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any　also　（perhaps　most　men）　either　through　defect　of　minde；　or　want　of　education　remain　unfit　during　the　whole　course　of　their　lives；　yet　have　Infants；　as　well　as　those　of　riper　years；　an　humane　nature；　wherefore　Man　is　made　fit　for　Society　not　by　Nature；　but　by　Education：　furthermore；　although　Man　were　born　in　such　a　condition　as　to　desire　it；　it　followes　not；　that　he　therefore　were　Born　fit　to　enter　into　it；　for　it　is　one　thing　to　desire；　another　to　be　in　capacity　fit　for　what　we　desire；　for　even　they；　who　through　their　pride；　will　not　stoop　to　equall　conditions；　without　which　there　can　be　no　Society；　do　yet　desire　it。　　　　　The　mutuall　fear＇　It　is　objected：　It　is　so　improbable　that　men　should　grow　into　civill　Societies　out　of　fear；　that　if　they　had　been　afraid；　they　would　not　have　endur'd　each　others　looks：　They　Presume；　I　believe；　that　to　fear　is　nothing　else　then　to　be　affrighted：　I　comprehend　in　this　word　Fear；　a　certain　foresight　of　future　evill；　neither　doe　I　conceive　flight　the　sole　property　of　fear；　but　to　distrust；　suspect；　take　heed；　provide　so　that　they　may　not　fear；　is　also　incident　to　the　fearfull。　They　who　go　to　Sleep；　shut　their　Dores；　they　who　Travell　carry　their　Swords　with　them；　because　they　fear　Theives。　Kingdomes　guard　their　Coasts　and　Frontiers　with　Forts；　and　Castles；　Cities　are　compast　with　Walls；　and　all　for　fear　of　neighbouring　Kingdomes　and　Townes；　even　the　strongest　Armies；　and　most　accomplisht　for　Fight；　yet　sometimes　Parly　for　Peace；　as　fearing　each　others　Power；　and　lest　they　might　be　overcome。　It　is　through　fear　that　men　secure　themselves；　by　flight　indeed；　and　in　corners；　if　they　think　they　cannot　escaPe　otherwise；　but　for　the　most　part　by　Armes；　and　Defensive　Weapons；　whence　it　happens；　that　daring　to　come　forth；　they　know　each　others　Spirits；　but　then；　if　they　fight；　Civill　Society　ariseth　from　the　Victory；　if　they　agree；　from　their　Agreement。　　　　　III。　The　cause　of　mutuall　fear　consists　partly　in　the　naturall　equality　of　men；　partly　in　their　mutuall　will　of　hurting：　whence　it　comes　to　passe　that　we　can　neither　expect　from　others；　nor　promise　to　our　selves　the　least　security：　For　if　we　look　on　men　fullgrown；　and　consider　how　brittle　the　frame　of　our　humane　body　is；　（which　perishing；　all　its　strength；　vigour；　and　wisdome　it　selfe　perisheth　with　it）　and　how　easie　a　matter　it　is；　even　for　the　weakest　man　to　kill　the　strongest；　there　is　no　reason　why　any　man　trusting　to　his　own　strength　should　conceive　himself　made　by　nature　above　others：　they　are　equalls　who　can　doe　equall　things　one　against　the　other；　but　they　who　can　do　the　greatest　things；　（namely　kill）　can　doe　equall　things。　All　men　therefore　among　themselves　are　by　nature　equall；　the　inequality　we　now　discern；　hath　its　spring　from　the　Civill　Law。　　　　　IV。　All　men　in　the　State　of　nature　have　a　desire；　and　will　to　hurt；　but　not　proceeding　from　the　same　cause；　neither　equally　to　be　condemn'd；　for　one　man　according　to　that　naturall　equality　which　is　among　us；　permits　as　much　to　others；　as　he　assumes　to　himself　（which　is　an　argument　of　a　temperate　man；　and　one　that　rightly　values　his　power）；　another；　supposing　himselfe　above　others；　will　have　a　License　to　doe　what　he　lists；　and　challenges　Respect；　and　Honour；　as　due　to　him　before　others；　（which　is　an　Argument　of　a　fiery　spirit：）　This　mans　will　to　hurt　ariseth　from　Vain　glory；　and　the　false　esteeme　he　hath　of　his　owne　strength；　the　other's；　from　the　necessity　of　defending　himselfe；　his　liberty；　and　his　goods　against　this　mans　violence。　　　　　