three dialogues-第12部分

快捷操作: 按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页 按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页 按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部! 如果本书没有阅读完，想下次继续接着阅读，可使用上方 "收藏到我的浏览器" 功能 和 "加入书签" 功能！



　　　　　。　I　know　nothing　of　its　nature。

　　　　　。　Proceed　then　to　the　second　point；　and　assign　some
reason　why　we　should　allow　an　existence　to　this　inactive；
unthinking；　unknown　thing。

　　　　　。　When　we　see　ideas　produced　in　our　minds；　after　an
orderly　and　constant　manner；　it　is　natural　to　think　they　have
some　fixed　and　regular　occasions；　at　the　presence　of　which　they
are　excited。

　　　　　。　You　acknowledge　then　God　alone　to　be　the　cause　of
our　ideas；　and　that　He　causes　them　at　the　presence　of　those
occasions。

　　　　　。　That　is　my　opinion。

　　　　　。　Those　things　which　you　say　are　present　to　God；
without　doubt　He　perceives。

　　　　　。　Certainly；　otherwise　they　could　not　be　to　Him　an
occasion　of　acting。

　　　　　。　Not　to　insist　now　on　your　making　sense　of　this
hypothesis；　or　answering　all　the　puzzling　questions　and
difficulties　it　is　liable　to：　I　only　ask　whether　the　order　and
regularity　observable　in　the　series　of　our　ideas；　or　the　course
of　nature；　be　not　sufficiently　accounted　for　by　the　wisdom　and
power　of　God；　and　whether　it　doth　not　derogate　from　those
attributes；　to　suppose　He　is　influenced；　directed；　or　put　in
mind；　when　and　what　He　is　to　act；　by　an　unthinking　substance？
And；　lastly；　whether；　in　case　I　granted　all　you　contend　for；　it
would　make　anything　to　your　purpose；　it　not　being　easy　to
conceive　how　the　external　or　absolute　existence　of　an　unthinking
substance；　distinct　from　its　being　perceived；　can　be　inferred
from　my　allowing　that　there　are　certain　things　perceived　by　the
mind　of　God；　which　are　to　Him　the　occasion　of　producing　ideas　in
us？

　　　　　。　I　am　perfectly　at　a　loss　what　to　think；　this　notion
of　　seeming　now　altogether　as　groundless　as　the　rest。

　　　　　。　Do　you　not　at　length　perceive　that　in　all　these
different　acceptations　of　；　you　have　been　only　supposing
you　know　not　what；　for　no　manner　of　reason；　and　to　no　kind　of
use？

　　　　　。　I　freely　own　myself　less　fond　of　my　notions　since
they　have　been　so　accurately　examined。　But　still；　methinks；　I
have　some　confused　perception　that　there　is　such　a　thing　as
。　｛221｝

　　　　　。　Either　you　perceive　the　being　of　Matter　immediately
or　mediately。　If　immediately；　pray　inform　me　by　which　of　the
senses　you　perceive　it。　If　mediately；　let　me　know　by　what
reasoning　it　is　inferred　from　those　things　which　you　perceive
immediately。　So　much　for　the　perception。　Then　for　the　Matter
itself；　I　ask　whether　it　is　object；　；　cause；
instrument；　or　occasion？　You　have　already　pleaded　for　each　of
these；　shifting　your　notions；　and　making　Matter　to　appear
sometimes　in　one　shape；　then　in　another。　And　what　you　have
offered　hath　been　disapproved　and　rejected　by　yourself。　If　you
have　anything　new　to　advance　I　would　gladly　bear　it。

　　　　　。　I　think　I　have　already　offered　all　I　had　to　say　on
those　heads。　I　am　at　a　loss　what　more　to　urge。

　　　　　。　And　yet　you　are　loath　to　part　with　your　old
prejudice。　But；　to　make　you　quit　it　more　easily；　I　desire　that；
beside　what　has　been　hitherto　suggested；　you　will　farther
consider　whether；　upon。　supposition　that　Matter　exists；　you　can
possibly　conceive　how　you　should　be　affected　by　it。　Or；　supposing
it　did　not　exist；　whether　it　be　not　evident　you　might　for　all
that　be　affected　with　the　same　ideas　you　now　are；　and
consequently　have　the　very　same　reasons　to　believe　its　existence
that　you　now　can　have。

