the six enneads-第130部分

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viewing　them　in　isolation；　and　thus　we　have　observed　Being；　Stability；　Motion…　these　three；　of　which　each　is　a　unity　to　itself；　in　so　doing；　have　we　not　regarded　them　as　being　different　from　each　other？　By　this　posing　of　three　entities；　each　a　unity；　we　have；　surely；　found　Being　to　contain　Difference。　　　　　Again；　inasmuch　as　we　restore　them　to　an　all…embracing　unity；　identifying　all　with　unity；　do　we　not　see　in　this　amalgamation　Identity　emerging　as　a　Real　Existent？　　　　　Thus；　in　addition　to　the　other　three　＇Being；　Motion；　Stability＇；　we　are　obliged　to　posit　the　further　two；　Identity　and　Difference；　so　that　we　have　in　all　five　genera。　In　so　doing；　we　shall　not　withhold　Identity　and　Difference　from　the　subsequents　of　the　Intellectual　order；　the　thing　of　Sense　has；　it　is　clear；　a　particular　identity　and　a　particular　difference；　but　Identity　and　Difference　have　the　generic　status　independently　of　the　particular。　　　　　They　will；　moreover；　be　primary　genera；　because　nothing　can　be　predicated　of　them　as　denoting　their　essential　nature。　Nothing；　of　course　we　mean；　but　Being；　but　this　Being　is　not　their　genus；　since　they　cannot　be　identified　with　any　particular　being　as　such。　Similarly；　Being　will　not　stand　as　genus　to　Motion　or　Stability；　for　these　also　are　not　its　species。　Beings　＇or　Existents＇　comprise　not　merely　what　are　to　be　regarded　as　species　of　the　genus　Being；　but　also　participants　in　Being。　On　the　other　hand；　Being　does　not　participate　in　the　other　four　principles　as　its　genera：　they　are　not　prior　to　Being；　they　do　not　even　attain　to　its　level。　　　　　9。　The　above　considerations…　to　which　others；　doubtless；　might　be　added…　suffice　to　show　that　these　five　are　primary　genera。　But　that　they　are　the　only　primary　genera；　that　there　are　no　others；　how　can　we　be　confident　of　this？　Why　do　we　not　add　unity　to　them？　Quantity？　Quality？　Relation；　and　all　else　included　by　our　various　forerunners？　　　　　As　for　unity：　If　the　term　is　to　mean　a　unity　in　which　nothing　else　is　present；　neither　Soul　nor　Intellect　nor　anything　else；　this　can　be　predicated　of　nothing；　and　therefore　cannot　be　a　genus。　If　it　denotes　the　unity　present　in　Being；　in　which　case　we　predicate　Being　of　unity；　this　unity　is　not　primal。　　　　　Besides；　unity；　containing　no　differences；　cannot　produce　species；　and　not　producing　species；　cannot　be　a　genus。　You　cannot　so　much　as　divide　unity：　to　divide　it　would　be　to　make　it　many。　Unity；　aspiring　to　be　a　genus；　becomes　a　plurality　and　annuls　itself。　　　　　Again；　you　must　add　to　it　to　divide　it　into　species；　for　there　can　be　no　differentiae　in　unity　as　there　are　in　Substance。　The　mind　accepts　differences　of　Being；　but　differences　within　unity　there　cannot　be。　Every　differentia　introduces　a　duality　destroying　the　unity；　for　the　addition　of　any　one　thing　always　does　away　with　the　previous　quantity。　　　　　It　may　be　contended　that　the　unity　which　is　implicit　in　Being　and　in　Motion　is　common　to　all　other　things；　and　that　therefore　Being　and　unity　are　inseparable。　But　we　rejected　the　idea　that　Being　is　a　genus　comprising　all　things；　on　the　ground　that　these　things　are　not　beings　in　the　sense　of　the　Absolute　Being；　but　beings　in　another　mode：　in　the　same　way；　we　assert；　unity　is　not　a　genus；　the　Primary　Unity　having　a　character　distinct　from　all　other　unities。　　　　　Admitted　that　not　everything　suffices　to　produce　a　genus；　it　may　yet　be　urged　that　there　is　an　Absolute　or　Primary　Unity　corresponding　to　the　other　primaries。　