bentham-第4部分

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omplete。　It　is　a　security　for　accuracy；　but　not　for　comprehensiveness；　or　rather；　it　is　a　security　for　one　sort　of　comprehensiveness；　but　not　for　another。　　　　　Bentham's　method　of　laying　out　his　subject　is　admirable　as　a　preservative　against　one　kind　of　narrow　and　partial　views。　He　begins　by　placing　before　himself　the　whole　of　the　field　of　inquiry　to　which　the　particular　question　belongs；　and　divides　down　till　he　arrives　at　the　thing　he　is　in　search　of；　and　thus　by　successively　rejecting　all　which　is　not　the　thing；　he　gradually　works　out　a　definition　of　what　it　is。　This；　which　he　calls　the　exhaustive　method；　is　as　old　as　philosophy　itself。　Plato　owes　everything　to　it；　and　does　everything　by　it；　and　the　use　made　of　it　by　that　great　man　in　his　Dialogues；　Bacon；　in　one　of　those　pregnant　logical　hints　scattered　through　his　writings；　and　so　much　neglected　by　most　of　his　pretended　followers；　pronounces　to　be　the　nearest　approach　to　a　true　inductive　method　in　the　ancient　philosophy。　Bentham　was　probably　not　aware　that　Plato　had　anticipated　him　in　the　process　to　which　he　too　declared　that　he　owed　everything。　By　the　practice　of　it；　his　speculations　are　rendered　eminently　systematic　and　consistent；　no　question；　with　him；　is　ever　an　insulated　one；　he　sees　every　subject　in　connexion　with　all　the　other　subjects　with　which　in　his　view　it　is　related；　and　from　which　it　requires　to　be　distinguished；　and　as　all　that　he　knows；　in　the　least　degree　allied　to　the　subject；　has　been　marshalled　in　an　orderly　manner　before　him；　he　does　not；　like　people　who　use　a　looser　method；　forget　and　overlook　a　thing　on　one　occasion　to　remember　it　on　another。　Hence　there　is　probably　no　philosopher　of　so　wide　a　range；　in　whom　there　are　so　few　inconsistencies。　If　any　of　the　truths　which　he　did　not　see；　had　come　to　be　seen　by　him；　he　would　have　remembered　it　everywhere　and　at　all　times；　and　would　have　adjusted　his　whole　system　to　it。　And　this　is　another　admirable　quality　which　he　has　impressed　upon　the　best　of　the　minds　trained　in　his　habits　of　thought：　when　those　minds　open　to　admit　new　truths；　they　digest　them　as　fast　as　they　receive　them。　　　　　But　this　system；　excellent　for　keeping　before　the　mind　of　the　thinker　all　that　he　knows；　does　not　make　him　know　enough；　it　does　not　make　a　knowledge　of　some　of　the　properties　of　a　thing　suffice　for　the　whole　of　it；　nor　render　a　rooted　habit　of　surveying　a　complex　object　（though　ever　so　carefully）　in　only　one　of　its　aspects；　tantamount　to　the　power　of　contemplating　it　in　all。　To　give　this　last　power；　other　qualities　are　required：　whether　Bentham　possessed　those　other　qualities　we　now　have　to　see。　Bentham's　mind；　as　we　have　already　said；　was　eminently　synthetical。　He　begins　all　his　inquiries　by　supposing　nothing　to　he　known　on　the　subject；　and　reconstructs　all　philosophy　ab　initio；　without　reference　to　the　opinions　of　his　predecessors。　But　to　build　either　a　philosophy　or　anything　else；　there　must　be　materials。　For　the　philosophy　of　matter；　the　materials　are　the　properties　of　matter；　for　moral　and　political　philosophy；　the　properties　of　man；　and　of　man's　position　in　the　world。　The　knowledge　which　any　inquirer　possesses　of　these　properties；　constitutes　a　limit　beyond　which；　as　a　moralist　or　a　political　philosopher；　whatever　be　his　powers　of　mind；　he　cannot　reach。　Nobody's　synthesis　can　be　more　complete　than　his　analysis。　