bentham-第6部分

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for　movement　and　activity；　a　principle　scarcely　of　less　influence　in　human　life　than　its　opposite；　the　love　of　ease：　None　of　these　powerful　constituents　of　human　nature　are　thought　worthy　of　a　place　among　the　'Springs　of　Action'；　and　though　there　is　possibly　no　one　of　them　of　the　existence　of　which　an　acknowledgment　might　not　be　found　in　some　corner　of　Bentham's　writings；　no　conclusions　are　ever　founded　on　the　acknowledgment。　Man；　that　most　complex　being；　is　a　very　simple　one　in　his　eyes。　Even　under　the　head　of　sympathy；　his　recognition　does　not　extend　to　the　more　complex　forms　of　the　feeling　　the　love　of　loving；　the　need　of　a　sympathizing　support；　or　of　objects　of　admiration　and　reverence。　If　he　thought　at　all　of　any　of　the　deeper　feelings　of　human　nature；　it　was　but　as　idiosyncrasies　of　taste；　with　which　the　moralist　no　more　than　the　legislator　had　any　concern；　further　than　to　prohibit　such　as　were　mischievous　among　the　actions　to　which　they　might　chance　to　lead。　To　say　either　that　man　should；　or　that　he　should　not；　take　pleasure　in　one　thing；　displeasure　in　another；　appeared　to　him　as　much　an　act　of　despotism　in　the　moralist　as　in　the　political　ruler。　　　　　It　would　be　most　unjust　to　Bentham　to　surmise　（as　narrow…minded　and　passionate　adversaries　are　apt　in　such　cases　to　do）　that　this　picture　of　human　nature　was　copied　from　himself；　that　all　those　constituents　of　humanity　which　he　rejected　from　his　table　of　motives；　were　wanting　in　his　own　breast。　The　unusual　strength　of　his　early　feelings　of　virtue；　was；　as　we　have　seen；　the　original　cause　of　all　his　speculations；　and　a　noble　sense　of　morality；　and　especially　of　justice；　guides　and　pervades　them　all。　But　having　been　early　accustomed　to　keep　before　his　mind's　eye　the　happiness　of　mankind　（or　rather　of　the　whole　sentient　world）；　as　the　only　thing　desirable　in　itself；　or　which　rendered　anything　else　desirable；　he　confounded　all　disinterested　feelings　which　he　found　in　himself；　with　the　desire　of　general　happiness：　just　as　some　religious　writers；　who　loved　virtue　for　its　own　sake　as　much　perhaps　as　men　could　do；　habitually　confounded　their　love　of　virtue　with　their　fear　of　hell。　It　would　have　required　greater　subtlety　than　Bentham　possessed；　to　distinguish　from　each　other；　feelings　which；　from　long　habit；　always　acted　in　the　same　direction；　and　his　want　of　imagination　prevented　him　from　reading　the　distinction；　where　it　is　legible　enough；　in　the　hearts　of　others。　　　　　Accordingly；　he　has　not　been　followed　in　this　grand　oversight　by　any　of　the　able　men　who；　from　the　extent　of　their　intellectual　obligations　to　him；　have　been　regarded　as　his　disciples。　They　may　have　followed　him　in　his　doctrine　of　utility；　and　in　his　rejection　of　a　moral　sense　as　the　test　of　right　and　wrong：　but　while　repudiating　it　as　such；　they　have；　with　Hartley；　acknowledged　it　as　a　fact　in　human　nature；　they　have　endeavoured　to　account　for　it；　to　assign　its　laws：　nor　are　they　justly　chargeable　either　with　undervaluing　this　part　of　our　nature；　or　with　any　disposition　to　throw　it　into　the　background　of　their　speculations。　If　any　part　of　the　influence　of　this　cardinal　error　has　extended　itself　to　them；　it　is　circuitously；　and　through　the　effect　on　their　minds　of　other　parts　of　Bentham's　doctrines。　　　　　Sympathy；　the　only　disinterested　motive　which　Bentham　recognized；　he　felt　the　inadequacy　of；　except　in　certain　limited　cases；　as　a　security　for　virtuous　action。　