three dialogues-第5部分

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　　　　　。　Without　doubt；　if　they　have　any　thought　at　all。

　　　　　。　Answer　me；　Hylas。　Think　you　the　senses　were　bestowed
upon　all　animals　for　their　preservation　and　well…being　in　life？
or　were　they　given　to　men　alone　for　this　end？

　　　　　。　I　make　no　question　but　they　have　the　same　use　in　all
other　animals。

　　　　　。　If　so；　is　it　not　necessary　they　should　be　enabled　by
them　to　perceive　their　own　limbs；　and　those　bodies　which　are
capable　of　harming　them？

　　　　　。　Certainly。

　　　　　。　A　mite　therefore　must　be　supposed　to　see　his　own
foot；　and　things　equal　or　even　less　than　it；　as　bodies　of　some
considerable　dimension；　though　at　the　same　time　they　appear　to
you　scarce　discernible；　or　at　best　as　so　many　visible　points？

　　　　　。　I　cannot　deny　it。

　　　　　。　And　to　creatures　less　than　the　mite　they　will　seem
yet　larger？

　　　　　。　They　will。

　　　　　。　Insomuch　that　what　you　can　hardly　discern　will　to
another　extremely　minute　animal　appear　as　some　huge　mountain？
｛189｝

　　　　　。　All　this　I　grant。

　　　　　。　Can　one　and　the　same　thing　be　at　the　same　time　in
itself　of　different　dimensions？

　　　　　。　That　were　absurd　to　imagine。

　　　　　。　But；　from　what　you　have　laid　down　it　follows　that
both　the　extension　by　you　perceived；　and　that　perceived　by　the
mite　itself；　as　likewise　all　those　perceived　by　lesser　animals；
are　each　of　them　the　true　extension　of　the　mite's　foot；　that　is
to　say；　by　your　own　principles　you　are　led　into　an　absurdity。

　　　　　。　There　seems　to　be　some　difficulty　in　the　point。

　　　　　。　Again；　have　you　not　acknowledged　that　no　real
inherent　property　of　any　object　can　be　changed　without　some
change　in　the　thing　itself？

　　　　　。　I　have。

　　　　　。　But；　as　we　approach　to　or　recede　from　an　object；　the
visible　extension　varies；　being　at　one　distance　ten　or　a　hundred
times　greater　than　another。　Doth　it　not　therefore　follow　from
hence　likewise　that　it　is　not　really　inherent　in　the　object？

　　　　　。　I　own　I　am　at　a　loss　what　to　think。

　　　　　。　Your　judgment　will　soon　be　determined；　if　you　will
venture　to　think　as　freely　concerning　this　quality　as　you　have
done　concerning　the　rest。　Was　it　not　admitted　as　a　good　argument；
that　neither　heat　nor　cold　was　in　the　water；　because　it　seemed
warm　to　one　hand　and　cold　to　the　other？

　　　　　。　It　was。

　　　　　。　Is　it　not　the　very　same　reasoning　to　conclude；　there
is　no　extension　or　figure　in　an　object；　because　to　one　eye　it
shall　seem　little；　smooth；　and　round；　when　at　the　same　time　it
appears　to　the　other；　great；　uneven；　and　regular？

　　　　　。　The　very　same。　But　does　this　latter　fact　ever　happen？

　　　　　。　You　may　at　any　time　make　the　experiment；　by　looking
with　one　eye　bare；　and　with　the　other　through　a　microscope。

　　　　　。　I　know　not　how　to　maintain　it；　and　yet　I　am　loath　to
give　up　；　I　see　so　many　odd　consequences　following
upon　such　a　concession。

