shorter logic-第48部分

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acknowledging　that　their　inward　being　corresponds　with　the　import　of　their　acts；　the　pragmatic
historian　fancies　himself　justified　and　even　obliged　to　trace　the　supposed　secret　motives　that　lie
behind　the　open　facts　of　the　record。　The　historian；　in　that　case；　is　supposed　to　write　with　more
depth　in　proportion　as　he　succeeds　in　tearing　away　the　aureole　from　all　that　has　been　heretofore
held　grand　and　glorious；　and　in　depressing　it；　so　far　as　its　origin　and　proper　significance　are
concerned；　to　the　level　of　vulgar　mediocrity。　To　make　these　pragmatic　researches　in　history　easier；
it　is　usual　to　recommend　the　study　of　psychology；　which　is　supposed　to　make　us　acquainted　with
the　real　motives　of　human　actions。　The　psychology　in　question　however；　is　only　that　petty
knowledge　of　men；　which　looks　away　from　the　essential　and　permanent　in　human　nature　to　fasten
its　glance　on　the　casual　and　private　features　shown　in　isolated　instincts　and　passions。　A　pragmatic
psychology　ought　at　leat　to　leave　the　historian；　who　investigates　the　motives　at　the　ground　of　great
actions；　a　choice　between　the　'substantial'　interests　of　patriotism；　justice；　religious　truth；　and　the
like；　on　the　one　hand；　and　the　subjective　and　'formal'　interests　of　vanity；　ambition；　avarice；　and　the
like；　on　the　other。　The　latter；　however；　are　the　motives　which　must　be　viewed　by　the　pragmatist　as
really　efficient；　otherwise　the　assumption　of　a　contrast　between　inward　（the　disposition　of　the
agent）　and　the　outward　（the　import　of　he　action）　would　fall　to　the　ground。　But　inward　and　outward
have　in　truth　the　same　content；　and　the　right　doctrine　is　the　very　reverse　of　this　pedantic　judiciality。
If　the　heroes　of　history　had　been　actuated　by　subjective　and　formal　interests　alone；　they　would
never　have　accomplished　what　they　have。　And　if　we　have　due　regard　to　the　unity　between　the
inner　and　the　outer；　we　must　own　that　great　men　willed　what　they　did；　and　did　what　they　willed。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§141　

The　empty　abstractions；　by　means　of　which　the　one　identical　content　perforce
continues　in　the　two　correlatives；　suspend　themselves　in　the　immediate　transition；
the　one　into　the　other。　The　content　is　itself　nothing　but　their　identity　（§138）：　and
these　abstractions　are　the　seeming　of　essence；　put　as　seeming。　By　the
manifestation　of　force　the　inward　is　put　into　existence：　but　this　putting　is　the
mediation　by　empty　abstractions。　In　its　own　self　the　intermediating　process
vanishes　to　the　immediacy；　in　which　the　inward　and　the　outward　are　absolutely
identical　and　their　difference　is　distinctly　no　more　than　assumed　and　imposed。
This　identity　is　Actuality。　




ESSENCE：　Second　Subdivision　of　The　Logic；
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　C。　ACTUALITY



　　　　　　　　　　　　　Substantiality　…　Causality　…　Reciprocity



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　142
Actuality　is　the　unity；　become　immediate；　of　essence　with　existence；　or　of　inward
with　outward。　The　utterance　of　the　actual　is　the　actual　itself：　so　that　in　this
utterance　it　remains　just　as　essential；　and　only　is　essential；　in　so　far　as　it　is
immediate　external　existence。　

We　have　ere　this　met　Being　and　Existence　as　forms　of　the　immediate。　Being　is；　in
general；　unreflected　immediacy　and　transition　into　another。　Existence　is　immediate
unity　of　being　and　reflection：　hence　appearance：　it　comes　from　the　ground；　and
falls　to　the　ground。　