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　it　is　possible　we　might　perceive　all
things　just　as　we　do　now；　though　there　was　no　Matter　in　the
world；　neither　can　I　conceive；　if　there　be　Matter；　how　it　should
produce'　any　idea　in　our　minds。　And；　I　do　farther　grant　you　have
entirely　satisfied　me　that　it　is　impossible　there　should　be　such
a　thing　as　matter　in　any　of　the　foregoing　acceptations。　But　still
I　cannot　help　supposing　that　there　is　　in　some　sense　or
other。　　do　not　indeed　pretend　to　determine。

　　　　　。　I　do　not　expect　you　should　define　exactly　the　nature
of　that　unknown　being。　Only　be　pleased　to　tell　me　whether　it　is　a
Substance；　and　if　so；　whether　you　can　suppose　a　Substance　without
accidents；　or；　in　case　you　suppose　it　to　have　accidents　or
qualities；　I　desire　you　will　let　me　know　what　those　qualities
are；　at　least　what　is　meant　by　Matter's　supporting　them？

　　　　　。　We　have　already　argued　on　those　points。　I　have　no
more　to　say　to　them。　But；　to　prevent　any　farther　questions；　let
me　tell　you　I　at　present　understand　by　　neither　substance
nor　accident；　thinking　nor　extended　being；　neither　cause；
instrument；　nor　occasion；　but　Something　entirely　unknown；
distinct　from　all　these。　｛222｝

　　　　　。　It　seems　then　you　include　in　your　present　notion　of
Matter　nothing　but　the　general　abstract　idea　of　。

　　　　　。　Nothing　else；　save　only　that　I　super…add　to　this
general　idea　the　negation　of　all　those　particular　things；
qualities；　or　ideas；　that　I　perceive；　imagine；　or　in　anywise
apprehend。

　　　　　。　Pray　where　do　you　suppose　this　unknown　Matter　to
exist？

　　　　　。　Oh　Philonous！　now　you　think　you　have　entangled　me；
for；　if　I　say　it　exists　in　place；　then　you　will　infer　that　it
exists　in　the　mind；　since　it　is　agreed　that　place　or　extension
exists　only　in　the　mind。　But　I　am　not　ashamed　to　own　my
ignorance。　I　know　not　where　it　exists；　only　I　am　sure　it　exists
not　in　place。　There　is　a　negative　answer　for　you。　And　you　must
expect　no　other　to　all　the　questions　you　put　for　the　future　about
Matter。

　　　　　。　Since　you　will　not　tell　me　where　it　exists；　be
pleased　to　inform　me　after　what　manner　you　suppose　it　to　exist；
or　what　you　mean　by　its　？

　　　　　。　It　neither　thinks　nor　acts；　neither　perceives　nor　is
perceived。

　　　　　。　But　what　is　there　positive　in　your　abstracted　notion
of　its　existence？

　　　　　。　Upon　a　nice　observation；　I　do　not　find　I　have　any
positive　notion　or　meaning　at　all。　I　tell　you　again；　I　am　not
ashamed　to　own　my　ignorance。　I　know　not　what　is　meant　by　its
；　or　how　it　exists。

　　　　　。　Continue；　good　Hylas；　to　act　the　same　ingenuous
part；　and　tell　me　sincerely　whether　you　can　frame　a　distinct　idea
of　Entity　in　general；　prescinded　from　and　exclusive　of　all
thinking　and　corporeal　beings；　all　particular　things　whatsoever。

　　　　　。　Hold；　let　me　think　a　little　　I　profess；　Philonous；
I　do　not　find　that　I　can。　At　first　glance；　methought　I　had　some
dilute　and　airy　notion　of　Pure　Entity　in　abstract；　but；　upon
closer　attention；　it　hath　quite　vanished　out　of　sight。　The　more　I
think　on　it；　the　more　am　I　confirmed　in　my　prudent　resolution　of
giving　none　but　negative　answers；　and　not　pretending　to　the　least
degree　of　any　positive　knowledge　or　conception　of　Matter；　its
；　its　；　its　；　or　anything　belonging　to　it。

