shorter logic-第7部分

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constituted　by　the　system　of　these　peculiar　phases；　and　each　is　a　necessary
member　of　the　organisation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§16

In　the　form　of　an　Encyclopaedia；　the　science　has　no　room　for　a　detailed
exposition　of　particulars；　and　must　be　limited　to　setting　forth　the　commencement
of　the　special　sciences　and　the　notions　of　cardinal　importance　in　them。　

How　much　of　the　particular　parts　is　requisite　to　constitute　a　particular　branch　of
knowledge　is　so　far　indeterminate；　that　the　part；　if　it　is　to　be　something　true；　must
be　not　an　isolated　member　merely；　but　itself　an　organic　whole。　The　entire　field　of
philosophy　therefore　really　forms　a　single　science；　but　it　may　also　be　viewed　as　a
total；　composed　of　several　particular　sciences。　

The　encyclopaedia　of　philosophy　must　not　be　confounded　with　ordinary
encyclopaedias。　An　ordinary　encyclopaedia　does　not　pretend　to　be　more　than　an
aggregation　of　sciences；　regulated　by　no　principle；　and　merely　as　experience　offers
them。　Sometimes　it　even　includes　what　merely　bear　the　name　of　sciences；　while
they　are　nothing　more　than　a　collection　of　bits　of　information。　In　an　aggregate　like
this；　the　several　branches　of　knowledge　owe　their　place　in　the　encyclopaedia　to
extrinsic　reasons；　and　their　unity　is　therefore　artificial：　they　are　arranged；　but　we
cannot　say　they　form　a　system。　For　the　same　reason；　especially　as　the　materials
to　be　combined　also　depend　upon　no　one　rule　or　principle；　the　arrangement　is　at
best　an　experiment；　and　will　always　exhibit　inequalities。　

An　encyclopaedia　of　philosophy　excludes　three　kinds　of　partial　science。　I。　It
excludes　mere　aggregates　of　bits　of　information。　Philology　in　its　prima　facie　aspect
belongs　to　this　class。　II。　It　rejects　the　quasi…sciences；　which　are　founded　on　an　act
of　arbitrary　will　alone；　such　as　Heraldry。　Sciences　of　this　class　are　positive　from
beginning　to　end。　III。　In　another　class　of　sciences；　also　styled　positive；　but　which
have　a　rational　basis　and　a　rational　beginning；　philosophy　claims　that　constituent
as　its　own。　The　positive　features　remain　the　property　of　the　sciences　themselves。　

