gorgias-第5部分

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w　what　food　is　the　best　for　the　body；　and　if　the　physician　and　the　cook　had　to　enter　into　a　competition　in　which　children　were　the　judges；　or　men　who　had　no　more　sense　than　children；　as　to　which　of　them　best　understands　the　goodness　or　badness　of　food；　the　physician　would　be　starved　to　death。　A　flattery　I　deem　this　to　be　and　of　an　ignoble　sort；　Polus；　for　to　you　I　am　now　addressing　myself；　because　it　aims　at　pleasure　without　any　thought　of　the　best。　An　art　I　do　not　call　it；　but　only　an　experience；　because　it　is　unable　to　explain　or　to　give　a　reason　of　the　nature　of　its　own　applications。　And　I　do　not　call　any　irrational　thing　an　art；　but　if　you　dispute　my　words；　I　am　prepared　to　argue　in　defence　of　them。　　　Cookery；　then；　I　maintain　to　be　a　flattery　which　takes　the　form　of　medicine；　and　tiring；　in　like　manner；　is　a　flattery　which　takes　the　form　of　gymnastic；　and　is　knavish；　false；　ignoble；　illiberal；　working　deceitfully　by　the　help　of　lines；　and　colours；　and　enamels；　and　garments；　and　making　men　affect　a　spurious　beauty　to　the　neglect　of　the　true　beauty　which　is　given　by　gymnastic。　　　I　would　rather　not　be　tedious；　and　therefore　I　will　only　say；　after　the　manner　of　the　geometricians　（for　I　think　that　by　this　time　you　will　be　able　to　follow）

　　　　astiring　：　gymnastic　：：　cookery　：　medicine；　or　rather；　　　　　astiring　：　gymnastic　：：　sophistry　：　legislation；　and　　　　　as　cookery　：　medicine　：：　rhetoric　：　justice。

And　this；　I　say；　is　the　natural　difference　between　the　rhetorician　and　the　sophist；　but　by　reason　of　their　near　connection；　they　are　apt　to　be　jumbled　up　together；　neither　do　they　know　what　to　make　of　themselves；　nor　do　other　men　know　what　to　make　of　them。　For　if　the　body　presided　over　itself；　and　were　not　under　the　guidance　of　the　soul；　and　the　soul　did　not　discern　and　discriminate　between　cookery　and　medicine；　but　the　body　was　made　the　judge　of　them；　and　the　rule　of　judgment　was　the　bodily　delight　which　was　given　by　them；　then　the　word　of　Anaxagoras；　that　word　with　which　you；　friend　Polus；　are　so　well　acquainted；　would　prevail　far　and　wide：　〃Chaos〃　would　come　again；　and　cookery；　health；　and　medicine　would　mingle　in　an　indiscriminate　mass。　And　now　I　have　told　you　my　notion　of　rhetoric；　which　is；　in　relation　to　the　soul；　what　cookery　is　to　the　body。　I　may　have　been　inconsistent　in　making　a　long　speech；　when　I　would　not　allow　you　to　discourse　at　length。　But　I　think　that　I　may　be　excused；　because　you　did　not　understand　me；　and　could　make　no　use　of　my　answer　when　I　spoke　shortly；　and　therefore　I　had　to　enter　into　explanation。　And　if　I　show　an　equal　inability　to　make　use　of　yours；　I　hope　that　you　will　speak　at　equal　length；　but　if　I　am　able　to　understand　you；　let　me　have　the　benefit　of　your　brevity；　as　is　only　fair：　And　now　you　may　do　what　you　please　with　my　answer。　　　Pol。　What　do　you　mean？　do　you　think　that　rhetoric　is　flattery？　　　Soc。　Nay；　I　said　a　part　of　flattery…if　at　your　age；　Polus；　you　cannot　remember；　what　will　you　do　by…and…by；　when　you　get　older？　　　Pol。　And　are　the　good　rhetoricians　meanly　regarded　in　states；　under　the　idea　that　they　are　flatterers？　　　Soc。　Is　that　a　question　or　the　beginning　of　a　speech？　　　Pol。　I　am　asking　a　question。　　　Soc。　Then　my　answer　is；　that　they　are　not　regarded　at　all。　　　Pol。　How　not　regarded？　Have　they　not　very　great　power　in　states？　　　Soc。　Not　if　you　mean　to　say　that　power　is　a　good　to　the　possessor。　　　Pol。　And　that　is　what　I　do　mean　to　say。　　　Soc。　