　　　　　。　When；　therefore；　you　speak　of　the　existence　of
Matter；　you　have　not　any　notion　in　your　mind？

　　　　　。　None　at　all。

　　　　　。　Pray　tell　me　if　the　case　stands　not　thus　　At
first；　from　a　belief　of　material　substance；　you　would　have　it
that　the　｛223｝　immediate　objects　existed　without　the　mind；　then
that　they　are　archetypes；　then　causes；　next　instruments；　then
occasions：　lastly　；　which　being　interpreted
proves　。　So　Matter　comes　to　nothing。　What　think　you；
Hylas；　is　not　this　a　fair　summary　of　your　whole　proceeding？

　　　　　。　Be　that　as　it　will；　yet　I　still　insist　upon　it；　that
our　not　being　able　to　conceive　a　thing　is　no　argument　against　its
existence。

　　　　　。　That　from　a　cause；　effect；　operation；　sign；　or　other
circumstance；　there　may　reasonably　be　inferred　the　existence　of　a
thing　not　immediately　perceived；　and　that　it　were　absurd　for　any
man　to　argue　against　the　existence　of　that　thing；　from　his　having
no　direct　and　positive　notion　of　it；　I　freely　own。　But；　where
there　is　nothing　of　all　this；　where　neither　reason　nor　revelation
induces　us　to　believe　the　existence　of　a　thing；　where　we　have　not
even　a　relative　notion　of　it；　where　an　abstraction　is　made　from
perceiving　and　being　perceived；　from　Spirit　and　idea：　lastly；
where　there　is　not　so　much　as　the　most　inadequate　or　faint　idea
pretended　to　　I　will　not　indeed　thence　conclude　against　the
reality　of　any　notion；　or　existence　of　anything；　but　my　inference
shall　be；　that　you　mean　nothing　at　all；　that　you　employ　words　to
no　manner　of　purpose；　without　any　design　or　signification
whatsoever。　And　I　leave　it　to　you　to　consider　how　mere　jargon
should　be　treated。

　　　　　。　To　deal　frankly　with　you；　Philonous；　your　arguments
seem　in　themselves　unanswerable；　but　they　have　not　so　great　an
effect　on　me　as　to　produce　that　entire　conviction；　that　hearty
acquiescence；　which　attends　demonstration。　I　find　myself
relapsing　into　an　obscure　surmise　of　I　know　not　what；　。

　　　　　。　But；　are　you　not　sensible；　Hylas；　that　two　things
must　concur　to　take　away　all　scruple；　and　work　a　plenary　assent
in　the　mind；？　Let　a　visible　object　be　set　in　never　so　clear　a
light；　yet；　if　there　is　any　imperfection　in　the　sight；　or　if　the
eye　is　not　directed　towards　it；　it　will　not　be　distinctly　seen。
And　though　a　demonstration　be　never　so　well　grounded　and　fairly
proposed；　yet；　if　there　is　withal　a　stain　of　prejudice；　or　a
wrong　bias　on　the　understanding；　can　it　be　expected　on　a　sudden
to　perceive　clearly；　and　adhere　firmly　to　the　truth？　No；　there　is
need　of　time　and　pains：　the　attention　must　be　awakened　and
detained　by　a　frequent　repetition　of　the　same　thing　placed　oft　in
the　same；　oft　in　different　lights。　I　have　said　it　already；　and
find　I　must　still　repeat　and　inculcate；　that　it　is　an
unaccountable　licence　｛224｝　you　take；　in　pretending　to　maintain
you　know　not　what；　for　you　know　not　what　reason；　to　you　know　not
what　purpose。　Can　this　be　paralleled　in　any　art　or　science；　any
sect　or　profession　of　men？　Or　is　there　anything　so　barefacedly
groundless　and　unreasonable　to　be　met　with　even　in　the　lowest　of
common　conversation？　But；　perhaps　you　will　still　say；　Matter　may
exist；　though　at　the　same　time　you　neither　know　
by　；　or　by　its　。　This　indeed　is　surprising；
and　the　more　so　because　i