Personal　affection；　he　well　knew；　is　as　liable　to　operate　to　the　injury　of　third　parties；　and　requires　as　much　to　be　kept　under　government；　as　any　other　feeling　whatever：　and　general　philanthropy；　considered　as　a　motive　influencing　mankind　in　general；　he　estimated　at　its　true　value　when　divorced　from　the　feeling　of　duty　　as　the　very　weakest　and　most　unsteady　of　all　feelings。　There　remained；　as　a　motive　by　which　mankind　are　influenced；　and　by　which　they　may　be　guided　to　their　good；　only　personal　interest。　Accordingly；　Bentham's　idea　of　the　world　is　that　of　a　collection　of　persons　pursuing　each　his　separate　interest　or　pleasure；　and　the　prevention　of　whom　from　jostling　one　another　more　than　is　unavoidable；　may　be　attempted　by　hopes　and　fears　derived　from　three　sources　　the　law；　religion　and　public　opinion。　To　these　three　powers；　considered　as　binding　human　conduct；　he　gave　the　name　of　sanctions。　the　political　sanction；　operating　by　the　rewards　and　penalties　of　the　law；　the　religious　sanction；　by　those　expected　from　the　Ruler　of　the　Universe；　and　the　popular　which　he　characteristically　calls　also　the　moral　sanction；　operating　through　the　pains　and　pleasures　arising　from　the　favour　or　disfavour　of　our　fellow…creatures。　　　　　Such　is　Bentham's　theory　of　the　world。　And　now；　in　a　spirit　neither　of　apology　nor　of　censure；　but　of　calm　appreciation；　we　are　to　inquire　how　far　this　view　of　human　nature　and　life　will　carry　any　one：　how　much　it　will　accomplish　in　morals；　and　how　much　in　political　and　social　philosophy：　what　it　will　do　for　the　individual；　and　what　for　society。　　　　　It　will　do　nothing　for　the　conduct　of　the　individual；　beyond　prescribing　some　of　the　more　obvious　dictates　of　worldly　prudence；　and　outward　probity　and　beneficence。　There　is　no　need　to　expatiate　on　the　deficiencies　of　a　system　of　ethics　which　does　not　pretend　to　aid　individuals　in　the　formation　of　their　own　character。　which　recognizes　no　such　wish　as　that　of　self　culture；　we　may　even　say　no　such　power；　as　existing　in　human　nature；　and　if　it　did　recognize；　could　furnish　little　assistance　to　that　great　duty；　because　it　overlooks　the　existence　of　about　half　of　the　whole　number　of　mental　feelings　which　human　beings　are　capable　of；　including　all　those　of　which　the　direct　objects　are　states　of　their　own　mind。　　　　　Morality　consists　of　two　parts。　One　of　these　is　self…education；　the　training；　by　the　human　being　himself；　of　his　affections　and　will。　That　department　is　a　blank　in　Bentham's　system。　The　other　and　co…equal　part；　the　regulation　of　his　outward　actions；　must　be　altogether　halting　and　imperfect　without　the　first；　for　how　can　we　judge　in　what　manner　many　an　action　will　affect　even　the　worldly　interests　of　ourselves　or　others；　unless　we　take　in；　as　part　of　the　question；　its　influence　on　the　regulation　of　our；　or　their；　affections　and　desires？　A　moralist　on　Bentham's　principles　may　get　as　far　as　this；　that　he　ought　not　to　slay；　burn；　or　steal；　but　what　will　be　his　qualifications　for　regulating　the　nicer　shades　of　human　behaviour；　or　for　laying　down　even　the　greater　moralities　as　to　those　facts　in　human　life　which　tend　to　influence　the　depths　of　the　character　quite　independently　of　any　influence　on　worldly　circumstances　　such；　for　instance；　as　the　sexual　relations；　or　those　of　family　in　general；　or　any　other　social　and　sympathetic　connexions　of　an　intimate　kind？　