bentham-第5部分

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he　power　by　which　one　human　being　enters　into　the　mind　and　circumstances　of　another。　This　power　constitutes　the　poet；　in　so　far　as　he　does　anything　but　melodiously　utter　his　own　actual　feelings。　It　constitutes　the　dramatist　entirely。　It　is　one　of　the　constituents　of　the　historian；　by　it　we　understand　other　times；　by　it　Guizot　interprets　to　us　the　middle　ages；　Nisard；　in　his　beautiful　Studies　on　the　later　Latin　poets；　places　us　in　the　Rome　of　the　Caesars；　Michelet　disengages　the　distinctive　characters　of　the　different　races　and　generations　of　mankind　from　the　facts　of　their　history。　Without　it　nobody　knows　even　his　own　nature；　further　than　circumstances　have　actually　tried　it　and　called　it　out；　nor　the　nature　of　his　fellow…creatures；　beyond　such　generalizations　as　he　may　have　been　enabled　to　make　from　his　observation　of　their　outward　conduct。　　　　　By　these　limits；　accordingly；　Bentham's　knowledge　of　human　nature　is　bounded。　It　is　wholly　empirical；　and　the　empiricism　of　one　who　has　had　little　experience。　He　had　neither　internal　experience　nor　external；　the　quiet；　even　tenor　of　his　life；　and　his　healthiness　of　mind；　conspired　to　exclude　him　from　both。　He　never　knew　prosperity　and　adversity；　passion　nor　satiety。　he　never　had　even　the　experiences　which　sickness　gives；　he　lived　from　childhood　to　the　age　of　eighty…five　in　boyish　health。　He　knew　no　dejection；　no　heaviness　of　heart。　He　never　felt　life　a　sore　and　a　weary　burthen。　He　was　a　boy　to　the　last。　Self…consciousness；　that　daemon　of　the　men　of　genius　of　our　time；　from　Wordsworth　to　Byron；　from　Goethe　to　Chateaubriand；　and　to　which　this　age　owes　so　much　both　of　its　cheerful　and　its　mournful　wisdom；　never　was　awakened　in　him。　How　much　of　human　nature　slumbered　in　him　he　knew　not；　neither　can　we　know。　He　had　never　been　made　alive　to　the　unseen　influences　which　were　acting　on　himself；　nor　consequently　on　his　fellow…creatures。　Other　ages　and　other　nations　were　a　blank　to　him　for　purposes　of　instruction。　He　measured　them　but　by　one　standard；　their　knowledge　of　facts；　and　their　capability　to　take　correct　views　of　utility；　and　merge　all　other　objects　in　it。　His　own　lot　was　cast　in　a　generation　of　the　leanest　and　barrenest　men　whom　England　had　yet　produced；　and　he　was　an　old　man　when　a　better　race　came　in　with　the　present　century。　He　saw　accordingly　in　man　little　but　what　the　vulgarest　eye　can　see；　recognized　no　diversities　of　character　but　such　as　he　who　runs　may　read。　Knowing　so　little　of　human　feelings；　he　knew　still　less　of　the　influences　by　which　those　feelings　are　formed：　all　the　more　subtle　workings　both　of　the　mind　upon　itself；　and　of　external　things　upon　the　mind；　escaped　him；　and　no　one；　probably；　who；　in　a　highly　instructed　age；　ever　attempted　to　give　a　rule　to　all　human　conduct；　set　out　with　a　more　limited　conception　either　of　the　agencies　by　which　human　conduct　is；　or　of　those　by　which　it　should　be；　influenced。　　　　　This；　then；　is　our　idea　of　Bentham。　He　was　a　man　both　of　remarkable　endowments　for　philosophy；　and　of　remarkable　deficiencies　for　it：　fitted；　beyond　almost　any　man；　for　drawing　from　his　premises；　conclusions　not　only　correct；　but　sufficiently　precise　and　specific　to　be　practical：　but　whose　general　conception　of　human　nature　and　life　furnished　him　with　an　unusually　slender　stock　of　premises。　It　is　obvious　what　would　be　likely　to　be　achieved　by　such　a　man；　what　a　thinker；　thus　gifted　and　thus　disqualified；　could　do　in　philosophy。　