bentham-第3部分

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f　fact　relevant　to　the　question；　and　if　he　could　not　find　that　it　did　either；　he　treated　it　as　an　attempt　on　the　part　of　the　disputant　to　impose　his　own　individual　sentiment　on　other　people；　without　giving　them　a　reason　for　it；　a　'　contrivance　for　avoiding　the　obligation　of　appealing　to　any　external　standard；　and　for　prevailing　upon　the　reader　to　accept　of　the　author's　sentiment　and　opinion　as　a　reason；　and　that　a　sufficient　one；　for　itself。　Bentham　shall　speak　for　himself　on　this　subject：　the　passage　is　from　his　first　systematic　work；　'Introduction　to　the　Principles　of　Morals　and　Legislation'；　and　we　could　scarcely　quote　anything　more　strongly　exemplifying　both　the　strength　and　weakness　of　his　mode　of　philosophizing。

　　　　It　is　curious　enough　to　observe　the　variety　of　inventions　men　have　hit　upon；　and　the　variety　of　phrases　they　have　brought　forward；　in　order　to　conceal　from　the　world；　and；　if　possible；　from　themselves；　this　very　general　and　therefore　very　pardonable　self…sufficiency。　　　　　1。　One　man　says；　he　has　a　thing　made　on　purpose　to　tell　him　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong；　and　that　is　called　a　'moral　sense'。。　and　then　he　goes　to　work　at　his　ease；　and　says；　such　a　thing　is　right；　and　such　a　thing　is　wrong　　why？　'Because　my　moral　sense　tells　me　it　is。'　　　　　2。　Another　man　comes　and　alters　the　phrase：　leaving　out　moral；　and　putting　in　common　in　the　room　of　it。　He　then　tells　you　that　his　common　sense　tells　him　what　is　right　and　wrong；　as　surely　as　the　other's　moral　sense　did；　meaning　by　common　sense　a　sense　of　some　kind　or　other；　which；　he　says；　is　possessed　by　all　mankind：　the　sense　of　those　whose　sense　is　not　the　same　as　the　author's　being　struck　out　as　not　worth　taking。　This　contrivance　does　better　than　the　other；　for　a　moral　sense　being　a　new　thing；　a　man　may　feel　about　him　a　good　while　without　being　able　to　find　it　out：　but　common　sense　is　as　old　as　the　creation；　and　there　is　no　man　but　would　be　ashamed　to　be　thought　not　to　have　as　much　of　it　as　his　neighbours。　It　has　another　great　advantage：　by　appearing　to　share　power；　it　lessens　envy；　for　when　a　man　gets　up　upon　this　ground；　in　order　to　anathematize　those　who　differ　from　him；　it　is　not　by　a　sic　volo　sic　jubeo；　but　by　a　velitis　jubeatis。　　　　　3。　Another　man　comes；　and　says；　that　as　to　a　moral　sense　indeed；　he　cannot　find　that　he　has　any　such　thing：　that；　however；　he　has　an　understanding；　which　will　do　quite　as　well。　This　understanding；　he　says；　is　the　standard　of　right　and　wrong：　it　tells　him　so　and　so。　All　good　and　wise　men　understand　as　he　does：　if　other　men's　understandings　differ　in　any　part　from　his；　so　much　the　worse　for　them：　it　is　a　sure　sign　they　are　either　defective　or　corrupt。　　　　　4。　Another　man　says；　that　there　is　an　eternal　and　immutable　Rule　of　Right：　that　the　rule　of　right　dictates　so　and　so：　and　then　he　begins　giving　you　his　sentiments　upon　anything　that　comes　uppermost：　and　these　sentiments　（you　are　to　take　for　granted）　are　so　many　branches　of　the　eternal　rule　of　right。　　　　　5。　Another　man；　or　perhaps　the　same　man　（it　is　nO　matter）；　says　that　there　are　certain　practices　conformable　and　others　repugnant；　to　the　Fitness　of　Things；　and　then　he　tells　you；　at　his　leisure；　what　practices　are　conformable；　and　what　repugnant：　just　as　he　happens　to　like　a　practice　or　dislike　it。　　　　　6。　