shorter logic-第23部分

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more　insignificant　than　being　that　which　at　first　sight　is　perhaps　supposed　to　be；
an　external　and　sensible　existence；　like　that　of　the　paper　lying　before　me。
However；　in　this　matter；　nobody　proposes　to　speak　of　the　sensible　existence　of　a
limited　and　perishable　thing。　Besides；　the　petty　stricture　of　the　Kritik　that　'thought
and　being　are　different'　can　at　most　molest　the　path　of　the　human　mind　from　the
thought　of　God　to　the　certainty　that　he　is：　it　cannot　take　it　away。　It　is　this　process
of　transition；　depending　on　the　absolute　inseparability　of　the　thought　of　God　from
his　being；　for　which　its　proper　authority　has　been　revindicated　in　the　theory　of
faith　or　immediate　knowledge　—　whereof　hereafter。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　52

In　this　way　thought；　at　its　highest　pitch；　has　to　go　outside　for　any
determinateness；　and　although　it　is　continually　termed　Reason；　is　out…and…out
abstract　thinking。　And　the　result　of　all　is　that　Reason　supplies　nothing　beyond　the
formal　unity　required　to　simplify　and　systematise　experiences；　it　is　a　canon；　not
an　organon；　of　truth；　and　can　furnish　only　a　criticism　of　knowledge；　not　a
doctrine　of　the　infinite。　In　its　final　analysis　this　criticism　is　summed　up　in　the
assertion　that　in　strictness　thought　is　only　the　indeterminate　unity　and　the　action
of　this　indeterminate　unity。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§52n

Kant　undoubtedly　held　reason　to　be　the　faculty　of　the　unconditioned　but　if　reason　be　reduced　to
abstract　identity　only；　it　by　implication　renounces　its　unconditionality　and　is　in　reality　no　better　than
empty　understanding。　For　reason　is　unconditioned　only　in　so　far　as　its　character　and　quality　are　not
due　to　an　extraneous　and　foreign　content；　only　in　so　far　as　it　is　self…characterising；　and　thus；　in
point　of　content；　is　its　own　master。　Kant；　however；　expressly　explains　that　the　action　of　reason
consists　solely　in　applying　the　categories　to　systematise　the　matter　given　by　perception；　i。e。　to
place　it　in　an　outside　order；　under　the　guidance　of　the　principle　of　non…contradiction。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　53

（b）　The　Practical　Reason　is　understood　by　Kant　to　mean　a　thinking　Will；　i。e。　a
Will　that　determines　itself　on　universal　principles。　Its　office　is　to　give　objective；
imperative　laws　of　freedom　laws；　that　is；　which　state　what　ought　to　happen。　The
warrant　for　thus　assuming　thought　to　be　an　activity　which　makes　itself　felt
objectively；　that　is；　to　be　really　a　Reason；　is　the　alleged　possibility　of　proving
practical　freedom　by　experience；　that　is；　of　showing　it　in　the　phenomenon　of
selfconsciousness。　This　experience　in　consciousness　is　at　once　met　by　all　that　the
Necessitarian　produces　from　contrary　experience；　particularly　by　the　sceptical
induction　（employed　among　others　by　Hume）　from　the　endless　diversity　of　what
men　regard　as　right　and　duty　i。e。　from　the　diversity　apparent　in　those　professedly
objective　laws　of　freedom。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　54

What；　then；　is　to　serve　as　the　law　which　the　Practical　Reason　embraces　and
obeys；　and　as　the　criterion　in　its　act　of　selfdetermination？　There　is　no　rule　at　hand
but　the　same　abstract　identity　of　understanding　as　before：　there　must　be　no
contradiction　in　the　act　of　self…　determination。　Hence　the　Practical　Reason　never
shakes　off　the　formalism　which　is　represented　as　the　climax　of　the　Theoretical
Reason。　

But　this　Practical　Reason　does　not　confine　the　universal　principle　of　the　Good　to
its　own　inward　regulation：　it　first　becomes　practical；　in　the　true　sense　of　the
word；　when　it　insists　on　the　Good　being　manifested　in　the　world　with　an　outward
objectivity；　and　requires　that　the　thought　shall　be　objective　throughout；　and　not
merely　subjective。　We　shall　speak　of　this　postulate　of　the　Practical　Reason
afterwards。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§54n

The　free　self…determination　which　Kant　denied　to　the　speculative；　he　has　expressly　vindicated　for
the　practical　reason。　To　many　minds　this　particular　aspect　of　the　Kantian　philosophy　made　it
welcome；　and　that　for　good　reasons。　To　estimate　rightly　what　we　owe　to　Kant　in　the　matter；　we
ought　to　set　before　our　minds　the　form　of　practical　philosophy　and　in　particular　of　'moral
philosophy'　which　prevailed　in　his　time。　It　may　be　generally　described　as　a　system　of
Eudaemonism；　which；　when　asked　what　man's　chief　end　ought　to　be；　replied　Happiness。　And　by
happiness　Eudaemonism　understood　the　satisfaction　of　the　private　appetites；　wishes；　and　wants　of
the　man：　thus　raising　the　contingent　and　particular　into　a　principle　for　the　will　and　its　actualisation。
To　this　Eudaemonism；　which　was　destitute　of　stability　and　consistency；　and　which　left　the　'door
and　gate'　wide　open　for　every　whim　and　caprice；　Kant　opposed　the　practical　reason；　and　thus
emphasised　the　need　for　a　principle　of　will　which　should　be　universal　and　lay　the　same　obligation
on　all。　The　theoretical　reason；　as　has　been　made　evident　in　the　preceding　paragraphs；　is　identified
by　Kant　with　the　negative　faculty　of　the　infinite；　and　as　it　has　no　positive　content　of　its　own；　it　is
restricted　to　the　function　of　detecting　the　finitude　of　experiential　knowledge。　To　the　practical
reason；　on　the　contrary；　he　has　expressly　allowed　a　positive　infinity；　by　ascribing　to　the　will　the
power　of　modifying　itself　in　universal　modes；　i。e。　by　thought。　Such　a　power　the　will　undoubtedly
has：　and　it　is　well　to　remember　that　man　is　free　only　in　so　far　as　he　possesses　it　and　avails　himself
of　it　in　his　conduct。　But　a　recognition　of　the　existence　of　this　power　is　not　enough　and　does　not
avail　to　tell　us　what　are　the　contents　of　the　will　or　practical　reason。　Hence　to　say　that　a　man　must
make　the　Good　the　content　of　his　will　raises　the　question；　what　that　content　is；　and　what　are　the
means　of　ascertaining　what　good　is。　Nor　does　one　get　over　the　difficulty　by　the　principle　that　the
will　must　be　consistent　with　itself；　or　by　the　precept　to　do　duty　for　the　sake　of　duty。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　55