V。　Furthermore；　since　the　combate　of　Wits　is　the　fiercest；　the　greatest　discords　which　are；　must　necessarily　arise　from　this　Contention；　for　in　this　case　it　is　not　only　odious　to　contend　against；　but　also　not　to　consent；　for　not　to　approve　of　what　a　man　saith　is　no　lesse　then　tacitely　to　accuse　him　of　an　Errour　in　that　thing　which　he　speaketh；　as　in　very　many　things　to　dissent；　is　as　much　as　if　you　accounted　him　a　fool　whom　you　dissent　from；　which　may　appear　hence；　that　there　are　no　Warres　so　sharply　wag'd　as　between　Sects　of　the　same　Religion；　and　Factions　of　the　same　Commonweale；　where　the　Contestation　is　Either　concerning　Doctrines；　or　Politique　Prudence。　And　since　all　the　pleasure；　and　jollity　of　the　mind　consists　in　this；　even　to　get　some；　with　whom　comparing；　it　may　find　somewhat　wherein　to　Tryumph；　and　Vaunt　it　self；　its　impossible　but　men　must　declare　sometimes　some　mutuall　scorn　and　contempt　either　by　Laughter；　or　by　Words；　or　by　Gesture；　or　some　signe　or　other。　then　which　there　is　no　greater　vexation　of　mind；　and　then　from　which　there　cannot　possibly　arise　a　greater　desire　to　doe　hurt。　　　　　VI。　But　the　most　frequent　reason　why　men　desire　to　hurt　each　other；　ariseth　hence；　that　many　men　at　the　same　time　have　an　Appetite　to　the　same　thing；　which　yet　very　often　they　can　neither　enjoy　in　common；　nor　yet　divide　it；　whence　it　followes　that　the　strongest　must　have　it；　and　who　is　strongest　must　be　decided　by　the　Sword。　　　　　VII。　Among　so　many　dangers　therefore；　as　the　naturall　lusts　of　men　do　daily　threaten　each　other　withall；　to　have　a　care　of　ones　selfe　is　not　a　matter　so　scornfully　to　be　lookt　upon；　as　if　so　be　there　had　not　been　a　power　and　will　left　in　one　to　have　done　otherwise；　for　every　man　is　desirous　of　what　is　good　for　him；　and　shuns　what　is　evill；　but　chiefly　the　chiefest　of　naturall　evills；　which　is　Death；　and　this　he　doth；　by　a　certain　impulsion　of　nature；　no　lesse　then　that　whereby　a　Stone　moves　downward：　It　is　therefore　neither　absurd；　nor　reprehensible；　neither　against　the　dictates　of　true　reason　for　a　man　to　use　all　his　endeavours　to　preserve　and　defend　his　Body；　and　the　Members　thereof　from　death　and　sorrowes；　but　that　which　is　not　contrary　to　right　reason；　that　all　men　account　to　be　done　justly；　and　with　right；　Neither　by　the　word　Right　is　any　thing　else　signified；　then　that　liberty　which　every　man　hath　to　make　use　of　his　naturall　faculties　according　to　right　reason：　Therefore　the　first　foundation　of　naturall　Right　is　this；　That　every　man　as　much　as　in　him　lies　endeavour　to　protect　his　life　and　members。　　　　　VIII。　But　because　it　is　in　vaine　for　a　man　to　have　a　Right　to　the　end；　if　the　Right　to　the　necessary　meanes　be　deny'd　him；　it　followes；　that　since　every　man　hath　a　Right　to　preserve　himself；　he　must　also　be　allowed　a　Right　to　use　all　the　means；　and　do　all　the　actions；　without　wHich　He　cannot　Preserve　himself　　　　　IX。　Now　whether　the　means　which　he　is　about　to　use；　and　the　action　he　is　performing；　be　necessary　to　the　preservation　of　his　Life；　and　Members；　or　not；　he　Himself；　by　the　right　of　nature；　must　be　judg；　for　say　another　man；　judg　that　it　is　contrary　to　right　reason　that　I　should　judg　of　mine　own　perill：　why　now；　because　he　judgeth　of　what　concerns　me；　by　the　same　reason；　because　we　are　equall　by　nature；　will　I　judge　also　of　things　which　doe　belong　to　him；　therefore　it　agrees　with　right　reason　（that　is）　it　is　the　right　of　nature　that　I　judge　of　his　opinion；　（i。