He　could；　with　close　and　accurate　logic；　hunt　half…truths　to　their　consequences　and　practical　applications；　on　a　scale　both　of　greatness　and　of　minuteness　not　previously　exemplified；　and　this　is　the　character　which　posterity　will　probably　assign　to　Bentham。　　　　　We　express　our　sincere　and　well…considered　conviction　when　we　say；　that　there　is　hardly　anything　positive　in　Bentham's　philosophy　which　is　not　true：　that　when　his　practical　conclusions　are　erroneous；　which　in　our　opinion　they　are　very　often；　it　is　not　because　the　considerations　which　he　urges　are　not　rational　and　valid　in　themselves；　but　because　some　more　important　principle；　which　he　did　not　perceive；　supersedes　those　considerations；　and　turns　the　scale。　The　bad　part　of　his　writings　is　his　resolute　denial　of　all　that　he　does　not　see；　of　all　truths　but　those　which　he　recognizes。　By　that　alone　has　he　exercised　any　bad　influence　upon　his　age；　by　that　he　has；　not　created　a　school　of　deniers；　for　this　is　an　ignorant　prejudice；　but　put　himself　at　the　head　of　the　school　which　exists　always；　though　it　does　not　always　find　a　great　man　to　give　it　the　sanction　of　philosophy。　thrown　the　mantle　of　intellect　over　the　natural　tendency　of　men　in　all　ages　to　deny　or　disparage　all　feelings　and　mental　states　of　which　they　have　no　consciousness　in　themselves。　　　　　The　truths　which　are　not　Bentham's；　which　his　philosophy　takes　no　account　of；　are　many　and　important；　but　his　non…recognition　of　them　does　not　put　them　out　of　existence；　they　are　still　with　us；　and　it　is　a　comparatively　easy　task　that　is　reserved　for　us；　to　harmonize　those　truths　with　his。　To　reject　his　half　of　the　truth　because　he　overlooked　the　other　half；　would　be　to　fall　into　his　error　without　having　his　excuse。　For　our　own　part；　we　have　a　large　tolerance　for　one…eyed　men；　provided　their　one　eye　is　a　penetrating　one：　if　they　saw　more；　they　probably　would　not　see　so　keenly；　nor　so　eagerly　pursue　one　course　of　inquiry。　Almost　all　rich　veins　of　original　and　striking　speculation　have　been　opened　by　systematic　half…thinkers：　though　whether　these　new　thoughts　drive　out　others　as　good；　or　are　peacefully　superadded　to　them；　depends　on　whether　these　half…thinkers　are　or　are　not　followed　in　the　same　track　by　complete　thinkers。　The　field　of　man's　nature　and　life　cannot　be　too　much　worked；　or　in　too　many　directions；　until　every　clod　is　turned　up　the　work　is　imperfect；　no　whole　truth　is　possible　but　by　combining　the　points　of　view　of　all　the　fractional　truths；　nor；　therefore；　until　it　has　been　fully　seen　what　each　fractional　truth　can　do　by　itself。　　　　　What　Bentham's　fractional　truths　could　do；　there　is　no　such　good　means　of　showing　as　by　a　review　of　his　philosophy：　and　such　a　review；　though　inevitably　a　most　brief　and　general　one；　it　is　now　necessary　to　attempt。　　　　　The　first　question　in　regard　to　any　man　of　speculation　is；　what　is　his　theory　of　human　life？　In　the　minds　of　many　philosophers；　whatever　theory　they　have　of　this　sort　is　latent；　and　it　would　be　a　revelation　to　themselves　to　have　it　pointed　out　to　them　in　their　writings　as　others　can　see　it；　unconsciously　moulding　everything　to　its　own　likeness。　But　Bentham　always　knew　his　own　premises；　and　made　his　reader　know　them：　it　was　not　his　custom　to　leave　the　theoretic　grounds　of　his　practical　conclusions　to　conjecture。　Few　great　thinkers　have　afforded　the　means　of　assigning　with　so　much　certainty　the　exact　conception　which　they　had　formed　of　man　and　of　man's　life。　　　　　