Then；　if　so；　I　think　that　they　have　the　least　power　of　all　the　citizens。　　　Pol。　What！　Are　they　not　like　tyrants？　They　kill　and　despoil　and　exile　any　one　whom　they　please。　　　Soc。　By　the　dog；　Polus；　I　cannot　make　out　at　each　deliverance　of　yours；　whether　you　are　giving　an　opinion　of　your　own；　or　asking　a　question　of　me。　　　Pol。　I　am　asking　a　question　of　you。　　　Soc。　Yes；　my　friend；　but　you　ask　two　questions　at　once。　　　Pol。　How　two　questions？　　　Soc。　Why；　did　you　not　say　just　now　that　the　rhetoricians　are　like　tyrants；　and　that　they　kill　and　despoil　or　exile　any　one　whom　they　please？　　　Pol。　I　did。　　　Soc。　Well　then；　I　say　to　you　that　here　are　two　questions　in　one；　and　I　will　answer　both　of　them。　And　I　tell　you；　Polus；　that　rhetoricians　and　tyrants　have　the　least　possible　power　in　states；　as　I　was　just　now　saying；　for　they　do　literally　nothing　which　they　will；　but　only　what　they　think　best。　　　Pol。　And　is　not　that　a　great　power？　　　Soc。　Polus　has　already　said　the　reverse。　　　Soc。　No；　by　the　great…what　do　you　call　him？…not　you；　for　you　say　that　power　is　a　good　to　him　who　has　the　power。　　　Pol。　I　do。　　　Soc。　And　would　you　maintain　that　if　a　fool　does　what　he　think　best；　this　is　a　good；　and　would　you　call　this　great　power？　　　Pol。　I　should　not。　　　Soc。　Then　you　must　prove　that　the　rhetorician　is　not　a　fool；　and　that　rhetoric　is　an　art　and　not　a　flattery…and　so　you　will　have　refuted　me；　but　if　you　leave　me　unrefuted；　why；　the　rhetoricians　who　do　what　they　think　best　in　states；　and　the　tyrants；　will　have　nothing　upon　which　to　congratulate　themselves；　if　as　you　say；　power　be　indeed　a　good；　admitting　at　the　same　time　that　what　is　done　without　sense　is　an　evil。　　　Pol。　Yes；　I　admit　that。　　　Soc。　How　then　can　the　rhetoricians　or　the　tyrants　have　great　power　in　states；　unless　Polus　can　refute　Socrates；　and　prove　to　him　that　they　do　as　they　will？　　　Pol。　This　fellow…　　　Soc。　I　say　that　they　do　not　do　as　they　will…now　refute　me。　　　Pol。　Why；　have　you　not　already　said　that　they　do　as　they　think　best？　　　Soc。　And　I　say　so　still。　　　Pol。　Then　surely　they　do　as　they　will？　　　Soc。　I　deny　it。　　　Pol。　But　they　do　what　they　think　best？　　　Soc。　Aye。　　　Pol。　That；　Socrates；　is　monstrous　and　absurd。　　　Soc。　Good　words；　good　Polus；　as　I　may　say　in　your　own　peculiar　style；　but　if　you　have　any　questions　to　ask　of　me；　either　prove　that　I　am　in　error　or　give　the　answer　yourself。　　　Pol。　Very　well；　I　am　willing　to　answer　that　I　may　know　what　you　mean。　　　Soc。　Do　men　appear　to　you　to　will　that　which　they　do；　or　to　will　that　further　end　for　the　sake　of　which　they　do　a　thing？　when　they　take　medicine；　for　example；　at　the　bidding　of　a　physician；　do　they　will　the　drinking　of　the　medicine　which　is　painful；　or　the　health　for　the　sake　of　which　they　drink？　　　Pol。　Clearly；　the　health。　　　Soc。　And　when　men　go　on　a　voyage　or　engage　in　business；　they　do　not　will　that　which　they　are　doing　at　the　time；　for　who　would　desire　to　take　the　risk　of　a　voyage　or　the　trouble　of　business？…But　they　will；　to　have　the　wealth　for　the　sake　of　which　they　go　on　a　voyage。　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　And　is　not　this　universally　true？　If　a　man　does　something　for　the　sake　of　something　else；　he　wills　not　that　which　he　does；　but　that　for　the　sake　of　which　he　does　it。　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　are　not　all　things　either　good　or　evil；　or　intermediate　and　indifferent？　　　Pol。　To　be　sure；　Socrates。　　　Soc。　Wisdom　and　health　and　wealth　and　the　like　you　would　call　goods；　and　their　opposites　evils？　　　