shorter logic-第4部分

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are　already　familiar。　The　mind；　denied　the　use　of　its　familiar　ideas；　feels　the
ground　where　it　once　stood　firm　and　at　home　taken　away　from　beneath　it；　and；
when　transported　into　the　region　of　pure　thought；　cannot　tell　where　in　the　world　it
is。　

One　consequence　of　this　weakness　is　that　authors；　preachers；　and　orators　are
found　most　intelligible；　when　they　speak　of　things　which　their　readers　or　hearers
already　know　by　rote　…　things　which　the　latter　are　conversant　with；　and　which
require　no　explanation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§4

The　philosopher　then　has　to　reckon　with　popular　modes　of　thought；　and　with　the
objects　of　religion。　In　dealing　with　the　ordinary　modes　of　mind；　he　will　first　of　all；
as　we　saw；　have　to　prove　and　almost　to　awaken　the　need　for　his　peculiar　method
of　knowledge。　In　dealing　with　the　objects　of　religion；　and　with　truth　as　a　whole；
he　will　have　to　show　that　philosophy　is　capable　of　apprehending　them　from　its
own　resources；　and　should　a　difference　from　religious　conceptions　come　to　light；
he　will　have　to　justify　the　points　in　which　it　diverges。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§5

To　give　the　reader　a　preliminary　explanation　of　the　distinction　thus　made；　and　to
let　him　see　at　the　same　moment　that　the　real　import　of　our　consciousness　is
retained；　and　even　for　the　first　time　put　in　its　proper　light；　when　translated　into　the
form　of　thought　and　the　notion　of　reason；　it　may　be　well　to　recall　another　of　these
old　unreasoned　beliefs。　And　that　is　the　conviction　that　to　get　at　the　truth　of　any
object　or　event；　even　of　feelings；　perceptions；　opinions；　and　mental　ideas；　we
must　think　it　over。　Now　in　any　case　to　think　things　over　is　at　least　to　transform
feelings；　ordinary　ideas；　etc。　into　thoughts。　

Nature　has　given　every　one　a　faculty　of　thought。　But　thought　is　all　that　philosophy
claims　as　the　form　proper　to　her　business：　and　thus　the　inadequate　view　which
ignores　the　distinction　stated　in　§3　leads　to　a　new　delusion；　the　reverse　of　the
complaint　previously　mentioned　about　the　unintelligibility　of　philosophy。　In　other
words；　this　science　must　often　submit　to　the　slight　of　hearing　even　people　who
have　never　taken　any　trouble　with　it　talking　as　if　they　thoroughly　understood　all
about　it。　With　no　preparation　beyond　an　ordinary　education　they　do　not　hesitate；
especially　under　the　influence　of　religious　sentiment；　to　philosophise　and　to
criticise　philosophy。　Everybody　allows　that　to　know　any　other　science　you　must
have　first　studied　it；　and　that　you　can　only　claim　to　express　a　judgement　upon　it　in
virtue　of　such　knowledge。　Everybody　allows　that　to　make　a　shoe　you　must　have
learned　and　practised　the　craft　of　the　shoemaker；　though　every　man　has　a　model
in　his　own　foot；　and　possesses　in　his　hands　the　natural　endowments　for　the
operations　required。　For　philosophy　alone；　it　seems　to　be　imagined；　such　study；
care；　and　application　are　not　in　the　least　requisite。　

This　comfortable　view　of　what　is　required　for　a　philosopher　has　recently　received
corroboration　through　the　theory　of　immediate　or　intuitive　knowledge。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§6

