shorter logic-第24部分

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cause　which　exists　and　acts　subjectively；　i。e。　as　our　idea　only：　and　teleology　is
accordingly　explained　to　be　only　a　principle　of　criticism；　purely　personal　to　our
understanding。　

After　the　Critical　philosophy　had　settled　that　Reason　can　know　phenomena　only；
there　would　still　have　been　an　option　for　animated　nature　between　two　equally
subjective　modes　of　thought。　Even　according　to　Kant's　own　exposition；　there
would　have　been　an　obligation　to　admit；　in　the　case　of　natural　productions；　a
knowledge　not　confined　to　the　categories　of　quality；　cause　and　effect；
composition；　constituents；　and　so　on。　The　principle　of　inward　adaptation　or
design；　had　it　been　kept　to　and　carried　out　in　scientific　application；　would　have　led
to　a　different　and　a　higher　method　of　observing　nature。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　59

If　we　adopt　this　principle；　the　Idea；　when　all　limitations　were　removed　from　it；
would　appear　as　follows。　The　universality　moulded　by　Reason；　and　described　as
the　absolute　and　final　end　or　the　Good；　would　be　realised　in　the　world；　and
realised　moreover　by　means　of　a　third　thing；　the　power　which　proposes　this　End
as　well　as　realises　it　that　is；　God。　Thus　in　him；　who　is　the　absolute　truth；　those
oppositions　of　universal　and　individual；　subjective　and　objective；　are　solved　and
explained　to　be　neither　self…subsistent　nor　true。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　60

But　Good　which　is　thus　put　forward　as　the　final　cause　of　the　world　has　been
already　described　as　only　our　good；　the　moral　law　of　our　Practical　Reason。　This
being　so；　the　unity　in　question　goes　no　further　than　make　the　state　of　the　world
and　the　course　of　its　events　harmonise　with　our　moral　standards。　Besides；　even
with　this　limitation；　the　final　cause；　or　Good；　is　a　vague　abstraction；　and　the　same
vagueness　attaches　to　what　is　to　be　Duty。　But；　further；　this　harmony　is　met　by　the
revival　and　reassertion　of　the　antithesis；　which　it　by　its　own　principle　had　nullified。
The　harmony　is　then　described　as　merely　subjective；　something　which　merely
ought　to　be；　and　which　at　the　same　time　is　not　real　a　mere　article　of　faith；
possessing　a　subjective　certainty；　but　without　truth；　or　that　objectivity　which　is
proper　to　the　Idea。　This　contradiction　may　seem　to　be　disguised　by　adjourning　the
realisation　of　the　Idea　to　a　future；　to　a　time　when　the　Idea　will　also　be。　But　a
sensuous　condition　like　time　is　the　reverse　of　a　reconciliation　of　the　discrepancy；
and　an　infinite　progression　which　is　the　corresponding　image　adopted　by　the
understanding　on　the　very　face　of　it　only　repeats　and　re…enacts　the　contradiction。　