Pol。　I　should。　　　Soc。　And　the　things　which　are　neither　good　nor　evil；　and　which　partake　sometimes　of　the　nature　of　good　and　at　other　times　of　evil；　or　of　neither；　are　such　as　sitting；　walking；　running；　sailing；　or；　again；　wood；　stones；　and　the　like：…these　are　the　things　which　you　call　neither　good　nor　evil？　　　Pol。　Exactly　so。　　　Soc。　Are　these　indifferent　things　done　for　the　sake　of　the　good；　or　the　good　for　the　sake　of　the　indifferent？　　　Pol。　Clearly；　the　indifferent　for　the　sake　of　the　good。　　　Soc。　When　we　walk　we　walk　for　the　sake　of　the　good；　and　under　the　idea　that　it　is　better　to　walk；　and　when　we　stand　we　stand　equally　for　the　sake　of　the　good？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　when　we　kill　a　man　we　kill　him　or　exile　him　or　despoil　him　of　his　goods；　because；　as　we　think；　it　will　conduce　to　our　good？　　　Pol。　Certainly。　　　Soc。　Men　who　do　any　of　these　things　do　them　for　the　sake　of　the　good？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　And　did　we　not　admit　that　in　doing　something　for　the　sake　of　something　else；　we　do　not　will　those　things　which　we　do；　but　that　other　thing　for　the　sake　of　which　we　do　them？　　　Pol。　Most　true。　　　Soc。　Then　we　do　not　will　simply　to　kill　a　man　or　to　exile　him　or　to　despoil　him　of　his　goods；　but　we　will　to　do　that　which　conduces　to　our　good；　and　if　the　act　is　not　conducive　to　our　good　we　do　not　will　it；　for　we　will；　as　you　say；　that　which　is　our　good；　but　that　which　is　neither　good　nor　evil；　or　simply　evil；　we　do　not　will。　Why　are　you　silent；　Polus？　Am　I　not　right？　　　Pol。　You　are　right。　　　Soc。　Hence　we　may　infer；　that　if　any　one；　whether　he　be　a　tyrant　or　a　rhetorician；　kills　another　or　exiles　another　or　deprives　him　of　his　property；　under　the　idea　that　the　act　is　for　his　own　interests　when　really　not　for　his　own　interests；　he　may　be　said　to　do　what　seems　best　to　him？　　　Pol。　Yes。　　　Soc。　But　does　he　do　what　he　wills　if　he　does　what　is　evil？　Why　do　you　not　answer？　　　Pol。　Well；　I　suppose　not。　　　Soc。　Then　if　great　power　is　a　good　as　you　allow；　will　such　a　one　have　great　power　in　a　state？　　　Pol。　He　will　not。　　　Soc。　Then　I　was　right　in　saying　that　a　man　may　do　what　seems　good　to　him　in　a　state；　and　not　have　great　power；　and　not　do　what　he　wills？　　　Pol。　As　though　you；　Socrates；　would　not　like　to　have　the　power　of　doing　what　seemed　good　to　you　in　the　state；　rather　than　not；　you　would　not　be　jealous　when　you　saw　any　one　killing　or　despoiling　or　imprisoning　whom　he　pleased；　Oh；　no！　　　Soc。　Justly　or　unjustly；　do　you　mean？　　　Pol。　In　either　case　is　he　not　equally　to　be　envied？　　　Soc。　Forbear；　Polus！　　　Pol。　Why　〃forbear〃？　　　Soc。　Because　you　ought　not　to　envy　wretches　who　are　not　to　be　envied；　but　only　to　pity　them。　　　Pol。　And　are　those　of　whom　spoke　wretches？　　　Soc。　Yes；　certainly　they　are。　　　Pol。　And　so　you　think　that　he　who　slays　any　one　whom　he　pleases；　and　justly　slays　him；　is　pitiable　and　wretched？　　　Soc。　No；　I　do　not　say　that　of　him：　but　neither　do　I　think　that　he　is　to　be　envied。　　　Pol。　Were　you　not　saying　just　now　that　he　is　wretched？　　　Soc。　Yes；　my　friend；　if　he　killed　another　unjustly；　in　which　case　he　is　also　to　be　pitied；　and　he　is　not　to　be　envied　if　he　killed　him　justly。　　　Pol。　At　any　rate　you　will　allow　that　he　who　is　unjustly　put　to　death　is　wretched；　and　to　be　pitied？　　　Soc。　Not　so　much；　Polus；　as　he　who　kills　him；　and　not　so　much　as　he　who　is　justly　killed。　　　Pol。　How　can　that　be；　Socrates？　　　Soc。　That　may　very　well　be；　inasmuch　as　doing　injustice　is　the　greatest　of　evils。　　　Pol。　But