But　if　Being　and　unity　are　identified；　then　since　Being　has　already　been　included　among　the　genera；　it　is　but　a　name　that　is　introduced　in　unity：　if；　however；　they　are　both　unity；　some　principle　is　implied：　if　there　is　anything　in　addition　＇to　this　principle＇；　unity　is　predicated　of　this　added　thing；　if　there　is　nothing　added；　the　reference　is　again　to　that　unity　predicated　of　nothing。　If　however　the　unity　referred　to　is　that　which　accompanies　Being；　we　have　already　decided　that　it　is　not　unity　in　the　primary　sense。　　　　　But　is　there　any　reason　why　this　less　complete　unity　should　not　still　possess　Primary　Being；　seeing　that　even　its　posterior　we　rank　as　Being；　and　〃Being〃　in　the　sense　of　the　Primary　Being？　The　reason　is　that　the　prior　of　this　Being　cannot　itself　be　Being…　or　else；　if　the　prior　is　Being；　this　is　not　Primary　Being：　but　the　prior　is　unity；　＇therefore　unity　is　not　Being＇。　　　　　Furthermore；　unity；　abstracted　from　Being；　has　no　differentiae。　　　　　Again；　even　taking　it　as　bound　up　with　Being：　If　it　is　a　consequent　of　Being；　then　it　is　a　consequent　of　everything；　and　therefore　the　latest　of　things：　but　the　genus　takes　priority。　If　it　is　simultaneous　with　Being；　it　is　simultaneous　with　everything：　but　a　genus　is　not　thus　simultaneous。　If　it　is　prior　to　Being；　it　is　of　the　nature　of　a　Principle；　and　therefore　will　belong　only　to　Being；　but　if　it　serves　as　Principle　to　Being；　it　is　not　its　genus：　if　it　is　not　genus　to　Being；　it　is　equally　not　a　genus　of　anything　else；　for　that　would　make　Being　a　genus　of　all　other　things。　　　　　In　sum；　the　unity　exhibited　in　Being　on　the　one　hand　approximates　to　Unity…Absolute　and　on　the　other　tends　to　identify　itself　with　Being：　Being　is　a　unity　in　relation　to　the　Absolute；　is　Being　by　virtue　of　its　sequence　upon　that　Absolute：　it　is　indeed　potentially　a　plurality；　and　yet　it　remains　a　unity　and　rejecting　division　refuses　thereby　to　become　a　genus。　　　　　10。　In　what　sense　is　the　particular　manifestation　of　Being　a　unity？　Clearly；　in　so　far　as　it　is　one　thing；　it　forfeits　its　unity；　with　〃one〃　and　〃thing〃　we　have　already　plurality。　No　species　can　be　a　unity　in　more　than　an　equivocal　sense：　a　species　is　a　plurality；　so　that　the　〃unity〃　here　is　that　of　an　army　or　a　chorus。　The　unity　of　the　higher　order　does　not　belong　to　species；　unity　is；　thus；　ambiguous；　not　taking　the　same　form　in　Being　and　in　particular　beings。　　　　　It　follows　that　unity　is　not　a　genus。　For　a　genus　is　such　that　wherever　it　is　affirmed　its　opposites　cannot　also　be　affirmed；　anything　of　which　unity　and　its　opposites　are　alike　affirmed…　and　this　implies　the　whole　of　Being…　cannot　have　unity　as　a　genus。　Consequently　unity　can　be　affirmed　as　a　genus　neither　of　the　primary　genera…　since　the　unity　of　Being　is　as　much　a　plurality　as　a　unity；　and　none　of　the　other　＇primary＇　genera　is　a　unity　to　the　entire　exclusion　of　plurality…　nor　of　things　posterior　to　Being；　for　these　most　certainly　are　a　plurality。　In　fact；　no　genus　with　all　its　items　can　be　a　unity；　so　that　unity　to　become　a　genus　must　forfeit　its　unity。　The　unit　is　prior　to　number；　yet　number　it　must　be；　if　it　is　to　be　a　genus。　　　　　Again；　the　unit　is　a　unit　from　the　point　of　view　of　number：　if　it　is　a　unit　generically；　it　will　not　be　a　unit　in　the　strict　sense。　　　　　Again；　just　as　the　unit；　appearing　in　numbers；　not　regarded　as　a　genus　predicated　of　them；　but　is　thought　of　as　inherent　in　them；　so　also　unity；　though　present　in　Being；　cannot　stand　as　genus　to　Being　or　to　the　other　genera　or　to　anything　whatever。　　　　　