嗔秤戻幣�哉膵�云利匈嬉蝕湊蛸賜�塋床四衲���萩晦編報炎嘔囚^泡仟 ̄云利匈��
栽怩弌傍利 卦指云慕朕村 紗秘慕禰 厘議慕尺 厘議慕禰 TXT畠云和墮 〆辺茄欺厘議箝誓匂〇

on the improvement of the understanding(戻互堋響嬬薦)-及6何蛍

酔楯荷恬: 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈 梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何! 泌惚云慕短嗤堋響頼���誅卒亮茂�俊彭堋響��辛聞喘貧圭 "辺茄欺厘議箝誓匂" 孔嬬 才 "紗秘慕禰" 孔嬬��





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     ��60�А  。�1��   But   these   arguments   demand   further   inquiry。   ��2��   First�察  �their 

upholders must   either grant   or  deny that   we  can understand   anything。  If 

they grant it�察�then necessarily the same must be said of understanding�察�as 

is said of fiction。 ��3�� If they deny it�察�let us�察�who know that we do know 

something�察  �see   what   they   mean。         ��4��   They   assert   that   the   soul   can   be 

conscious of�察�and perceive in a variety of ways�察�not itself nor things which 

exist�察�but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere else�察�in other 

words�察�that the soul can�察�by its unaided power�察�create sensations or ideas 

unconnected with things。           ��5�� In fact�察�they regard the soul as a sort of god。 

��60��6�� Further�察�they assert that we or our soul have such freedom that we 

can constrain ourselves�察�or our soul�察�or even our soul's freedom。                     ��7�� For�察�

after   it   has   formed   a   fictitious   idea�察  �and   has   given   its   assent   thereto�察  �it 

cannot think or feign it in any other manner�察�but is constrained by the first 

fictitious   idea   to   keep   all   its   other   thoughts   in   harmony   therewith。    ��8�� 

Our   opponents   are   thus   driven   to   admit�察  �in   support   of   their   fiction�察  �the 

absurdities   which   I   have   just   enumerated�察  �and   which   are   not   worthy   of 

rational refutation。 

     ��61�А    。�1�� While leaving such persons in their error�察�we will take care 

to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for our purpose�察�

namely�察。�61a�А�that the mind�察�in paying attention to a thing hypothetical or 

false�察 �so   as to   meditate upon   it   and understand   it�察 �and derive the   proper 

conclusions in due order therefrom�察�will readily discover its falsity�察�and if 

the  thing   hypothetical   be   in   its   nature   true�察  �and   the   mind   pays   attention 

to it�察�so as to understand it�察�and deduce the truths which are derivable from 

it�察�the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted series of apt conclusions�察�

in the same way as it would at once discover ��as we showed just now�� the 

absurdity of a false hypothesis�察�and of the conclusions drawn from it。 

     ��62�А    。�1�� We need�察�therefore�察�be in no fear of forming hypotheses�察�so 

long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is involved。                        ��2�� 

For�察�if we were to assert�察�haply�察�that men are suddenly turned into beasts�察�

the statement would be extremely general�察�so general that there would be 

no conception�察�that is�察�no idea or connection of subject and predicate�察�in 

our mind。 ��3�� If there were such a conception we should at the same time 

be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place。 ��4�� 



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Moreover�察      �we    pay   no    attention    to  the   nature    of  the   subject    and    the 

predicate。 

     ��63�А    。�1��   Now�察  �if   the   first   idea   be   not   fictitious�察  �and   if   all   the   other 

ideas     be   deduced      therefrom�察    �our    hurry    to  form    fictitious    ideas    will 

gradually   subside。        ��2��   Further�察  �as   a   fictitious   idea   cannot   be   clear   and 

distinct�察�but is necessarily confused�察�and as all confusion arises from the 

fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a thing either simple or 

complex�察�and does not distinguish between the known and the unknown�察�

and�察  �again�察  �that   it   directs   its   attention   promiscuously   to   all   parts   of   an 

object at once without making distinctions�察�it follows�察�first�察�that if the idea 

be of something very simple�察�it must necessarily be clear and distinct。                       ��3�� 