A　great　multitude　of　people　are　continually　talking　of　the　Law　of　Nature；　and　then　they　go　on　giving　you　their　sentiments　about　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong：　and　these　sentiments；　you　are　to　understand；　are　so　many　chapters　and　sections　of　the　Law　of　Nature。　　　　　7。　Instead　of　the　phrase；　Law　of　Nature；　you　have　sometimes　Law　of　Reason；　Right　Reason；　Natural　Justice；　Natural　Equity；　Good　Order。　Any　of　them　will　do　equally　well。　This　latter　is　most　used　in　politics。　The　three　last　are　much　more　tolerable　than　the　others；　because　they　do　not　very　explicitly　claim　to　be　anything　more　than　phrases：　they　insist　but　feebly　upon　their　being　looked　upon　as　so　many　positive　standards　of　themselves；　and　seem　content　to　be　taken；　upon　occasion；　for　phrases　expressive　of　the　conformity　of　the　thing　in　question　to　the　proper　standards；　whatever　that　may　be。　On　most　occasions；　however；　it　will　be　better　to　say　utility。　utility　is　clearer　as　referring　more　explicitly　to　pain　and　pleasure。　　　　　8。　We　have　one　philosopher；　who　says；　there　is　no　harm　in　anything　in　the　world　but　in　telling　a　lie；　and　that　if；　for　example；　you　were　to　murder　your　own　father；　this　would　only　be　a　particular　way　of　saying；　he　was　not　your　father。　Of　course　when　this　philosopher　sees　anything　that　he　does　not　like；　he　says；　it　is　a　particular　way　of　telling　a　lie。　It　is　saying；　that　the　act　ought　to　be　done；　or　may　be　done；　when；　in　truth；　it　ought　not　be　done。　　　　　9。　The　fairest　and　openest　of　them　all　is　that　sort　of　man　who　speaks　out；　and　says；　I　am　of　the　number　of　the　Elect：　now　God　himself　takes　care　to　inform　the　Elect　what　is　right：　and　that　with　so　good　effect；　and　let　them　strive　ever　so；　they　cannot　help　not　only　knowing　it　but　practising　it。　If　therefore　a　man　wants　to　know　what　is　right　and　what　is　wrong；　he　has　nothing　to　do　but　to　come　to　me。

　　　　Few　will　contend　that　this　is　a　perfectly　fair　representation　of　the　animus　of　those　who　employ　the　various　phrases　so　amusingly　animadverted　on；　but　that　the　phrases　contain　no　argument；　save　what　is　grounded　on　the　very　feelings　they　are　adduced　to　justify；　is　a　truth　which　Bentham　had　the　eminent　merit　of　first　pointing　out。　　　　　It　is　the　introduction　into　the　philosophy　of　human　conduct；　of　this　method　of　detail　　of　this　practice　of　never　reasoning　about　wholes　until　they　have　been　resolved　into　their　parts；　nor　about　abstractions　until　they　have　been　translated　into　realities　　that　constitutes　the　originality　of　Bentham　in　philosophy；　and　makes　him　the　great　reformer　of　the　moral　and　political　branch　of　it。　To　what　he　terms　the　'exhaustive　method　of　classification'；　which　is　but　one　branch　of　this　more　general　method；　he　himself　ascribes　everything　original　in　the　systematic　and　elaborate　work　from　which　we　have　quoted。　The　generalities　of　his　philosophy　itself　have　little　or　no　novelty：　to　ascribe　any　to　the　doctrine　that　general　utility　is　the　foundation　of　morality；　would　imply　great　ignorance　of　the　history　of　philosophy；　of　general　literature；　and　of　Bentham's　own　writings。　He　derived　the　idea；　as　he　says　himself；　from　Helvetius；　and　it　was　the　doctrine　no　less；　of　the　religious　philosophers　of　that　age；　prior　to　Reid　and　Beattie。　We　never　saw　an　abler　defence　of　the　doctrine　of　utility　than　in　a　book　written　in　refutation　of　Shaftesbury；　and　now　little　read　　Brown's　'Essays　on　the　Characteristics'；　and　in　Johnson's　celebrated　review　of　Soame　Jenyns；　the　same　doctrine　is　set　forth　as　that　both　of　the　author　and　of　the　reviewer。　