criminal psychology-第51部分

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　the　noise　comes；　though　if　he　knows　the　law；　if　he　knows　that　fact；　his　answer　would　be　reversed。　So；　as　every　child　knows　that　the　reflection　of　sound　is　frequently　deceptive；　everybody　who　is　asked　in　court　will　say　that　he　believes　the　wagon　　to　be　on　the　right　side　though　it　might　as　well　have　been　on　the　left。　Again；　if　we　were　unaware　that　light　is　otherwise　refracted　in　water　than　in　air　we　could　say　that　a　stick　in　the　water　has　been　bent　obtusely；　but　inasmuch　as　everybody　knows　this　fact　of　the　relation　of　light　to　water；　he　will　declare　that　the　stick　appears　bent　but　really　is　straight。

From　these　simplest　of　sense…perceptions　to　the　most　complicated；　known　only　to　half　a　dozen　foremost　physicists；　there　is　an　infinite　series　of　laws　controlling　each　stage　of　perception；　and　for　each　stage　there　is　a　group　of　men　who　know　just　so　much　and　no　more。　We　have；　therefore；　to　assume　that　their　perceptions　will　vary　with　the　number　and　manner　of　their　accomplishments；　and　we　may　almost　convince　ourselves　that　each　examinee　who　has　to　give　evidence　concerning　his　sense…perception　should　literally　undergo　examination　to　make　clear　his　scholarly　status　and　thereby　the　value　of　his　testimony。　Of　course；　in　practice　this　is　not　required。　First　of　all　we　judge　approximately　a　man's　nature　and　nurture　and　according　to　the　impression　he　makes　upon　us；　thence；　his　intellectual　status。　This　causes　great　mistakes。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　the　testimony　is　concerned　almost　always　with　one　or　several　physical　events；　so　that　a　simple　relational　interrogation　will　establish　certainly　whether　the　witness　knows　and　attends　to　the　physical　law　in　question　or　not。　But　anyway；　too　little　is　done　to　determine　the　means　a　man　uses　to　reach　a　certain　perception。　If　instantaneous　contradictions　appear；　there　is　little　damage；　for　in　the　absence　of　anything　certain；　further　inferences　are　fortunately　made　in　rare　cases　only。　But　when　the　observation　is　that　of　one　person　alone；　or　even　when　more　testify　but　have　accidentally　the　same　amount　of　knowledge　and　hence　have　made　the　same　mistake；　and　no　contradiction　appears；　we　suppose　ourselves　to　possess　the　precise　truth；　confirmed　by　several　witnesses；　and　we　argue　merrily　on　the　basis　of　it。　In　the　meantime　we　quite　forget　that　contradictions　are　our　salvation　from　the　trusting　acceptance　of　untruth　and　that　the　absence　of　contradiction　means；　as　a　rule；　the　absence　of　a　starting　point　for　further　examination。

For　this　reason　and　others　modern　psychology　requires　us　to　be　cautious。　Among　the　others　is　the　circumstance　that　perceptions　are　rarely　pure。　Their　purity　consists　in　containing　nothing　else　than　perception；　they　are　mixed　when　they　are　connected　with　imaginations；　judgments；　efforts；　and　volitions。　How　rarely　a　perception　is　pure　I　have　already　tried　to　show；　judgments　almost　　always　accompany　it。　I　repeat　too；　that　owing　to　this　circumstance　and　our　ignorance　of　it；　countless　testimonies　are　interpreted　altogether　falsely。　This　is　true　in　many　other　fields。　When；　for　example；　A。　Fick　says：　‘‘The　condition　we　call　sensation　occurs　in　the　consciousness　of　the　subject　when　his　sensory　nerves　are　stimulated；''　he　does　not　mean　that　the　nervous　stimulus　in　itself　is　capable　of　causing　the　condition　in　question。　This　one　stimulus　is　only　a　single　tone　in　the　murmur　of　countless　stimuli；　which　earlier　and　at　the　same　time　have　influenced　us　and　are　different　in　their　effect　on　each　man。　Therefore；　that　single　additional　tone　will　also　be　different　in　each　man。　Or；　when　Bernstein　says　that　‘‘Sensation；　i。　e。；　the　stimulation　of　the　sensorium　and　the　passage　of　this　stimulation　to　the　brain；　does　not　in　itself　imply　the　perception　of　an　object　or　an　event　in　the　external　world；''　we　gather　that　the　objectivity　of　the　perception　works　correctively　not　more　than　one　time　out　of　many。　So　here　again　everything　depends　upon　the　nature　and　nurture　of　the　subject。