So　much　for　the　form　of　philosophical　knowledge。　It　is　no　less　desirable；　on　the
other　hand；　that　philosophy　should　understand　that　its　content　is　no　other　than
actuality；　that　core　of　truth　which；　originally　produced　and　producing　itself　within
the　precincts　of　the　mental　life；　has　become　the　world；　the　inward　and　outward
world；　of　consciousness。　At　first　we　become　aware　of　these　contents　in　what　we
call　Experience。　But　even　Experience；　as　it　surveys　the　wide　range　of　inward　and
outward　existence；　has　sense　enough　to　distinguish　the　mere　appearance；　which　is
transient　and　meaningless；　from　what　in　itself　really　deserves　the　name　of
actuality。　As　it　is　only　in　form　that　philosophy　is　distinguished　from　other　modes
of　attaining　an　acquaintance　with　this　same　sum　of　being；　it　must　necessarily　be　in
harmony　with　actuality　and　experience。　In　fact；　this　harmony　may　be　viewed　as　at
least　an　extrinsic　means　of　testing　the　truth　of　a　philosophy。　Similarly　it　may　be
held　the　highest　and　final　aim　of　philosophic　science　to　bring　about；　through　the
ascertainment　of　this　harmony；　a　reconciliation　of　the　self…conscious　reason　with
the　reason　which　is　in　the　world　…　in　other　words；　with　actuality。　

In　the　Preface　to　my　Philosophy　of　Right；　p。　xxvii；　are　found　the　propositions：　

　　　　　What　is　reasonable　is　actual　
　　　　　and　
　　　　　What　is　actual　is　reasonable。　


These　simple　statements　have　given　rise　to　expressions　of　surprise　and　hostility；
even　in　quarters　where　it　would　be　reckoned　an　insult　to　presume　absence　of
philosophy；　and　still　more　of　religion。　Religion　at　least　need　not　be　brought　in
evidence；　its　doctrines　of　the　divine　governments　of　the　world　affirm　these
propositions　too　decidedly。　For　their　philosophic　sense；　we　must　presuppose
intelligence　enough　to　know；　not　only　that　God　is　actual；　that　He　is　the　supreme
actuality；　that　He　alone　is　truly　actual；　but　also；　as　regards　the　logical　bearings　of
the　question；　that　existence　is　in　part　mere　appearance；　and　only　in　part　actuality。
In　common　life；　any　freak　of　fancy；　any　error；　evil　and　everything　of　the　nature
of　evil；　as　well　as　every　degenerate　and　transitory　existence　whatever；　gets　in　a
casual　way　the　name　of　actuality。　But　even　our　ordinary　feelings　are　enough　to
forbid　a　casual　（fortuitous）　existence　getting　the　emphatic　name　of　an　actual；　for
by　fortuitous　we　mean　an　existence　which　has　no　greater　value　than　that　of
something　possible；　which　may　as　well　not　be　as　be。　As　for　the　term　Actuality；
these　critics　would　have　done　well　to　consider　the　sense　in　which　I　employ　it。　In　a
detailed　Logic　I　had　treated　among　other　things　of　actuality；　and　accurately
distinguished　it　not　only　from　the　fortuitous；　which；　after　all；　has　existence；　but
even　from　the　cognate　categories　of　existence　and　the　other　modifications　of
being。　