A　general　remark　may　still　be　offered　on　the　result　to　which　the　Critical
philosophy　led　as　to　the　nature　of　knowledge；　a　result　which　has　grown　one　of　the
current　'idols'　or　axiomatic　beliefs　of　the　day。　In　every　dualistic　system；　and
especially　in　that　of　Kant；　the　fundamental　defect　makes　itself　visible　in　the
inconsistency　of　unifying　at　one　moment　what　a　moment　before　had　been
explained　to　be　independent　and　therefore　incapable　of　unification。　And　then；　at
the　very　moment　after　unification　has　been　alleged　to　be　the　truth；　we　suddenly
come　upon　the　doctrine　that　the　two　elements；　which；　in　their　true　status　of
unification；　had　been　refused　all　independent　subsistence；　are　only　true　and　actual
in　their　state　of　separation。　Philosophising　of　this　kind　wants　the　little　penetration
needed　to　discover；　that　this　shuffling　only　evidences　how　unsatisfactory　each　one
of　the　two　terms　is。　Arid　it　fails　simply　because　it　is　incapable　of　bringing　two
thoughts　together。　（And　in　point　of　form　there　are　never　more　than　two。）　It　argues
an　utter　want　of　consistency　to　say；　on　the　one　hand；　that　the　understanding　only
knows　phenomena；　and；　on　the　other；　assert　the　absolute　character　of　this
knowledge；　by　such　statements　as　'Cognition　can　go　no　further'；　'Here　is　the
natural　and　absolute　limit　of　human　knowledge。'　But　'natural'　is　the　wrong　word
here。　The　things　of　nature　are　limited　and　are　natural　things　only　to　such　extent　as
they　are　not　aware　of　their　universal　limit；　or　to　such　extent　as　their　mode　or
quality　is　a　limit　from　our　point　of　view；　and　not　from　their　own。　No　one　knows；
or　even　feels；　that　anything　is　a　limit　or　defect；　until　he　is　at　the　same　time　above
and　beyond　it。　Living　beings；　for　example；　possess　the　privilege　of　pain　which　is
denied　to　the　inanimate：　even　with　living　beings；　a　single　mode　or　quality　passes
into　the　feeling　of　a　negative。　For　living　beings　as　such　possess　within　them　a
universal　vitality；　which　overpasses　and　includes　the　single　mode；　and　thus；　as
they　maintain　themselves　in　the　negative　of　themselves；　they　feel　the
contradiction　to　exist　within　them。　But　the　contradiction　is　within　them　only　in　so
far　as　one　and　the　same　subject　includes　both　the　universality　of　their　sense　of
life；　and　the　individual　mode　which　is　in　negation　with　it。　This　illustration　will
show　how　a　limit　or　imperfection　in　knowledge　comes　to　be　termed　a　limit　or
imperfection；　only　when　it　is　compared　with　the　actually　present　Idea　of　the
universal；　of　a　total　and　perfect。　A　very　little　consideration　might　show　that　to　call
a　thing　finite　or　limited　proves　by　implication　the　very　presence　of　the　infinite　and
unlimited；　and　that　our　knowledge　of　a　limit　can　only　be　when　the　unlimited　is　on
this　side　in　consciousness。　

The　result　however　of　Kant's　view　of　cognition　suggests　a　second　remark。　The
philosophy　of　Kant　could　have　no　influence　on　the　method　of　the　sciences。　It
leaves　the　categories　and　method　of　ordinary　knowledge　quite　unmolested。
Occasionally；　it　may　be；　in　the　first　sections　of　a　scientific　work　of　that　period；　we
find　propositions　borrowed　from　the　Kantian　philosophy；　but　the　course　of　the
treatise　renders　it　apparent　that　these　propositions　were　superfluous　decoration；
and　that　the　few　first　pages　might　have　been　omitted　without　producing　the　least
change　in　the　empirical　contents。　