For a very simple object cannot be known in part�察�it must either be known 

altogether or not at all。 

     ��64�А    。�1�� Secondly�察�it follows that if a complex object be divided by 

thought into a number of simple component parts�察�and if each be regarded 

separately�察     �all  confusion      will   disappear。      ��2��   Thirdly�察    �it  follows    that 

fiction    cannot     be   simple�察   �but   is  made     up   of  the   blending     of   several 

confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in nature�察�or rather is 

composed        of   attention    directed    to   all  such    ideas   at  once�察   。�64b�А   �and 

unaccompanied by any mental assent。                       ��64��3�� Now a fiction that was 

simple      would    be   clear   and    distinct�察  �and   therefore     true�察 �also   a  fiction 

composed only of distinct ideas would be clear and distinct�察�and therefore 

true。    ��4��   For   instance�察  �when   we   know   the   nature   of   the   circle   and   the 

square�察�it is impossible for us to blend together these two figures�察�and to 

hypothesize a square circle�察�any more than a square soul�察�or things of that 

kind。 

     ��65�А。�1�� Let us shortly come to our conclusion�察�and again repeat that 

we   need   have   no   fear   of   confusing   with   true   ideas   that   which   is   only   a 

fiction。     ��2��   As   for   the   first   sort   of   fiction   of   which   we   have   already 

spoken�察�when a thing is clearly conceived�察�we saw that if the existence of a 

that thing is in itself an eternal trut fiction can have no part in it�察�but if the 

existence   of   the     conceived   be   not an   eternal   truth�察 �we   have only  to   be 

careful      such     existence     be   compared       to  the   thing's    essence�察    �and   to 

consider the order of nature。 ��64��3�� As for the second sort of fiction�察�which 



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we stated to be the result of simultaneously directing the attention�察�without 

the assent of the intellect�察�to different confused ideas representing different 

things   and   actions   existing   in   nature�察  �we   have   seen   that   an   absolutely 

simple      thing   cannot     be   feigned�察   �but   must     be   understood�察     �and    that  a 

complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the simple parts 

whereof   it   is   composed�察  �we   shall   not   even   be   able   to   hypothesize   any 

untrue action concerning such objects�察�for we shall be obliged to consider 

at the same time the causes and manner of such action。 

     ��66�А    。�1��    These    matters     being    thus   understood�察     �let  us   pass   on   to 

consider the false idea�察�observing the objects with which it is concerned�察�

and the   means of guarding ourselves   from falling   into false perceptions。 

��2��   Neither   of   these   tasks   will   present   much   difficulty�察  �after   our   inquiry 

concerning        fictitious   ideas。    ��3��   The    false   idea   only    differs   from     the 

fictitious idea in the fact of implying a mental assent ´ that is�察�as we have 

already   remarked�察  �while   the   representations   are   occurring�察  �there   are   no 

causes present to us�察�wherefrom�察�as in fiction�察�we can conclude that such 

representations do not arise from external objects�此�in fact�察�it is much the 

same as   dreaming   with our eyes   open�察�or   while awake。                   ��67��4�� Thus�察  �a 

false idea is concerned with�察�or ��to speak more correctly�� is attributable to�察�

the existence of a thing whereof the essence is known�察�or the essence itself�察�

in the same way as a fictitious idea。 

     ��67�А    。�1�� If attributable to the existence of the thing�察�it is corrected in 

the   same   way   as   a   fictitious   idea   under   similar   circumstances。           ��2��   If 

attributable to   the essence�察�it is likewise corrected   in the same way  as   a 

fictitious     idea。   ��67��3��    For    if  the   nature    of  the   thing    known      implies 

necessary   existence�察  �we   cannot   possible   be   in   error   with   regard   to   its 

existence�察  �but   if   the   nature   of   the   thing   be   not   an   eternal   truth�察  �like   its 

essence�察  �but   contrariwise   the   necessity   or   impossibility   of   its   existence 

depends on external causes�察�then we must follow the same course as we 

adopted in the        of fiction�察�for it is corrected in the same manner。 

     ��68�А    。�1��   As   for   false   ideas   concerned   with   essences�察  �or   even   with 

actions�察     �such     perceptions       are    necessarily      always      confused�察      �being 

compounded of different confused perceptions of things existing in nature�察�

as�察�for instance�察�when men are persuaded that deities are present in woods�察�



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                            On the Improvement of the Understanding 



in   statues�察  �in   brute   beasts�察  �and   the   like�察  �that   there   are   bodies   which�察  �by 

their   composition   alone�察  �give   rise   to   intellect�察  �that   corpses   reason�察  �walk 

about�察  �and   speak�察  �that   God   is   deceived�察  �and   so   on。       ��68��2��   But   ideas 

which are clear and distinct can never be false�此�for ideas of things clearly 

and     distinctly    conceived       are   either    very    simple    themselves�察      �or   are 

compounded from very simple ideas�察�that is�察�are deduced therefrom。                            ��3�� 

The impossibility of a very simple idea being false is evident to everyone 

who understands the nature of truth or understanding and of falsehood。 

     ��69�А    。�1�� As   regards   that   which   constitutes   the   reality   of   truth�察  �it   is 

certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one�察�not so much by its 

extrinsic   object   as   by  its   intrinsic   nat
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酔楯荷恬: 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈 梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈 梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何!
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