The　positive　element　in　the　last　class　of　sciences　is　of　different　sorts。　（i）　Their
commencement；　though　rational　at　bottom；　yields　to　the　influence　of
fortuitousness；　when　they　have　to　bring　their　universal　truth　into　contact　with
actual　facts　and　the　single　phenomena　of　experience。　In　this　region　of　chance　and
change；　the　adequate　notion　of　science　must　yield　its　place　to　reasons　or　grounds
of　explanation。　Thus；　e。g。　in　the　science　of　jurisprudence；　or　in　the　system　of
direct　and　indirect　taxation；　it　is　necessary　to　have　certain　points　precisely　and
definitively　settled　which　lie　beyond　the　competence　of　the　absolute　lines　laid
down　by　the　pure　notion。　A　certain　latitude　of　settlement　accordingly　is　left；　and
each　point　may　be　determined　in　one　way　on　one　principle；　in　another　way　on
another；　and　admits　of　no　definitive　certainty。　Similarly　the　Idea　of　Nature；　when
parcelled　out　in　detail；　is　dissipated　into　contingencies。　Natural　history；　geography；
and　medicine　stumble　upon　descriptions　of　existence；　upon　kinds　and　distinctions；
which　are　not　determined　by　reason；　but　by　sport　and　adventitious　incidents。
Even　history　comes　under　the　same　category。　The　Idea　is　its　essence　and　inner
nature；　but；　as　it　appears；　everything　is　under　contingency　and　in　the　field　of
voluntary　action。　（ii）　These　sciences　are　positive　also　in　failing　to　recognise　the
finite　nature　of　what　they　predicate；　and　to　point　out　how　these　categories　and
their　whole　sphere　pass　into　a　higher。　They　assume　their　statements　to　possess　an
authority　beyond　appeal。　Here　the　fault　lies　in　the　finitude　of　the　form；　as　in　the
previous　instance　it　lay　in　the　matter。　（iii）　In　close　sequel　to　this；　sciences　are
positive　in　consequence　of　the　inadequate　grounds　on　which　their　conclusions
rest：　based　as　these　are　on　detached　and　casual　inference；　upon　feeling；　faith；　and
authority；　and；　generally　speaking；　upon　the　deliverances　of　inward　and　outward
perception。　Under　this　head　we　must　also　class　the　philosophy　which　proposes　to
build　upon　'anthropology'；　facts　of　consciousness；　inward　sense；　or　outward
experience。　It　may　happen；　however；　that　empirical　is　an　epithet　applicable　only
to　the　form　of　scientific　exposition；　while　intuitive　sagacity　has　arranged　what　are
mere　phenomena；　according　to　the　essential　sequence　of　the　notion。　In　such　a
case　the　contrasts　between　the　varied　and　numerous　phenomena　brought　together
serve　to　eliminate　the　external　and　accidental　circumstances　of　their　conditions；
and　the　universal　thus　comes　clearly　into　view。　Guided　by　such　an　intuition；
experimental　physics　will　present　the　rational　science　of　Nature　…　as　history　will
present　the　science　of　human　affairs　and　actions　…　in　an　external　picture；　which
mirrors　the　philosophic　notion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§17

It　may　seem　as　if　philosophy；　in　order　to　start　on　its　course；　had；　like　the　rest　of
the　sciences；　to　begin　with　a　subjective　presupposition。　The　sciences　postulate
their　respective　objects；　such　as　space；　number；　or　whatever　it　be；　and　it　might　be
supposed　that　philosophy　had　also　to　postulate　the　existence　of　thought。　But　the
two　cases　are　not　exactly　parallel。　It　is　by　the　free　act　of　thought　that　it　occupies　a
point　of　view；　in　which　it　is　for　its　own　self；　and　thus　gives　itself　an　object　of　its
own　production。　Nor　is　this　all。　The　very　point　of　view；　which　originally　is　taken
on　its　own　evidence　only；　must　in　the　course　of　the　science　be　converted　to　a
result　…　the　ultimate　result　in　which　philosophy　returns　into　itself　and　reaches　the
point　with　which　it　began。　In　this　manner　philosophy　exhibits　the　appearance　of　a
circle　which　closes　with　itself；　and　has　no　beginning　in　the　same　way　as　the　other
sciences　have。　To　speak　of　a　beginning　of　philosophy　has　a　meaning　only　in
relation　to　a　person　who　proposes　to　commence　the　study；　and　not　in　relation　to
the　science　as　science。　The　same　thing　may　be　thus　expressed。　The　notion　of
science　…　the　notion　therefore　with　which　we　start　…　which；　for　the　very　reason
that　it　is　initial；　implies　a　separation　between　the　thought　which　is　our　object；　and
the　subject　philosophising　which　is；　as　it　were；　external　to　the　former；　must　be
grasped　and　comprehended　by　the　science　itself。　This　is　in　short；　the　one　single
aim；　action；　and　goal　of　philosophy　…　to　arrive　at　the　notion　of　its　notion；　and　thus
secure　its　return　and　its　satisfaction。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§18