Further；　as　the　simplex　must　be　the　principle　of　the　non…simplex；　though　not　its　genus…　for　then　the　non…simplex　too　would　be　simplex；…　so　it　stands　with　unity；　if　unity　is　a　Principle；　it　cannot　be　a　genus　to　its　subsequents；　and　therefore　cannot　be　a　genus　of　Being　or　of　other　things。　If　it　is　nevertheless　to　be　a　genus；　everything　of　which　it　is　a　genus　must　be　taken　as　a　unit…　a　notion　which　implies　the　separation　of　unity　from　substance：　it　will　not；　therefore；　be　all…embracing。　just　as　Being　is　not　a　genus　of　everything　but　only　of　species　each　of　which　is　a　being；　so　too　unity　will　be　a　genus　of　species　each　of　which　is　a　unity。　But　that　raises　the　question　of　what　difference　there　is　between　one　thing　and　another　in　so　far　as　they　are　both　units；　corresponding　to　the　difference　between　one　being　and　another。　　　　　Unity；　it　may　be　suggested；　is　divided　in　its　conjunction　with　Being　and　Substance；　Being　because　it　is　so　divided　is　considered　a　genus…　the　one　genus　manifested　in　many　particulars；　why　then　should　not　unity　be　similarly　a　genus；　inasmuch　as　its　manifestations　are　as　many　as　those　of　Substance　and　it　is　divided　into　as　many　particulars？　　　　　In　the　first　place；　the　mere　fact　that　an　entity　inheres　in　many　things　is　not　enough　to　make　it　a　genus　of　those　things　or　of　anything　else：　in　a　word；　a　common　property　need　not　be　a　genus。　The　point　inherent　in　a　line　is　not　a　genus　of　lines；　or　a　genus　at　all；　nor　again；　as　we　have　observed；　is　the　unity　latent　in　numbers　a　genus　either　of　the　numbers　or　of　anything　else：　genus　demands　that　the　common　property　of　diverse　objects　involve　also　differences　arising　out　of　its　own　character；　that　it　form　species；　and　that　it　belong　to　the　essence　of　the　objects。　But　what　differences　can　there　be　in　unity？　What　species　does　it　engender？　If　it　produces　the　same　species　as　we　find　in　connection　with　Being；　it　must　be　identical　with　Being：　only　the　name　will　differ；　and　the　term　Being　may　well　suffice。　　　　　11。　We　are　bound　however　to　enquire　under　what　mode　unity　is　contained　in　Being。　How　is　what　is　termed　the　〃dividing〃　effected…　especially　the　dividing　of　the　genera　Being　and　unity？　Is　it　the　same　division；　or　is　it　different　in　the　two　cases？　　　　　First　then：　In　what　sense；　precisely；　is　any　given　particular　called　and　known　to　be　a　unity？　Secondly：　Does　unity　as　used　of　Being　carry　the　same　connotation　as　in　reference　to　the　Absolute？　　　　　Unity　is　not　identical　in　all　things；　it　has　a　different　significance　according　as　it　is　applied　to　the　Sensible　and　the　Intellectual　realms…　Being　too；　of　course；　comports　such　a　difference…　and　there　is　a　difference　in　the　unity　affirmed　among　sensible　things　as　compared　with　each　other；　the　unity　is　not　the　same　in　the　cases　of　chorus；　camp；　ship；　house；　there　is　a　difference　again　as　between　such　discrete　things　and　the　continuous。　Nevertheless；　all　are　representations　of　the　one　exemplar；　some　quite　remote；　others　more　effective：　the　truer　likeness　is　in　the　Intellectual；　Soul　is　a　unity；　and　still　more　is　Intellect　a　unity　and　Being　a　unity。　　　　　When　we　predicate　Being　of　a　particular；　do　we　thereby　predicate　of　it　unity；　and　does　the　degree　of　its　unity　tally　with　that　of　its　being？　Such　correspondence　is　accidental：　unity　is　not　proportionate　to　Being；　less　unity　need　not　mean　less　Being。　An　army