　　　　　。　Odd；　say　you？　After　the　concessions　already　made；　I
hope　you　will　stick　at　nothing　for　its　oddness。　＇But；　on　the
other　hand；　should　it　not　seem　very　odd；　if　the　general　reasoning
｛190｝　which　includes　all　other　sensible　qualities　did　not　also
include　extension？　If　it　be　allowed　that　no　idea；　nor　anything
like　an　idea；　can　exist　in　an　unperceiving　substance；　then　surely
it　follows　that　no　figure；　or　mode　of　extension；　which　we　can
either　perceive；　or　imagine；　or　have　any　idea　of；　can　be　really
inherent　in　Matter；　not　to　mention　the　peculiar　difficulty　there
must　be　in　conceiving　a　material　substance；　prior　to　and　distinct
from　extension　to　be　the　　of　extension。　Be　the
sensible　quality　what　it　will　　figure；　or　sound；　or　colour；　it
seems　alike　impossible　it　should　subsist　in　that　which　doth　not
perceive　it。＇＇2＇

　　　　　。　I　give　up　the　point　for　the　present；　reserving　still
a　right　to　retract　my　opinion；　in　case　I　shall　hereafter　discover
any　false　step　in　my　progress　to　it。

　　　　　。　That　is　a　right　you　cannot　be　denied。　Figures　and
extension　being　despatched；　we　proceed　next　to　。　Can　a
real　motion　in　any　external　body　be　at　the　same　time　very　swift
and　very　slow？

　　　　　。　It　cannot。

　　　　　。　Is　not　the　motion　of　a　body　swift　in　a　reciprocal
proportion　to　the　time　it　takes　up　in　describing　any　given　space？
Thus　a　body　that　describes　a　mile　in　an　hour　moves　three　times
faster　than　it　would　in　case　it　described　only　a　mile　in　three
hours。

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。

　　　　　。　And　is　not　time　measured　by　the　succession　of　ideas
in　our　minds？

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　And　is　it　not　possible　ideas　should　succeed　one
another　twice　as　fast　in　your　mind　as　they　do　in　mine；　or　in　that
of　some　spirit　of　another　kind？

　　　　　。　I　own　it。

　　　　　。　Consequently　the　same　body　may　to　another　seem　to
perform　its　motion　over　any　space　in　half　the　time　that　it　doth
to　you。　And　the　same　reasoning　will　hold　as　to　any　other
proportion：　that　is　to　say；　according　to　your　principles　（since
the　motions　perceived　are　both　really　in　the　object）　it　is
possible　one　and　the　same　body　shall　be　really　moved　the　same　way
at　once；　both　very　swift　and　very　slow。　How　is　this　consistent
either　with　common　sense；　or　with　what　you　just　now　granted？
｛191｝

　　　　　。　I　have　nothing　to　say　to　it。

　　　　　。　Then　as　for　；　either　you　do　not　mean　any
sensible　quality　by　that　word；　and　so　it　is　beside　our　inquiry：
or　if　you　do；　it　must　be　either　hardness　or　resistance。　But　both
the　one　and　the　other　are　plainly　relative　to　our　senses：　it
being　evident　that　what　seems　hard　to　one　animal　may　appear　soft
to　another；　who　hath　greater　force　and　firmness　of　limbs。　Nor　is
it　less　plain　that　the　resistance　I　feel　is　not　in　the　body。

　　　　　。　I　own　the　very　　of　resistance；　which　is
all　you　immediately　perceive；　is　not　in　the　body；　but　the　
of　that　sensation　is。

　　　　　。　But　the　causes　of　our　sensations　are　not　things
immediately　perceived；　and　therefore　are　not　sensible。　This　point
I　thought　had　been　already　determined。

　　　　　。　I　own　it　was；　but　you　will　pardon　me　if　I　seem　a
little　embarrassed：　I　know　not　how　to　quit　my　old　notions。

　　　　　。　To　help　you　out；　do　but　consider　that　if　
be　once　acknowledged　to　have　no　existence　without　the　mind；　the
same　must　necessarily　be　granted　of　motion；　solidity；　and
gravity；　since　they　all　evidently　suppose　extension。　It　is
therefore　superfluous　to　inquire　particularly　concerning　each　of
them。　In　denying　extension；　you　have　denied　them　all　to　have　any
real　existence。