Sensations　are；　according　to　Aubert；　still　more　subjective。　‘‘They　are　the　specific　activity　of　the　sense　organs；　（not；　therefore；　passive　as　according　to　Helmholtz；　but　active　functions　of　the　sense　organs）。　Perception　arises　when　we　combine　our　particular　sensations　with　the　pure　images　of　the　spirit　or　the　schemata　of　the　understanding；　especially　with　the　pure　image　of　space。　The　so…called　ejection　or　externalization　of　sensations　occurs　only　as　their　scheme　and　relation　to　the　unity　of　their　object。''

So　long　as　anything　is　conceived　as　passive　it　may　always　recur　more　identically　than　when　it　is　conceived　as　active。　In　the　latter　case　the　individuality　of　the　particular　person　makes　the　perception　in　a　still　greater　degree　individual；　and　makes　it　almost　the　creature　of　him　who　perceives。　Whether　Aubert　is　right　or　not　is　not　our　task　to　discover；　but　if　he　is　right　then　sense…perception　is　as　various　as　is　humanity。　The　variety　is　still　further　increased　by　means　of　the　comprehensive　activity　which　Fischer＇1＇　presupposes。　‘‘Visual　perception　has　a　comprehensive　or　compounding　activity。　We　never　see　any　absolute　simple　and　hence　do　not　perceive　the　elements　of　things。　We　see　merely　a　spatial　continuum；　and　that　is　possible　only　through　comprehensive　activityespecially　in　the　case　of　movement　in　which　the　object　of　movement　and　the　environment　must　both　be　perceived。''　But　each　individual　method　of　‘‘comprehension''　is　different。　And　it　is　uncertain　whether　this　　is　purely　physical；　whether　only　the　memory　assists　（so　that　the　attention　in　biased　by　what　has　been　last　perceived）；　whether　imagination　is　at　work　or　an　especial　psychical　activity　must　be　presupposed　in　compounding　the　larger　elements。　The　fact　is　that　men　may　perceived　an　enormous　variety　of　things　with　a　single　glance。　And　generally　the　perceptive　power　will　vary　with　the　skill　of　the　individual。　The　narrowest；　smallest；　most　particularizing　glance　is　that　of　the　most　foolish；　and　the　broadest；　most　comprehensive；　and　comparing　glance；　that　of　the　most　wise。　This　is　particularly　noticeable　when　the　time　of　observation　is　short。　The　one　has　perceived　little　and　generally　the　least　important；　the　other　has　in　the　same　time　seen　everything　from　top　to　bottom　and　has　distinguished　between　the　important　and　the　unimportant；　has　observed　the　former　rather　longer　than　the　latter；　and　is　able　to　give　a　better　description　of　what　he　has　seen。　And　then；　when　two　so　different　descriptions　come　before　us；　we　wonder　at　them　and　say　that　one　of　them　is　untrue。＇1b＇


