emotions　of　the　same　man　one



with　another；　and　find　that　he　is　more　affected　or　stirred　by　one　emotion



than　by　another。　For　the　strength　of　every　emotion　is　defined　by　a



comparison　of　our　own　power　with　the　power　of　an　external　cause。　Now　the



power　of　the　mind　is　defined　by　knowledge　only；　and　its　infirmity　or　passion



is　defined　by　the　privation　of　knowledge　only：　it　therefore　follows；　that



that　mind　is　most　passive；　whose　greatest　part　is　made　up　of　inadequate



ideas；　so　that　it　may　be　characterized　more　readily　by　its　passive　states



than　by　its　activities：　on　the　other　hand；　that　mind　is　most　active；　whose



greatest　part　is　made　up　of　adequate　ideas；　so　that；　although　it　may　contain



as　many　inadequate　ideas　as　the　former　mind；　it　may　yet　be　more　easily



characterized　by　ideas　attributable　to　human　virtue；　than　by　ideas　which



tell　of　human　infirmity。　Again；　it　must　be　observed；　that　spiritual



unhealthiness；　and　misfortunes　can　generally　be　traced　to　excessive　love　for



something　which　is　subject　to　many　variations；　and　which　we　can　never　become



masters　of。　For　no　one　is　solicitous　or　anxious　about　anything；　unless　he



loves　it；　neither　do　wrongs；　suspicions；　enmities；　&c。　arise；　except　in



regard　to　things　whereof　no　one　can　be　really　master。



　