Man　is　conceived　by　Bentham　as　a　being　susceptible　of　pleasures　and　pains；　and　governed　in　all　his　conduct　partly　by　the　different　modifications　of　self…interest；　and　the　passions　commonly　classed　as　selfish；　partly　by　sympathies；　or　occasionally　antipathies；　towards　other　beings。　And　here　Bentham's　conception　of　human　nature　stops。　He　does　not　exclude　religion；　the　prospect　of　divine　rewards　and　punishments　he　includes　under　the　head　of　'self…regarding　interest'；　and　the　devotional　feeling　under　that　of　sympathy　with　God。　But　the　whole　of　the　impelling　or　restraining　principles；　whether　of　this　or　of　another　world；　which　he　recognizes；　are　either　self…love；　or　love　or　hatred　towards　other　sentient　beings。　That　there　might　be　no　doubt　of　what　he　thought　on　the　subject；　he　has　not　left　us　to　the　general　evidence　of　his　writings；　but　has　drawn　out　a　'Table　of　the　Springs　of　Action'；　an　express　enumeration　and　classification　of　human　motives；　with　their　various　names；　laudatory；　vituperative；　and　neutral：　and　this　table；　to　be　found　in　Part　I　of　his　collected　works；　we　recommend　to　the　study　of　those　who　would　understand　his　philosophy。　　　　　Man　is　never　recognized　by　him　as　a　being　capable　of　pursuing　spiritual　perfection　as　an　end；　of　desiring；　for　its　own　sake；　the　conformity　of　his　own　character　to　his　standard　of　excellence；　without　hope　of　good　or　fear　of　evil　from　other　source　than　his　own　inward　consciousness。　Even　in　the　more　limited　form　of　Conscience；　this　great　fact　in　human　nature　escapes　him。　Nothing　is　more　curious　than　the　absence　of　recognition　in　any　of　his　writings　of　the　existence　of　conscience；　as　a　thing　distinct　from　philanthropy；　from　affection　for　God　or　man；　and　from　self…interest　in　this　world　or　in　the　next。　There　is　a　studied　abstinence　from　any　of　the　phrases　which；　in　the　mouths　of　others；　import　the　acknowledgment　of　such　a　fact。　If　we　find　the　words　'Conscience'；　'Principle'；　'Moral　Rectitude'；　'Moral　Duty'；　in　his　Table　of　the　Springs　of　Action；　it　is　among　the　synonymes　of　the　'love　of　reputation'。　with　an　intimation　as　to　the　two　former　phrases；　that　they　are　also　sometimes　synonymous　with　the　religious　motive；　or　the　motive　of　sympathy。　The　feeling　of　moral　approbation　or　disapprobation　properly　so　called；　either　towards　ourselves　or　our　fellow…creatures；　he　seems　unaware　of　the　existence　of；　and　neither　the　word　self…respect；　nor　the　idea　to　which　that　word　is　appropriated；　occurs　even　once；　so　far　as　our　recollection　serves　us；　in　his　whole　writings。　　　　　Nor　is　it　only　the　moral　part　of　man's　nature；　in　the　strict　sense　of　the　term　　the　desire　of　perfection；　or　the　feeling　of　an　approving　or　of　an　accusing　conscience　　that　he　overlooks；　he　but　faintly　recognizes；　as　a　fact　in　human　nature；　the　pursuit　of　any　other　ideal　end　for　its　own　sake。　The　sense　of　honour；　and　personal　dignity　　that　feeling　of　personal　exaltation　and　degradation　which　acts　independently　of　other　people's　opinion；　or　even　in　defiance　of　it；　the　love　of　beauty；　the　passion　of　the　artist；　the　love　of　order；　of　congruity；　of　consistency　in　all　things；　and　conformity　to　their　end；　the　love　of　power；　not　in　the　limited　form　of　power　over　other　human　beings；　but　abstract　power；　the　power　of　making　our　volitions　effectual；　the　love　of　action；　the　thirst　for　movement　and　activity；　a　principle　scarcely　of　less　influence　in　human　life　than　its　opposite；　t