＇1＇　E。　L。　Fischer：　Theorie　der　Gesichtswahrnehmung。　Mainz　1891。

＇1b＇　Cf。　Archiv；　XVI；　371。


The　speed　of　apperception　has　been　subjected　to　measurement　by　Auerbach；　Kries；　Baxt；　von　Tigerstedt　and　Bergqvist；　Stern；　Vaschide；　Vurpass；　etc。　The　results　show　0。015　to　0。035　seconds　for　compounded　images。　Unfortunately；　most　of　these　experiments　have　brought　little　unanimity　in　the　results　and　have　not　compared；　e。　g。；　the　apperception…times　of　very　clever　people　with　those　of　very　slow　and　stupid　ones。　In　the　variety　of　perception　lies　the　power　of　presentation　（in　our　sense　of　the　term）。　In　the　main　other　forces　assist　in　this；　but　when　we　consider　how　the　senses　work　in　combination　we　must　conclude　that　they　determine　their　own　forms。　‘‘If　we　are　to　say　that　sense　experience　instructs　us　concerning　the　manifoldness　of　objects　we　may　do　so　correctly　if　we　add　the　scholium　that　many　things　could　not　be　mentioned　without　synthesis。''　So　Drner　writes。　But　if　we　approach　the　matter　from　another　side；　we　see　how　remarkable　it　is　that　human　perceptions　can　be　compared　at　all。　Hermann　Schwarz　says　‘‘According　to　the　opinion　of　the　physicists　we　know　external　events　directly　by　means　of　the　organs；　the　nerves　of　which　serve　passively　to　support　consciousness　in　the　perception　of　such　events。　On　the　contrary；　according　to　the　opinion　of　most　physiologists；　the　nerve　fibers　are　active　in　the　apprehension　of　external　events；　they　modify　it；　alter　it　until　it　is　well　nigh　unrecognizable；　and　turn　it　over　to　consciousness　only　after　the　original　process　has　undergone　still　another　trans…　　formation　into　new　forms　of　mechanical　energy　in　the　ganglion　cells　of　the　outer　brain。　This　is　the　difference　between　the　physical　theory　of　perception　and　the　physiological。''

In　this　connection　there　are　several　more　conditions　pertaining　to　general　sense…perception。　First　of　all　there　is　that　so…called　vicariousness　of　the　senses　which　substitutes　one　sense　for　another；　in　representation。　The　_*actual_　substitution　of　one　sense　by　another　as　that　of　touch　and　sight；　does　not　belong　to　the　present　discussion。　The　substitution　of　sound　and　sight　is　only　apparent。　E。　g。；　when　I　have　several　times　heard　the　half…noticed　voice　of　some　person　without　seeing　him；　I　will　imagine　a　definite　face　and　appearance　which　_*are_　pure　imagination。　So　again；　if　I　hear　cries　for　help　near　some　stream；　I　see　more　or　less　clearly　the　form　of　a　drowning　person；　etc。　It　is　quite　different　in　touching　and　seeing；　if　I　touch　a　ball；　a　die；　a　cat；　a　cloth；　etc。；　with　my　eyes　closed；　then　I　may　so　clearly　see　the　color　of　the　object　before　me　that　I　might　be　really　seeing　it。　But　in　this　case　there　is　a　real　substitution　of　greater　or　lesser　degree。

The　same　vicariousness　occurs　when　perception　is　attributed　to　one　sense　while　it　properly　belongs　to　another。　This　happens　particularly　at　such　times　when　one　has　not　been　present　during　the　event　or　when　the　perception　was　made　while　only　half　awake；　or　a　long　time　ago；　and　finally；　when　a　group　of　other　impressions　have　accompanied　the　event；　so　that　there　was　not　time　enough；　if　I　may　say　so；　properly　to　register　the　sense　impression。　So；　e。　g。；　some　person；　especially　a　close　friend；　may　have　been　merely　heard　and　later　quite　convincingly　supposed　to　have　been　seen。　Sensitive　people；　who　generally　have　an　acuter　olfactory　sense　than　others；　attach　to　any　perceived　odor　all　the　other　appropriate　phenomena。　The　vicariousnesses　of　visual　sensations　are　the　most　numerous　and　the　most　important。　Anybody　who　has　been　pushed　or　beaten；　and　has　felt　the　blows；　will；　if　other　circumstances　permit　and　the　impulse　is　strong　enough；　be　convinced　that　he　has　seen　his　assaulter　and　the　manner　of　t