e。）　whether　it　conduce　to　my　preservation；　or　not。　　　　　X。　Nature　hath　given　to　every　one　a　right　to　all。　That　is　it　was　lawfull　for　every　man　in　the　bare　state　of　nature；　or　before　such　time　as　men　had　engag'd　themselves　by　any　Covenants；　or　Bonds；　to　doe　what　hee　would；　and　against　whom　he　thought　fit；　and　to　possesse；　use；　and　enjoy　all　what　he　would；　or　could　get。　Now　because　whatsoever　a　man　would；　it　therefore　seems　good　to　him　because　he　wills　it；　and　either　it　really　doth；　or　at　least　seems　to　him　to　contribute　toward　his　preservation；　（but　we　have　already　allowed　him　to　be　judge　in　the　foregoing　Article　whether　it　doth　or　not；　in　so　much　as　we　are　to　hold　all　for　necessary　whatsoever　he　shall　esteeme　so）　and　by　the　7。　Article　it　appeares　that　by　the　right　of　Nature　those　things　may　be　done；　and　must　be　had；　which　necessarily　conduce　to　the　protection　of　life；　and　members；　it　followes；　that　in　the　state　of　nature；　To　have　all；　and　do　all　is　lawfull　for　all。　And　this　is　that　which　is　meant　by　that　common　saying；　Nature　hath　given　all　to　all；　from　whence　we　understand　likewise；　that　in　the　state　of　nature；　Profit　is　the　measure　of　Right。　　　　　In　the　meere　state　of　Nature＇　This　is　thus　to　be　understood：　What　any　man　does　in　the　bare　state　of　Nature　is　injurious　to　no　man；　not　that　in　such　a　State　he　cannot　offend　God；　or　break　the　Lawes　of　Nature；　for　Injustice　against　men　presupposeth　Humane　Lawes；　such；　as　in　the　State　of　Nature　there　are　none：　Now　the　truth　of　this　proposition　thus　conceived　is　sufficiently　demonstrated　to　the　mindfull　Reader　in　the　Articles　immediately　foregoing；　but　because　in　certaine　cases　the　difficulty　of　the　conclusion　makes　us　forget　the　premises；　I　will　contract　this　Argument；　and　make　it　most　evident　to　a　single　view；　every　man　hath　right　to　protect　himself；　as　appears　by　the　seventh　Article。　The　same　man　therefore　hath　a　right　to　use　all　the　means　which　necessarily　conduce　to　this　end　by　the　eight　Article：　But　those　are　the　necessary　means　which　he　shall　judge　to　be　such　by　the　ninth　Article。　He　therefore　hath　a　right　to　make　use；　of　and　to　doe　all　whatsoever　he　shall　judge　requisite　for　his　preservation：　wherefore　by　the　judgement　of　him　that　doth　it；　the　thing　done　is　either　right；　or　wrong；　and　therefore　right。　True　it　is　therefore　in　the　bare　State　of　Nature；　&c　but　if　any　man　pretend　somewhat　to　tend　necessarily　to　his　preservation；　which　yet　he　himself　doth　not　confidently　believe　so；　he　may　offend　against　the　Lawes　of　Nature；　as　in　the　third　Chapter　of　this　Book　is　more　at　large　declar'd。　It　hath　been　objected　by　some：　If　a　Sonne　kill　his　Father；　doth　he　him　no　injury？　I　have　answered；　That　a　Sonne　cannot　be　understood　to　be　at　any　time　in　the　State　of　Nature；　as　being　under　the　Power　and　command　of　them　to　whom　he　ownes　his　protection　as　soon　as　ever　he　is　born；　namely　either　his　Fathers；　or　his　Mothers；　or　his　that　nourisht　him；　as　is　demonstrated　in　the　ninth　Chapter。　　　　　XI。　But　it　was　the　least　benefit　for　men　thus　to　have　a　common　Right　to　all　things；　for　the　effects　of　this　Right　are　the　same；　almost；　as　if　there　had　been　no　Right　at　all；　for　although　any　man　might　say　of　every　thing；　This　is　mine；　yet　could　he　not　enjoy　it；　by　reason　of　his　Neighbour；　who　having　equall　Right；　and　equall　power；　would　pretend　the　same　thing　to　be　his。　　　　　XII。　If　now