　　　　　。　I　wonder；　Philonous；　if　what　you　say　be　true；　why
those　philosophers　who　deny　the　Secondary　Qualities　any　real
existence　should　yet　attribute　it　to　the　Primary。　If　there　is　no
difference　between　them；　how　can　this　be　accounted　for？

　　　　　。　It　is　not　my　business　to　account　for　every　opinion
of　the　philosophers。　But；　among　other　reasons　which　may　be
assigned　for　this；　it　seems　probable　that　pleasure　and　pain　being
rather　annexed　to　the　former　than　the　latter　may　be　one。　Heat　and
cold；　tastes　and　smells；　have　something　more　vividly　pleasing　or
disagreeable　than　the　ideas　of　extension；　figure；　and　motion
affect　us　with。　And；　it　being　too　visibly　absurd　to　hold　that
pain　or　pleasure　can　be　in　an　unperceiving　substance；　men　are
more　easily　weaned　from　believing　the　external　existence　of　the
Secondary　than　the　Primary　Qualities。　You　will　be　satisfied　there
is　something　in　this；　if　you　recollect　the　difference　you　made
between　an　intense　and　more　moderate　degree　of　heat；　allowing　the
one　a　real　existence；　while　you　denied　it　to　the　other。　But；
after　all；　there　is　no　rational　ground　for　that　distinction；　for；
surely　an　indifferent　sensation　is　as　｛191｝　truly　
as　one　more　pleasing　or　painful；　and　consequently　should　not　any
more　than　they　be　supposed　to　exist　in　an　unthinking　subject。

　　　　　。　It　is　just　come　into　my　head；　Philonous；　that　I　have
somewhere　heard　of　a　distinction　between　absolute　and　sensible
extension。　Now；　though　it　be　acknowledged　that　　and
；　consisting　merely　in　the　relation　which　other　extended
beings　have　to　the　parts　of　our　own　bodies；　do　not　really　inhere
in　the　substances　themselves；　yet　nothing　obliges　us　to　hold　the
same　with　regard　to　；　which　is　something
abstracted　from　　and　；　from　this　or　that　particular
magnitude　or　figure。　So　likewise　as　to　motion；　　and　
are　altogether　relative　to　the　succession　of　ideas　in　our　own
minds。　But；　it　doth　not　follow；　because　those　modifications　of
motion　exist　not　without　the　mind；　that　therefore　absolute　motion
abstracted　from　them　doth　not。

　　　　　。　Pray　what　is　it　that　distinguishes　one　motion；　or
one　part　of　extension；　from　another？　Is　it　not　something
sensible；　as　some　degree　of　swiftness　or　slowness；　some　certain
magnitude　or　figure　peculiar　to　each？

　　　　　。　I　think　so。

　　　　　。　These　qualities；　therefore；　stripped　of　all　sensible
properties；　are　without　all　specific　and　numerical　differences；
as　the　schools　call　them。

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　That　is　to　say；　they　are　extension　in　general；　and
motion　in　general。

　　　　　。　Let　it　be　so。

　　　　　。　But　it　is　a　universally　received　maxim　that
。　How　then　can　motion　in
general；　or　extension　in　general；　exist　in　any　corporeal
substance？　｛193｝

　　　　　。　I　will　take　time　to　solve　your　difficulty。

　　　　　。　But　I　think　the　point　may　be　speedily　decided。
Without　doubt　you　can　tell　whether　you　are　able　to　frame　this　or
that　idea。　Now　I　am　content　to　put　our　dispute　on　this　issue。　If
you　can　frame　in　your　thoughts　a　distinct　　of
motion　or　extension；　divested　of　all　those　sensible　modes；　as
swift　and　slow；　great　and　small；　round　and　square；　and　the　like；
which　are　acknowledged　to　exist　only　in　the　mind；　I　will　then
yield　the　point　you　contend　for。　But　if　you　cannot；　it　will　be
unreasonable　on　your　side　to　insist　any　longer　upon　what　you　have
no　notion　of。

　　　　　。　To　co