We　may　thus　readily　conceive　the　power　which　clear　and　distinct　knowledge；



and　especially　that　third　kind　of　knowledge　（II：xlvii。Note）；　founded　on　the



actual　knowledge　of　God；　possesses　over　the　emotions：　if　it　does　not



absolutely　destroy　them；　in　so　far　as　they　are　passions　（V：iii。　and



V：iv。Note）；　at　any　rate；　it　causes　them　to　occupy　a　very　small　part　of　the



mind　（V：xiv。）。　Further；　it　begets　a　love　towards　a　thing　immutable　and



eternal　（V：xv。）；　whereof　we　may　really　enter　into　possession　（II：xlv。）；



neither　can　it　be　defiled　with　those　faults　which　are　inherent　in　ordinary



love；　but　it　may　grow　from　strength　to　strength；　and　may　engross　the　greater



part　of　the　mind；　and　deeply　penetrate　it。　And　now　I　have　finished　with　all



that　concerns　this　present　life：　for；　as　I　said　in　the　beginning　of　this



note；　I　have　briefly　described　all　the　remedies　against　the　emotions。　And



this　everyone　may　readily　have　seen　for　himself；　if　he　has　attended　to



what　is　advanced　in　the　present　note；　and　also　to　the　definitions　of　the



mind　and　its　emotions；　and；　lastly；　to　Propositions　III：i。　and　III：iii。　It



is　now；　therefore；　time　to　pass　on　to　those　matters；　which　appertain　to　the



duration　of　the　mind；　without　relation　to　the　body。











Prop。　XXI。　The　mind　can　only　imagine　anything；



or　remember　what　is　past；　while　the　body　endures。







Proof。…　The　mind　does　not　express　the　actual　existence　of　its　body；　nor　does



it　imagine　the　modifications　of　the　body　as　actual；　except　while　the　body



endures　（II：viii。Coroll。）；　and；　consequently　（II：xxvi。）；　it　does　not　imagine



any　body　as　actually　existing；　except　while　its　own　body　endures。　Thus　it



cannot　imagine　anything　（for　definition　of　Imagination；　see　II：xvii。Note）；



or　remember　things　past；　except　while　the　body　endures　（see　definition　of



Memory；　II：xviii。Note）。　Q。E。D。











Prop。　XXII。　Nevertheless　in　God　there　is　necessarily　an　idea；



which　expresses　the　essence　of　this　or　that　human　body　under



the　form　of　eternity。







Proof。…　God　is　the　cause；　not　only　of　the　existence　of　this　or　that　human



body；　but　also　of　its　essence　（I：xxv。）。　This　essence；　therefore；　must



necessarily　be　conceived　through　the　very　essence　of　God　（I：Ax。iv。）；　and　be



thus　conceived　by　a　certain　eternal　necessity　（I：xvi。）；　and　this　conception。



must　necessarily　exist　in　God　（II：iii。）。　Q。E。D。











Prop。　XXIII。　The　human　mind　cannot　be　absolutely



destroyed　with　the　body；　but　there　remains　of　it



something　which　is　eternal。







Proof。…　There　is　necessarily　in　God　a　concept　or　idea；　which　expresses　the



essence　of　the　human　body　（last　Prop。）；　which；　therefore；　is　necessarily



something　appertaining　to　the　essence　of　the　human　mind　（II：xiii。）。　But　we



have　not　assigned　to　the　human　mind　any；　duration；　definable　by　time；　except



in　so　far　as　it　expresses　the　actual　existence　of　the　body；　which　is



explained　through　duration；　and　may　be　defined　by　time　…　that　is



（II：viii。Coroll。）；　we　do　not　assign　to　it　duration；　except　while　the　body



endures。　Yet；　as　there　is　something；　notwithstanding；　which　is　conceived　by



a　certain　eternal　necessity　through　the　very　essence　of　God　（last　Prop。）；



this　something；　which　appertains　to　the　essence　of　the　mind；　will



necessarily　be　eternal。　Q。E。D。







Note。…　This　idea；　which　expresses　the　essence　of　the　body　under　the　form　of



eternity；　is；　as　we　have　said；　a　certain　mode　of　thinking；　which　belongs　to



the　essence　of　the　mind；　and　is　necessarily　eternal。　Yet　it　is　not　possible



that　we　should　remember　that　we　existed　before　our　body；　for　our　body　can



bear　no　trace　of　such　existence；　neither　can　eternity　be　defined　in　terms　of



time；　or　have　any　relation　to　time。　But；　notwithstanding；　we　feel　and　know



that　we　are　eternal。　For　the　mind　feels　those　things　that　it　conceives　by



understanding；　no　less　than　those　things　that　it　remembers。　For　the　eyes　of



the　mind；　whereby　it　sees　and　observes　things；　are　none　other　than　proofs。



Thus；　although　we　do　not　remember　that　we　existed　before　the　body；　yet　we



feel　that　our　mind；　in　so　far　as　it　involves　the　essence　of　the　body；　under



the　form　of　eternity；　is　eternal；　and　that　thus　its　existence　cannot　be



defined　in　terms　of　time；　or　explained　through　duration。　Thus　our　mind　can



only　be　said　to　endure；　and　its　existence　can　only　be　defined　by　a　fixed



time；　in　so　far　as　it　involves　the　actual　existence　of　the　body。　Thus　far



only　has　it　the　power　of　determining　the　existence　of　things　by　time；　and



conceiving　them　under　the　category　of　duration。











Prop。　XXIV。　The　more　we　understand　particular



things；　the　more　do　we　understand　God。







Proof。…　This　is　evident　from　I：xxv。Coroll。











Prop。　XXV。　The　highest　endeavour　of　the　mind；



and　the　highest　virtue　is　to　understand　things



by　the　third　kind　of　knowledge。







Proof。…　The　third　kind　of　knowledge　proceeds　from　an　adequate　idea　of



certain　attributes　of　God　to　an　adequate　knowledge　of　the　essence　of　things



（see　its　definition　III：xl。Note。ii。）；　and；　in　proportion　as　we　understand



things　more　in　this　way；　we　better　understand　God　（by　the　last　Prop。）；



therefore　（IV：xxviii。）　the　highest　virtue　of　the　mind；　that　is　IV：Def。viii。）



the　power；　or　nature；　or　（III：vii。）　highest　endeavour　of　the　mind；　is　to



understand　things　by　the　third　kind　of　knowledge。　Q。E。D。











Prop。　XXVI。　In　proportion　as　the　mind　is



more　capable　of　understanding　things　by



the　third　kind　of　knowledge；　it　desires



more　to　understand　things　by　that　kind。







Proof。…　This　is　evident。　For；　in　so　far　as　we　conceive　the　mind　to　be



capable　of　conceiving　things　by　this　kind　of　knowledge；　we；　to　that　extent；



conceive　it　as　determined　thus　to　conceive　things；　and　consequently　（Def。　of