If　in　his　survey　of　human　nature　and　life　he　has　left　any　element　out；　then；　wheresoever　that　element　exerts　any　influence；　his　conclusions　will　fail；　more　or　less；　in　their　application。　If　he　has　left　out　many　elements；　and　those　very　important；　his　labours　may　be　highly　valuable；　he　may　have　largely　contributed　to　that　body　of　partial　truths　which；　when　completed　and　corrected　by　one　another；　constitute　practical　truth；　but　the　applicability　of　his　system　to　practice　in　its　own　proper　shape　will　be　of　an　exceedingly　limited　range。　　　　　Human　nature　and　human　life　are　wide　subjects；　and　whoever　would　embark　in　an　enterprise　requiring　a　thorough　knowledge　of　them；　has　need　both　of　large　stores　of　his　own；　and　of　all　aids　and　appliances　from　elsewhere。　His　qualifications　for　success　will　be　proportional　to　two　things：　the　degree　in　which　his　own　nature　and　circumstances　furnish　them　with　a　correct　and　complete　picture　of　man's　nature　and　circumstances；　and　his　capacity　of　deriving　light　from　other　minds。　　　　　Bentham　failed　in　deriving　light　from　other　minds。　His　writings　contain　few　traces　of　the　accurate　knowledge　of　any　schools　of　thinking　but　his　own；　and　many　proofs　of　his　entire　conviction　that　they　could　teach　him　nothing　worth　knowing。　For　some　of　the　most　illustrious　of　previous　thinkers；　his　contempt　was　unmeasured。　In　almost　the　only　passage　of　the　'Deontology'　which；　from　its　style；　and　from　its　having　before　appeared　in　print；　may　be　known　to　be　Bentham's；　Socrates；　and　Plato　are　spoken　of　in　terms　distressing　to　his　great　admirers；　and　the　incapacity　to　appreciate　such　men；　is　a　fact　perfectly　in　unison　with　the　general　habits　of　Bentham's　mind。　He　had　a　phrase；　expressive　of　the　view　he　took　of　all　moral　speculations　to　which　his　method　had　not　been　applied；　or　（which　he　considered　as　the　same　thing）　not　founded　on　a　recognition　of　utility　as　the　moral　standard；　this　phrase　was　'vague　generalities'。　Whatever　presented　itself　to　him　in　such　a　shape；　he　dismissed　as　unworthy　of　notice；　or　dwelt　upon　only　to　denounce　as　absurd。　He　did　not　heed；　or　rather　the　nature　of　his　mind　prevented　it　from　occurring　to　him；　that　these　generalities　contained　the　whole　unanalysed　experience　of　the　human　race。　　　　　Unless　it　can　be　asserted　that　mankind　did　not　know　anything　until　logicians　taught　it　to　them　that　until　the　last　hand　has　been　put　to　a　moral　truth　by　giving　it　a　metaphysically　precise　expression；　all　the　previous　rough…hewing　which　it　has　undergone　by　the　common　intellect　at　the　suggestion　of　common　wants　and　common　experience　is　to　go　for　nothing；　it　must　be　allowed；　that　even　the　originality　which　can；　and　the　courage　which　dares；　think　for　itself；　is　not　a　more　necessary　part　of　the　philosophical　character　than　a　thoughtful　regard　for　previous　thinkers；　and　for　the　collective　mind　of　the　human　race。　What　has　been　the　opinion　of　mankind；　has　been　the　opinion　of　persons　of　all　tempers　and　dispositions；　of　all　partialities　and　prepossessions；　of　all　varieties　in　position；　in　education；　in　opportunities　of　observation　and　inquiry。　No　one　inquirer　is　all　this；　every　inquirer　is　either　young　or　old；　rich　or　poor；　sickly　or　healthy；　married　or　unmarried；　meditative　or　active；　a　poet　or　a　logician；　an　ancient　or　a　modern；　a　man　or　a　woman；　and　if　a　thinking　person；　has；　in　addition；　the　accidental　peculiarities　of　his　individual　modes　of　thought。　