In　all　ages　of　philosophy　one　of　its　schools　has　been　utilitarian　　not　only　from　the　time　of　Epicurus；　but　long　before。　It　was　by　mere　accident　that　this　opinion　became　connected　in　Bentham　with　his　peculiar　method。　The　utilitarian　philosophers　antecedent　to　him　had　no　more　claims　to　the　method　than　their　antagonists。　To　refer；　for　instance；　to　the　Epicurean　philosophy；　according　to　the　most　complete　view　we　have　of　the　moral　part　of　it；　by　the　most　accomplished　scholar　of　antiquity；　Cicero；　we　ask　any　one　who　has　read　his　philosophical　writings；　the　'De　Finibus'　for　instance；　whether　the　arguments　of　the　Epicureans　do　not；　just　as　much　as　those　of　the　Stoics　or　Platonists；　consist　of　mere　rhetorical　appeals　to　common　notions；　to　eikita　and　simeia　instead　of　tekmiria；　notions　picked　up　as　it　were　casually；　and　when　true　at　all；　never　so　narrowly　looked　into　as　to　ascertain　in　what　sense　and　under　what　limitations　they　are　true。　The　application　of　a　real　inductive　philosophy　to　the　problems　of　ethics；　is　as　unknown　to　the　Epicurean　moralists　as　to　any　of　the　other　schools；　they　never　take　a　question　to　pieces；　and　join　issue　on　a　definite　point。　Bentham　certainly　did　not　learn　his　sifting　and　anatomizing　method　from　them。　　　　　This　method　Bentham　has　finally　installed　in　philosophy；　has　made　it　henceforth　imperative　on　philosophers　of　all　schools。　By　it　he　has　formed　the　intellects　of　many　thinkers；　who　either　never　adopted；　or　have　abandoned；　many　of　his　peculiar　opinions。　He　has　taught　the　method　to　men　of　the　most　opposite　schools　to　his；　he　has　made　them　perceive　that　if　they　do　not　test　their　doctrines　by　the　method　of　detail；　their　adversaries　will。　He　has　thus；　it　is　not　too　much　to　say；　for　the　first　time　introduced　precision　of　thought　into　moral　and　political　philosophy。　Instead　of　taking　up　their　opinions　by　intuition；　or　by　ratiocination　from　premises　adopted　on　a　mere　rough　view；　and　couched　in　language　so　vague　that　it　is　impossible　to　say　exactly　whether　they　are　true　or　false；　philosophers　are　now　forced　to　understand　one　another；　to　break　down　the　generality　of　their　propositions；　and　join　a　precise　issue　in　every　dispute。　This　is　nothing　less　than　a　revolution　in　philosophy。　Its　effect　is　gradually　becoming　evident　in　the　writings　of　English　thinkers　of　every　variety　of　opinion；　and　will　be　felt　more　and　more　in　proportion　as　Bentham's　writings　are　diffused；　and　as　the　number　of　minds　to　whose　formation　they　contribute　is　multiplied。　　　　　It　will　naturally　be　presumed　that　of　the　fruits　of　this　great　philosophical　improvement　some　portion　at　least　will　have　been　reaped　by　its　author。　Armed　with　such　a　potent　instrument；　and　wielding　it　with　such　singleness　of　aim；　cultivating　the　field　of　practical　philosophy　with　such　unwearied　and　such　consistent　use　of　a　method　right　in　itself；　and　not　adopted　by　his　predecessors；　it　cannot　he　but　that　Bentham　by　his　own　inquiries　must　have　accomplished　something　considerable。　And　so；　it　will　be　found；　he　has；　something　not　only　considerable；　but　extraordinary；　though　but　little　compared　with　what　he　has　left　undone；　and　far　short　of　what　his　sanguine　and　almost　boyish　fancy　made　him　flatter　himself　that　he　had　accomplished。　His　peculiar　method；　admirably　calculated　to　make　clear　thinkers；　and　sure　ones　to　the　extent　of　their　materials；　has　not　equal　efficacy　for　making　those　materials　complete。　It　is　a　security　for　accuracy；　but　not　for　comprehensiveness；　or　rather；　it　is　a　security　f