（c）　The　Reflective　Power　of　Judgement　is　invested　by　Kant　with　the　function　of
an　Intuitive　Understanding。　That　is　to　say；　whereas　the　particulars　had　hitherto
appeared；　so　far　as　the　universal　or　abstract　identity　was　concerned；　adventitious
and　incapable　of　being　deduced　from　it；　the　Intuitive　Understanding　apprehends
the　particulars　as　moulded　and　formed　by　the　universal　itself。　Experience　presents
such　universalised　particulars　in　the　products　of　Art　and　of　organic　nature。　

The　capital　feature　in　Kant's　Criticism　of　the　Judgement　is；　that　in　it　he　gave　a
representation　and　a　name；　if　not　even　an　intellectual　expression；　to　the　Idea。
Such　a　representation；　as　an　Intuitive　Understanding；　or　an　inner　adaptation；
suggests　a　universal　which　is　at　the　same　time　apprehended　as　essentially　a
concrete　unity。　It　is　in　these　apercus　alone　that　the　Kantian　philosophy　rises　to　the
speculative　height。　Schiller；　and　others；　have　found　in　the　idea　of　artistic　beauty；
where　thought　and　sensuous　conception　have　grown　together　into　one；　a　way　of
escape　from　the　abstract　and　separatist　understanding。　Others　have　found　the
same　relief　in　the　perception　and　consciousness　of　life　and　of　living　things；
whether　that　life　be　natural　or　intellectual。　The　work　of　Art；　as　well　as　the　living
individual；　is；　it　must　be　owned；　of　limited　content。　But　in　the　postulated　harmony
of　nature　（or　necessity）　and　free　purpose　in　the　final　purpose　of　the　world
conceived　as　realised；　Kant　has　put　before　us　the　Idea；　comprehensive　even　in　its
content。　Yet　what　may　be　called　the　laziness　of　thought；　when　dealing　with　the
supreme　Idea；　finds　a　too　easy　mode　of　evasion　in　the　'ought　to　be'：　instead　of　the
actual　realisation　of　the　ultimate　end；　it　clings　hard　to　the　disjunction　of　the　notion
from　reality。　Yet　if　thought　will　not　think　the　ideal　realised；　the　senses　and　the
intuition　can　at　any　rate　see　it　in　the　present　reality　of　living　organisms　and　of　the
beautiful　in　Art。　And　consequently　Kant's　remarks　on　these　objects　were　well
adapted　to　lead　the　mind　on　to　grasp　and　think　the　concrete　Idea。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　56

We　are　thus　led　to　conceive　a　different　relation　between　the　universal　of
understanding　and　the　particular　of　perception；　than　that　on　which　the　theory…of
the　Theoretical　and　Practical　Reason　is　founded。　But　while　this　is　so；　it　is　not
supplemented　by　a　recognition　that　the　former　is　the　genuine　relation　and　the　very
truth。　Instead　of　that；　the　unity　（of　universal　with　particular）　is　accepted　only　as　it
exists　in　finite　phenomena；　and　is　adduced　only　as　a　fact　of　experience。　Such
experience；　at　first　only　personal；　may　come　from　two　sources。　It　may　spring
from　Genius；　the　faculty　which　produces　'aesthetic　ideas'；　meaning　by　aesthetic
ideas；　the　picture…thoughts　of　the　free　imagination　which　subserve　an　idea　and
suggest　thoughts；　although　their　content　is　not　expressed　in　a　notional　form；　and
even　admits　of　no　such　expression。　It　may　also　be　due　to　Taste；　the　feeling　of
congruity　between　the　free　play　of　intuition　or　imagination　and　the　uniformity　of
understanding。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　57

The　principle　by　which　the　Reflective　faculty　of　Judgement　regulates　and　arranges
the　products　of　animated　nature　is　described　as　the　End　or　final　cause　the　notion
in　action；　the　universal　at　once　determining　and　determinate　in　itself。　At　the　same
time　Kant　is　careful　to　discard　the　conception　of　external　or　finite　adaptation；　in
which　the　End　is　only　an　adventitious　form　for　the　means　and　material　in　which　it
is　realised。　In　the　living　organism；　on　the　contrary；　the　final　cause　is　a　moulding
principle　and　an　energy　immanent　in　the　matter；　and　every　member　is　in　its　turn　a
means　as　well　as　an　end。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　58

Such　an　Idea　evidently　radically　transforms　the　relation　which　the　understanding
institutes　between　means　and　ends；　between　subjectivity　and　objectivity。　And　yet
in　the　face　of　this　unification；　the　End　or　design　is　subsequently　explained　to　be　a
cause　which　exists　and　acts　subjectively；　i。e。　as　our　idea　only：　and　teleology　is
accordi