We　may　next　institute　a　comparison　of　Kant　with　the　metaphysics　of　the
empirical　school。　Natural　plain　Empiricism；　though　it　unquestionably　insists　most
upon　sensuous　perception；　still　allows　a　supersensible　world　or　spiritual　reality；
whatever　may　be　its　structure　and　constitution；　and　whether　derived　from
intellect；　or　from　imagination；　etc。　So　far　as　form　goes；　the　facts　of　this
supersensible　world　rest　on　the　authority　of　mind；　in　the　same　way　as　the　other
facts　embraced　in　empirical　knowledge　rest　on　the　authority　of　external
perception。　But　when　Empiricism　becomes　reflective　and　logically　consistent；　it
turns　its　arms　against　this　dualism　in　the　ultimate　and　highest　species　of　fact；　it
denies　the　independence　of　the　thinking　principle　and　of　a　spiritual　world　which
develops　itself　in　thought。　Materialism　or　Naturalism；　therefore；　is　the　consistent
and　thoroughgoing　system　of　Empiricism。　In　direct　opposition　to　such　an
Empiricism；　Kant　asserts　the　principle　of　thought　and　freedom；　and　attaches
himself　to　the　first　mentioned　form　of　empirical　doctrine；　the　general　principles　of
which　he　never　departed　from。　There　is　a　dualism　in　his　philosophy　also。　On　one
side　stands　the　world　of　sensation；　and　of　the　understanding　which　reflects　upon
it。　This　world；　it　is　true；　he　alleges　to　be　a　world　of　appearances。　But　that　is　only　a
title　or　formal　description；　for　the　source；　the　facts；　and　the　modes　of　observation
continue　quite　the　same　as　in　Empiricism。　On　the　other　side　and　independent
stands　a　self…apprehending　thought；　the　principle　of　freedom；　which　Kant　has　in
common　with　ordinary　and　bygone　metaphysic；　but　emptied　of　all　that　it　held；
and　without　his　being　able　to　infuse　into　it　anything　new。　For；　in　the　Critical
doctrine；　thought；　or；　as　it　is　there　called；　Reason；　is　divested　of　every　specific
form；　and　thus　bereft　of　all　authority。　The　main　effect　of　the　Kantian　philosophy
has　been　to　revive　the　consciousness　of　Reason；　or　the　absolute　inwardness　of
thought。　Its　abstractness　indeed　prevented　that　inwardness　from　developing　into
anything；　or　from　originating　any　special　forms；　whether　cognitive　principles　or
moral　laws；　but　nevertheless　it　absolutely　refused　to　accept　or　indulge　anything
possessing　the　character　of　an　externality。　Henceforth　the　principle　of　the
independence　of　Reason；　or　of　its　absolute　self…subsistence；　is　made　a　general
principle　of　philosophy；　as　well　as　a　foregone　conclusion　of　the　time。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§60n

（1）　The　Critical　philosophy　has　one　great　negative　merit。　It　has　brought　home　the　conviction　that
the　categories　of　understanding　are　finite　in　their　range；　and　that　any　cognitive　process　confined
within　their　pale　falls　short　of　the　truth。　But　Kant　had　only　a　sight　of　half　the　truth。　He　explained　the
finite　nature　of　the　categories　to　mean　that　they　were　subjective　only；　valid　only　for　our　thought；
from　which　the　thing…in…itself　was　divided　by　an　impassable　gulf。　In　fact；　however；　it　is　not　because
they　are　subjective　that　the　categories　are　finite：　they　are　finite　by　their　very　nature；　and　it　is　on　their
own　selves　that　it　is　requisite　to　exhibit　their　finitude。　Kant　however　holds　that　what　we　think　is
false；　because　it　is　we　who　think　it。　A　further　deficiency　in　the　system　is　that　it　gives　only　a
historical　description　of　thought；　and　a　mere　enumeration　of　the　factors　of　consciousness。　The
enumeration　is　in　the　main　correct：　but　not　a　word　touches　upon　the　necessity　of　what　is　thus
empirically　colligated。　The　observations　made　on　the　various　stages　of　consciousness　culminant　in
the　summary　statement　that　the　content　of　all　we　are　acquainted　with　is　only　an　appearance。　And
as　it　is　true　at　least　that　all　finite　thinking　is　concerned　with　appearances；　so　far　the　conclusion　is
justified。　This　stage　of　'appearance'　however　…　the　phenomenal　world　…　is　not　the　terminus　of
thought：　there　is　another　and　a　higher　region。　But　that　region　was　to　the　Kantian　philosophy　an
inaccessible　'other　world'。　

（2）　After　all　it　was　only　formally　that　the　Kantian　system　established　the　principle　that　thought　is
spontaneous　and　self…determining。　Into　details　of　the　manner　and　the　extent　of　this
self…determinatio