In　actuality　this　unity　is　explicitly　put；　and　the　two　sides　of　the　relation　identified。
Hence　the　actual　is　exempted　from　transition；　and　its　externality　is　its　energising。
In　that　energising　it　is　reflected　into　itself：　its　existence　is　only　the　manifestation　of
itself；　not　of　another。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　142n
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Exists　but　not　Real

Actuality　and　thought　（or　Idea）　are　often　absurdly　opposed。　How　commonly　we　hear　people
saying　that；　though　no　objection　can　be　urged　against　the　truth　and　correctness　of　a　certain
thought；　there　is　nothing　of　the　kind　to　be　seen　in　reality；　or　it　cannot　be　actually　carried　out！
People　who　use　such　language　only　prove　that　they　have　not　properly　apprehended　the　nature
either　of　thought　or　of　actuality。　Thought　in　such　a　case　is；　one　the　one　hand；　the　synonym　for　a
subjective　conception；　plan；　intention；　or　the　like；　just　as　actuality；　on　the　other；　is　made
synonymous　with　external　and　sensible　existence。　This　is　all　very　well　in　common　life；　where　great
laxity　is　allowed　in　the　categories　and　the　names　given　to　them；　and　it　may　of　course　happen　that；
e。g。；　the　plan；　or　so…called　idea；　say；　of　a　certain　method　of　taxation　；　is　good　and　advisable　in　the
abstract；　but　that　nothing　of　the　sort　is　found　in　so…called　actuality；　or　could　possibly　be　carried　out
under　the　given　conditions。　But　when　the　abstract　understanding　gets　hold　of　these　categories　and
exaggerates　the　distinction　they　imply　into　a　hard　and　fast　line　of　contrast；　when　it　tells　us　that　in
this　actual　world　we　must　knock　ideas　out　of　our　heads；　it　is　necessary　energetically　to　protest
against　these　doctrines；　alike　in　the　name　of　science　and　of　sound　reason。　For　on　the　one　hand
Ideas　are　not　confined　to　our　heads　merely；　nor　is　the　Idea；　on　the　whole；　so　feeble　as　to　leave　the
question　of　its　actualisation　or　non…actualisation　dependent　on　our　will。　The　Idea　is　rather　the
absolutely　active　as　well　as　actual。　

？



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The　Actual　is　Real

And　on　the　other　hand　actuality　is　not　so　bad　and　irrational；　as　purblind　or　wrong…headed　and
muddle…brained　would…be　reformers　imagine。　So　far　is　actuality；　as　distinguished　from　mere
appearance；　and　primarily　presenting　a　unity　of　inward　and　outward；　from　being　in　contrariety　with
reason；　that　it　is　rather　thoroughly　reasonable；　and　everything　which　is　not　reasonable　must　on　that
very　ground　cease　to　be　held　actual。　The　same　view　may　be　traced　in　the　usages　of　educated
speech；　which　declines　to　give　the　name　of　real　poet　or　real　statesman　to　a　poet　or　a　statesman
who　can　do　nothing　really　meritorious　or　reasonable。　Aristotle　to　that　of　Plato。　Popular　opinion
makes　the　difference　to　be　as　follows。　While　Plato　recognises　the　idea　and　only　the　idea　as　the
truth；　Aristotle；　rejecting　the　idea；　keeps　to　what　is　actual；　and　is　on　that　account　to　be　considered
the　founder　and　chief　of　empiricism。　On　this　it　may　be　remarked：　that　it　is　not　the　vulgar　actuality　of
what　is　immediately　at　hand；　but　the　idea　as　actuality。　Where　then　lies　the　controversy　of　Aristotle
against　Plato？　It　lies　in　this：　Aristotle　calls　the　Platonic　idea　a　mere　dynamis；　and　establishes　in
opposition　to　Plato　that　the　idea；　which　both　equally　recognise　to　be　the　only　truth；　is　essentially　to
be　viewed　as　an　energeia；　in　other　words；　as　the　inward　which　is　quite　to　the　fore；　or　as　unity　of
inner　and　outer；　or　as　actuality；　in　the　emphatic　sense　here　given　to　the　word。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　143
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Actuality　is　concrete