As　the　whole　science；　and　only　the　whole；　can　exhibit　what　the　Idea　or　system　of
reason　is；　it　is　impossible　to　give　in　a　preliminary　way　a　general　impression　of　a
philosophy。　Nor　can　a　division　of　philosophy　into　its　parts　be　intelligible；　except　in
connection　with　the　system。　A　preliminary　division；　like　the　limited　conception
from　which　it　comes；　can　only　be　an　anticipation。　Here　however　it　is　premised
that　the　Idea　turns　out　to　be　the　thought　which　is　completely　identical　with　itself；
and　not　identical　simply　in　the　abstract；　but　also　in　its　action　of　setting　itself　over
against　itself；　so　as　to　gain　a　being　of　its　own；　and　yet　of　being　in　full　possession
of　itself　while　it　is　in　this　other。　Thus　philosophy　is　subdivided　into　three　parts：　

I。　Logic：　the　science　of　the　Idea　in　and　for　itself。　
II。　The　Philosophy　of　Nature：　the　science　of　the　Idea　in　its　otherness。　
III。　The　Philosophy　of　Mind：　the　science　of　the　Idea　come　back　to　itself　out　of
that　otherness。　

As　observed　in　§15；　the　differences　between　the　several　philosophical　sciences
are　only　aspects　or　specialisations　of　the　one　Idea　or　system　of　reason；　which　and
which　alone　is　alike　exhibited　in　these　different　media。　In　Nature　nothing　else
would　have　to　be　discerned；　except　the　Idea；　but　the　Idea　has　here　divested　itself
of　its　proper　being。　In　Mind；　again；　the　Idea　has　asserted　a　being　of　its　own；　and
is　on　the　way　to　become　absolute。　Every　such　form　in　which　the　Idea　is
expressed　is　at　the　same　time　a　passing　or　fleeting　stage；　and　hence　each　of　these
subdivisions　has　not　only　to　know　its　contents　as　an　object　which　has　being　for
the　time；　but　also　in　the　same　act　to　expound　how　these　contents　pass　into　their
higher　circle。　To　represent　the　relation　between　them　as　a　division；　therefore；
leads　to　misconception；　for　it　co…ordinates　the　several　parts　or　sciences　one　beside
another；　as　if　they　had　no　innate　development；　but　were；　like　so　many　species；
really　and　radically　distinct。　




II：　Preliminary　Notion


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Logic　derived　from　a　survey　of　the　whole　system
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　19

Logic　is　the　science　of　the　pure　Idea；　pure；　that　is；　because　the　Idea　is　in　the
abstract　medium　of　Thought。

This　definition；　and　the　others　which　occur　in　these　introductory　outlines；　are
derived　from　a　survey　of　the　whole　system；　to　which　accordingly　they　are
subsequent。　The　same　remark　applies　to　all　prefatory　notions　whatever　about
philosophy。

Logic　might　have　been　defined　as　the　science　of　thought；　and　of　its　laws　and
characteristic　forms。　But　thought；　as　thought；　constitutes　only　the　general
medium；　or　qualifying　circumstance；　which　renders　the　Idea　distinctively　logical。
If　we　identify　the　Idea　with　thought；　thought　must　not　be　taken　in　the　sense　of　a
method　or　form；　but　in　the　sense　of　the　self…developing　totality　of　its　laws　and
peculiar　terms。　These　laws　are　the　work　of　thought　itself；　and　not　a　fact　which　it
finds　and　must　submit　to。

From　different　points　of　view；　Logic　Is　either　the　hardest　or　the　easiest　of　the
sciences。　Logic　is　hard；　because　it　has　to　deal　not　with　perceptions；　nor；　like
geometry；　with　abstract　representations　of　the　senses；　but　with　the　pure
abstractions；　and　because　it　demands　a　force　and　facility　of　withdrawing　into　pure
thought；　of　keeping　firm　hold　on　it；　and　of　moving　in　such　an　element。　Logic　is
easy；　because　its　facts　are　nothing　but　our　own　thought　and　its　familiar　forms　or
terms：　and　these　are　the　acme　of　simplicity；　the　ABC　of　everything　else。　They　are
also　what　we　are　best　acquainted　with：　such　as　'is'　and　'is　not'