Every　circumstance　which　gives　a　character　to　the　life　of　a　human　being；　carries　with　it　its　peculiar　biases；　its　peculiar　facilities　for　perceiving　some　things；　and　for　missing　or　forgetting　others。　But；　from　points　of　view　different　from　his；　different　things　are　perceptible；　and　none　are　more　likely　to　have　seen　what　he　does　not　see；　than　those　who　do　not　see　what　he　sees。　The　general　opinion　of　mankind　is　the　average　of　the　conclusions　of　all　minds；　stripped　indeed　of　their　choicest　and　most　recondite　thoughts；　but　freed　from　their　twists　and　partialities：　a　net　result；　in　which　everybody's　point　of　view　is　represented；　nobody's　predominant。　The　collective　mind　does　not　penetrate　below　the　surface；　but　it　sees　all　the　surface；　which　profound　thinkers；　even　by　reason　of　their　profundity；　often　fail　to　do：　their　intenser　view　of　a　thing　in　some　of　its　aspects　diverting　their　attention　from　others。　　　　　The　hardiest　assertor；　therefore；　of　the　freedom　of　private　judgment　the　keenest　detector　of　the　errors　of　his　predecessors；　and　of　the　inaccuracies　of　current　modes　of　thought　　is　the　very　person　who　most　needs　to　fortify　the　weak　side　of　his　own　intellect；　by　study　of　the　opinions　of　mankind　in　all　ages　and　nations；　and　of　the　speculations　of　philosophers　of　the　modes　of　thought　most　opposite　to　his　own。　It　is　there　that　he　will　find　the　experiences　denied　to　himself　　the　remainder　of　the　truth　of　which　he　sees　but　half　　the　truths；　of　which　the　errors　he　detects　are　commonly　but　the　exaggerations。　If；　like　Bentham；　he　brings　with　him　an　improved　instrument　of　investigation；　the　greater　is　the　probability　that　he　will　find　ready　prepared　a　rich　abundance　of　rough　ore；　which　was　merely　waiting　for　that　instrument。　A　man　of　clear　ideas　errs　grievously　if　he　imagines　that　whatever　is　seen　confusedly　does　not　exist：　it　belongs　to　him；　when　he　meets　with　such　a　thing；　to　dispel　the　mist；　and　fix　the　outlines　of　the　vague　form　which　is　looming　through　it。　　　　　Bentham's　contempt；　then；　of　all　other　schools　of　thinkers；　his　determination　to　create　a　philosophy　wholly　out　of　the　materials　furnished　by　his　own　mind；　and　by　minds　like　his　own；　was　his　first　disqualification　as　a　philosopher。　His　second；　was　the　incompleteness　of　his　own　mind　as　a　representative　of　universal　human　nature。　In　many　of　the　most　natural　and　strongest　feelings　of　human　nature　he　had　no　sympathy；　from　many　of　its　graver　experiences　he　was　altogether　cut　off；　and　the　faculty　by　which　one　mind　understands　a　mind　different　from　itself；　and　throws　itself　into　the　feelings　of　that　other　mind；　was　denied　him　by　his　deficiency　of　Imagination。　　　　　With　Imagination　in　the　popular　sense；　command　of　imagery　and　metaphorical　expression；　Bentham　was；　to　a　certain　degree；　endowed。　For　want；　indeed；　of　poetical　culture；　the　images　with　which　his　fancy　supplied　him　were　seldom　beautiful；　but　they　were　quaint　and　humorous；　or　bold；　forcible；　and　intense：　passages　might　be　quoted　from　him　both　of　playful　irony；　and　of　declamatory　eloquence；　seldom　surpassed　in　the　writings　of　philosophers。　The　Imagination　which　he　had　not；　was　that　to　which　the　name　is　generally　appropriated　by　the　best　writers　of　the　present　day；　that　which　enables　us；　by　a　voluntary　effort；　to　conceive　the　absent　as　if　it　were　present；　the　imaginary　as　if　it　were　real；　and　to　cloth　it　in　the　feelings　which；　if　it　were　indeed　real；　it　would　bring　along　with　it。　This　is　the　power　by　which　one　human　being　enters　into　the　mind　and　circumstances　of　another。　This　power　cons