Such　a　concrete　category　as　Actuality　includes　the　characteristics　aforesaid　and
their　difference；　and　is　therefore　also　the　development　of　them；　in　such　a　way
that；　as　it　has　them；　they　are　at　the　same　time　plainly　understood　to　be　a　show；　to
be　assumed　or　imposed。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Possibility

＇a＇　Viewed　as　an　identity　in　general；　Actuality　is　first　of　all　Possibility　…the
reflection…into…self　which；　as　in　contrast　with　the　concrete　unity　of　the　actual；　is
taken　and　made　an　abstract　and　unessential　essentiality。　Possibility　is　what　is
essential　to　reality；　but　in　such　a　way　that　it　is　at　the　same　time　only　a　possibility。　

It　was　probably　the　import　of　Possibility　which　induced　Kant　to　regard　it　along
with　necessity　and　actuality　as　Modalities；　'since　these　categories　do　not　in　the
least　increase　the　notion　as　object；　but　only　express　its　relation　to　the　faculty　of
knowledge'。　For　Possibility　is　really　the　bare　abstraction　of　reflection…into…self　…
what　was　formerly　called　the　Inward；　only　that　it　is　now　taken　to　mean　the
external　inward；　lifted　out　of　reality　and　with　the　being　of　a　mere　supposition；　and
is　thus；　sure　enough；　supposed　only　as　a　bare　modality；　an　abstraction　which
comes　short；　and；　in　more　concrete　terms；　belongs　only　to　subjective　thought。　It
is　otherwise　with　Actuality　and　Necessity。　They　are　anything　but　a　mere　sort　and
mode　for　something　else：　in　fact　the　very　reverse　of　that。　If　they　are　supposed；　it
is　as　the　concrete；　but　not　merely　suppositions；　but　intrinsically　complete。　

As　Possibility　is；　in　the　first　instance；　the　mere　form　of　identity…with…self　（as
compared　with　the　concrete　which　is　actual）；　the　rule　for　it　merely　is　that　a　thing
must　not　be　self…contradictory。　Thus　everything　is　possible；　for　an　act　of
abstraction　can　give　any　content　this　form　of　identity。　Everything　however　is　as
impossible　as　it　is　possible。　In　every　content　…　which　is　and　must　be　concrete　…　the
speciality　of　its　nature　may　be　viewed　as　a　specialised　contrariety　and　in　that　way
as　a　contradiction。　Nothing　therefore　can　be　more　meaningless　than　to　speak　of
such　possibility　and　impossibility。　

In　philosophy　in　particular；　there　should　never　be　a　word　said　of　showing　that　〃It
is　possible〃；　or　〃There　is　still　another　possibility〃；　or；　to　adopt　another
phraseology；　〃It　is　conceivable〃。　The　same　consideration　should　warn　the　writer
of　history　against　employing　a　category　which　has　now　been　explained　to　be　on　its
own　merits；　untrue：　but　the　subtlety　of　the　empty　understanding　finds　its　chief
pleasure　in　the　fantastic　ingenuity　of　suggesting　possibilities　and　lots　of
possibilities。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　143n
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Possible　and　Actual

Our　picture…thought　is　at　first　disposed　to　see　in　possibility　the　richer　and　more　comprehensive；　in
actuality　the　poorer　and　narrower　category。　Everything；　it　is　said；　is　possible；　but　everything　which
is　possible　is　not　on　that　account　actual。　In　real　truth；　however；　if　we　deal　with　them　as　thoughts；
actuality　is　the　more　comprehensive；　because　it　is　the　concrete　thought　which　includes　possibility
as　an　abstract　element。　And　that　superiority　is　to　some　extent　ex