The　actuality　of　the　rational　stands　opposed　by　the　popular　fancy　that　Ideas　and
ideals　are　nothing　but　chimeras；　and　philosophy　a　mere　system　of　such
phantasms。　It　is　also　opposed　by　the　very　different　fancy　that　Ideas　and　ideals　are
something　far　too　excellent　to　have　actuality；　or　something　too　impotent　to
procure　it　for　themselves。　This　divorce　between　idea　and　reality　is　especially　dear
to　the　analytic　understanding　which　looks　upon　its　own　abstractions；　dreams
though　they　are；　as　something　true　and　real；　and　prides　itself　on　the　imperative
'ought'；　which　it　takes　especial　pleasure　in　prescribing　even　on　the　field　of　politics。
As　if　the　world　had　waited　on　it　to　learn　how　it　ought　to　be；　and　was　not！　For；　if　it
were　as　it　ought　to　be；　what　would　come　of　the　precocious　wisdom　of　that
'ought'？　When　understanding　turns　this　'ought'　against　trivial　external　and
transitory　objects；　against　social　regulations　or　conditions；　which　very　likely
possess　a　great　relative　importance　for　a　certain　time　and　special　circles；　it　may
often　be　right。　In　such　a　case　the　intelligent　observer　may　meet　much　that　fails　to
satisfy　the　general　requirements　of　right；　for　who　is　not　acute　enough　to　see　a
great　deal　in　his　own　surroundings　which　is　really　far　from　being　as　it　ought　to　be？
But　such　acuteness　is　mistaken　in　the　conceit　that；　when　it　examines　these　objects
and　pronounces　what　they　ought　to　be；　it　is　dealing　with　questions　of　philosophic
science。　The　object　of　philosophy　is　the　Idea：　and　the　Idea　is　not　so　impotent　as
merely　to　have　a　right　or　an　obligation　to　exist　without　actually　existing。　The
object　of　philosophy　is　an　actuality　of　which　those　objects；　social　regulations　and
conditions；　are　only　the　superficial　outside。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§7

Thus　reflection　…　thinking　things　over　…　in　a　general　way　involves　the　principle
（which　also　means　the　beginning）　of　philosophy。　And　when　the　reflective　spirit
arose　again　in　its　independence　in　modern　times；　after　the　epoch　of　the　Lutheran
Reformation；　it　did　not；　as　in　its　beginnings　among　the　Greeks；　stand　merely
aloof；　in　a　world　of　its　own；　but　at　once　turned　its　energies　also　upon　the
apparently　illimitable　material　of　the　phenomenal　world。　In　this　way　the　name
philosophy　came　to　be　applied　to　all　those　branches　of　knowledge；　which　are
engaged　in　ascertaining　the　standard　and　Universal　in　the　ocean　of　empirical
individualities；　as　well　as　in　ascertaining　the　Necessary　element；　or　Laws；　to　be
found　in　the　apparent　disorder　of　the　endless　masses　of　the　fortuitous。　It　thus
appears　that　modern　philosophy　derives　its　materials　from　our　own　personal
observations　and　perceptions　of　the　external　and　internal　world；　from　nature　as
well　as　from　the　mind　and　heart　of　man；　when　both　stand　in　the　immediate
presence　of　the　observer。　

This　principle　of　Experience　carries　with　it　the　unspeakably　important　condition
that；　in　order　to　accept　and　believe　any　fact；　we　must　be　in　contact　with　it；　or；　in
more　exact　terms；　that　we　must　find　the　fact　united　and　combined　with　the
certainty　of　our　own　selves。　We　must　be　in　touch　with　our　subject…matter；
whether　it　be　by　means　of　our　external　senses；　or；　else；　by　our　profounder　mind
and　our　intimate　self…consciousness。　This　principle　is　the　same　as　that　which　has
in　the　present　day　been　termed　faith；　immediate　knowledge；　the　revelation　in　the
outward　world；　and；　above　all；　in　our　own　heart。　

Those　sciences；　which　thus　got　the　name　of　philosophy；　we　call　empirical
sciences；　for　the　reason　that　they　take　their　departure　from　experience。　Still　the
essential　results　which　they　aim　at　and　provide　are　laws；　general　propositions；　a
theory　…　the　thoughts　of　what　is　found　existing。　On　this　ground　the　Newtonian
physics　was　called　Natural　Philosophy。　Hugo　Grotius；　again；　by　putting　together
and　comparing　the　behaviour　of　states　towards　each　other　as　recorded　in　history；
succeeded；　with　the　help　of　the　ordinary　methods　of　general　reasoning；　in　laying
down　certain　general　principles；　and　establishing　a　theory　which　may　be　termed
the　Philosophy　of　International　Law。　In　England　this　is　still　the　usual　signification
of　the　term　philosophy。　Newton　continues　to　be　celebrated　as　the　great