The　moralities　of　these　questions　depend　essentially　on　considerations　which　Bentham　never　so　much　as　took　into　the　account；　and　when　he　happened　to　be　in　the　right；　it　was　always；　and　necessarily；　on　wrong　or　insufficient　grounds。　　　　　It　is　fortunate　for　the　world　that　Bentham's　taste　lay　rather　in　the　direction　of　jurisprudential　than　of　properly　ethical　inquiry。　Nothing　expressly　of　the　latter　kind　has　been　published　under　his　name；　except　the　'Deontology'　　a　book　scarcely　ever；　in　our　experience；　alluded　to　by　any　admirer　of　Bentham　without　deep　regret　that　it　ever　saw　the　light。　We　did　not　expect　from　Bentham　correct　systematic　views　of　ethics；　or　a　sound　treatment　of　any　question　the　moralities　of　which　require　a　profound　knowledge　of　the　human　heart；　but　we　did　anticipate　that　the　greater　moral　questions　would　have　been　boldly　plunged　into；　and　at　least　a　searching　criticism　produced　of　the　received　opinions；　we　did　not　expect　that　the　petite　morale　almost　alone　would　have　been　treated；　and　that　with　the　most　pedantic　minuteness；　and　on　the　quid　pro　quo　principles　which　regulate　trade。　The　book　has　not　even　the　value　which　would　belong　to　an　authentic　exhibition　of　the　legitimate　consequences　of　an　erroneous　line　of　thought；　for　the　style　proves　it　to　have　been　so　entirely　rewritten；　that　it　is　impossible　to　tell　how　much　or　how　little　of　it　is　Bentham's。　The　collected　edition；　now　in　progress；　will　not；　it　is　said；　include　Bentham's　religious　writings；　these；　although　we　think　most　of　them　of　exceedingly　small　value；　are　at　least　his；　and　the　world　has　a　right　to　whatever　light　they　throw　upon　the　constitution　of　his　mind。　But　the　omission　of　the　'Deontology'　would　be　an　act　of　editorial　discretion　which　we　should　seem　entirely　justifiable。　　　　　If　Bentham's　theory　of　life　can　do　so　little　for　the　individual；　what　can　it　do　for　society？　　　　　It　will　enable　a　society　which　has　attained　a　certain　state　of　spiritual　development；　and　the　maintenance　of　which　in　that　state　is　otherwise　provided　for；　to　prescribe　the　rules　by　which　it　may　protect　its　material　interests。　It　will　do　nothing　（except　sometimes　as　an　instrument　in　the　hands　of　a　higher　doctrine）　for　the　spiritual　interests　of　society；　nor　does　it　suffice　of　itself　even　for　the　material　interests。　That　which　alone　causes　any　material　interests　to　exist；　which　alone　enables　any　body　of　human　beings　to　exist　as　a　society；　is　national　character：　that　it　is；　which　causes　one　nation　to　succeed　in　what　it　attempts；　another　to　fail；　one　nation　to　understand　and　aspire　to　elevated　things；　another　to　grovel　in　mean　ones；　which　makes　the　greatness　of　one　nation　lasting；　and　dooms　another　to　early　and　rapid　decay。　The　true　teacher　of　the　fitting　social　arrangements　for　England；　France；　or　America；　is　the　one　who　can　point　out　how　the　English；　French　or　American　character　can　be　improved；　and　how　it　has　been　made　what　it　is。　A　philosophy　of　laws　and　institutions；　not　founded　on　a　philosophy　of　national　character；　is　an　absurdity。　But　what　could　Bentham's　opinion　be　worth　on　national　character？　How　could　he；　whose　mind　contained　so　few　and　so　poor　types　of　individual　character；　rise　to　that　higher　generalization？　All　he　can　do　is　but　to　indicate　means　by　which；　in　any　given　state　of　the　national　mind；　the　material　interests　of　society　can　be　protected；　saving　the　question；　of　which　others　must　judge；　whether　the　use　of　those　means　would　have；　on　the　national　character；　any　injurious　influence。　　　　　We　have　arrived；