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on the improvement of the understanding(戻互堋響嬬薦)-及6何蛍
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On the Improvement of the Understanding
��60�А 。�1�� But these arguments demand further inquiry。 ��2�� First�察 �their
upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand anything。 If
they grant it�察�then necessarily the same must be said of understanding�察�as
is said of fiction。 ��3�� If they deny it�察�let us�察�who know that we do know
something�察 �see what they mean。 ��4�� They assert that the soul can be
conscious of�察�and perceive in a variety of ways�察�not itself nor things which
exist�察�but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else�察�in other
words�察�that the soul can�察�by its unaided power�察�create sensations or ideas
unconnected with things。 ��5�� In fact�察�they regard the soul as a sort of god。
��60��6�� Further�察�they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we
can constrain ourselves�察�or our soul�察�or even our soul's freedom。 ��7�� For�察�
after it has formed a fictitious idea�察 �and has given its assent thereto�察 �it
cannot think or feign it in any other manner�察�but is constrained by the first
fictitious idea to keep all its other thoughts in harmony therewith。 ��8��
Our opponents are thus driven to admit�察 �in support of their fiction�察 �the
absurdities which I have just enumerated�察 �and which are not worthy of
rational refutation。
��61�А 。�1�� While leaving such persons in their error�察�we will take care
to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose�察�
namely�察。�61a�А�that the mind�察�in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or
false�察 �so as to meditate upon it and understand it�察 �and derive the proper
conclusions in due order therefrom�察�will readily discover its falsity�察�and if
the thing hypothetical be in its nature true�察 �and the mind pays attention
to it�察�so as to understand it�察�and deduce the truths which are derivable from
it�察�the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions�察�
in the same way as it would at once discover ��as we showed just now�� the
absurdity of a false hypothesis�察�and of the conclusions drawn from it。
��62�А 。�1�� We need�察�therefore�察�be in no fear of forming hypotheses�察�so
long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved。 ��2��
For�察�if we were to assert�察�haply�察�that men are suddenly turned into beasts�察�
the statement would be extremely general�察�so general that there would be
no conception�察�that is�察�no idea or connection of subject and predicate�察�in
our mind。 ��3�� If there were such a conception we should at the same time
be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place。 ��4��
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Moreover�察 �we pay no attention to the nature of the subject and the
predicate。
��63�А 。�1�� Now�察 �if the first idea be not fictitious�察 �and if all the other
ideas be deduced therefrom�察 �our hurry to form fictitious ideas will
gradually subside。 ��2�� Further�察 �as a fictitious idea cannot be clear and
distinct�察�but is necessarily confused�察�and as all confusion arises from the
fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or
complex�察�and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown�察�
and�察 �again�察 �that it directs its attention promiscuously to all parts of an
object at once without making distinctions�察�it follows�察�first�察�that if the idea
be of something very simple�察�it must necessarily be clear and distinct。 ��3��
For a very simple object cannot be known in part�察�it must either be known
altogether or not at all。
��64�А 。�1�� Secondly�察�it follows that if a complex object be divided by
thought into a number of simple component parts�察�and if each be regarded
separately�察 �all confusion will disappear。 ��2�� Thirdly�察 �it follows that
fiction cannot be simple�察 �but is made up of the blending of several
confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature�察�or rather is
composed of attention directed to all such ideas at once�察 。�64b�А �and
unaccompanied by any mental assent。 ��64��3�� Now a fiction that was
simple would be clear and distinct�察 �and therefore true�察 �also a fiction
composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct�察�and therefore
true。 ��4�� For instance�察 �when we know the nature of the circle and the
square�察�it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures�察�and to
hypothesize a square circle�察�any more than a square soul�察�or things of that
kind。
��65�А。�1�� Let us shortly come to our conclusion�察�and again repeat that
we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which is only a
fiction。 ��2�� As for the first sort of fiction of which we have already
spoken�察�when a thing is clearly conceived�察�we saw that if the existence of a
that thing is in itself an eternal trut fiction can have no part in it�察�but if the
existence of the conceived be not an eternal truth�察 �we have only to be
careful such existence be compared to the thing's essence�察 �and to
consider the order of nature。 ��64��3�� As for the second sort of fiction�察�which
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we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention�察�without
the assent of the intellect�察�to different confused ideas representing different
things and actions existing in nature�察 �we have seen that an absolutely
simple thing cannot be feigned�察 �but must be understood�察 �and that a
complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts
whereof it is composed�察 �we shall not even be able to hypothesize any
untrue action concerning such objects�察�for we shall be obliged to consider
at the same time the causes and manner of such action。
��66�А 。�1�� These matters being thus understood�察 �let us pass on to
consider the false idea�察�observing the objects with which it is concerned�察�
and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into false perceptions。
��2�� Neither of these tasks will present much difficulty�察 �after our inquiry
concerning fictitious ideas。 ��3�� The false idea only differs from the
fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent ´ that is�察�as we have
already remarked�察 �while the representations are occurring�察 �there are no
causes present to us�察�wherefrom�察�as in fiction�察�we can conclude that such
representations do not arise from external objects�此�in fact�察�it is much the
same as dreaming with our eyes open�察�or while awake。 ��67��4�� Thus�察 �a
false idea is concerned with�察�or ��to speak more correctly�� is attributable to�察�
the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known�察�or the essence itself�察�
in the same way as a fictitious idea。
��67�А 。�1�� If attributable to the existence of the thing�察�it is corrected in
the same way as a fictitious idea under similar circumstances。 ��2�� If
attributable to the essence�察�it is likewise corrected in the same way as a
fictitious idea。 ��67��3�� For if the nature of the thing known implies
necessary existence�察 �we cannot possible be in error with regard to its
existence�察 �but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal truth�察 �like its
essence�察 �but contrariwise the necessity or impossibility of its existence
depends on external causes�察�then we must follow the same course as we
adopted in the of fiction�察�for it is corrected in the same manner。
��68�А 。�1�� As for false ideas concerned with essences�察 �or even with
actions�察 �such perceptions are necessarily always confused�察 �being
compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature�察�
as�察�for instance�察�when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods�察�
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On the Improvement of the Understanding
in statues�察 �in brute beasts�察 �and the like�察 �that there are bodies which�察 �by
their composition alone�察 �give rise to intellect�察 �that corpses reason�察 �walk
about�察 �and speak�察 �that God is deceived�察 �and so on。 ��68��2�� But ideas
which are clear and distinct can never be false�此�for ideas of things clearly
and distinctly conceived are either very simple themselves�察 �or are
compounded from very simple ideas�察�that is�察�are deduced therefrom。 ��3��
The impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone
who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood。
��69�А 。�1�� As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth�察 �it is
certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one�察�not so much by its
extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nat
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