criminal psychology-第39部分

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bility　or　possibility。

Another　form　which　seems　to　contradict　the　assertion　that　negative　propositions　are　infinite　is　positive　evidence　in　the　shape　of　negation。　If　we　give　an　expert　a　stain　to　examine　and　ask　him　whether　it　is　a　blood　stain；　and　he　tells　us：　‘‘It　is　not　a　blood　stain；''　then　this　single　scientifically　established　assertion　proves　that　we　do　not　have　to　deal　with　blood；　and　hence　‘‘negative''　proof　seems　brought　in　a　single　instance。　But　as　a　matter　of　fact　we　deal　here　with　an　actually　positive　proof；　for　the　expert　has　given　us　the　deduced　proposition；　not　the　essential　assertion。　He　has　found　the　　stain　to　be　a　rust　stain　or　a　tobacco　stain；　and　hence　he　may　assert　and　deduce　that　it　is　not　blood。　Even　were　he　a　skeptic；　he　would　say；　‘‘We　have　not　yet　seen　the　blood　of　a　mammal　in　which　the　characteristic　signs　for　recognition　were　not　present；　and　we　have　never　yet　recognized　a　body　without　the　blood　pertaining　to　it；　and　hence　we　may　say；　we　are　not　dealing　with　blood　because　all　of　us　found　the　characteristics　of　the　stain　to　be　what　we　have　been　until　now　accustomed　to　call　the　characteristics　of　rust　stain。''

We　have　still　to　touch　upon　the　difference　between　logical　connection　and　experience。　If　I　say；　‘‘This　mineral　tastes　salty；　therefore　it　is　soluble　in　water；''　the　inference　depends　upon　logical　relationships；　for　my　intent　is：　‘‘If　I　perceive　a　salty　taste；　it　has　to　be　brought　to　the　nerves　of　taste；　which　can　be　done　only　by　the　combination　of　the　mineral　with　the　saliva；　hence　by　its　solution　in　the　saliva。　But　if　it　is　soluble　in　saliva　it　must　also　be　soluble　in　water。''　If　I　say　on　the　other　hand；　‘‘This　mineral　tastes　salty；　has　a　hardness　of　2；　a　specific　gravity　of　2。2；　and　consequently　it　crystallizes　hexagonally；''this　statement　depends　on　experience；　for　what　I　really　say　is：　‘‘I　know　first　of　all；　that　a　mineral　which　has　the　qualities　mentioned　must　be　rock　salt；　for　at　the　least；　we　know　of　no　mineral　which　has　these　qualities　and　is　not　rock　salt；　and　which　in　the　second　place　crystallizes　hexagonally　as　rock　salt　does；a　way　which；　at　least；　we　find　rock　salt　never　to　have　missed。''　If　we　examine　the　matter　still　more　closely　we　become　convinced　that　in　the　first　case　only　the　formal　and　logical　side；　in　the　second　the　experiential　aspect　predominates。　The　premises　of　both　cases　are　purely　matters　of　experience　and　the　formal　question　of　inference　is　a　matter　of　logic。　Only；at　one　time　the　first　question；　at　another　the　second　comes　more　obviously　into　the　foreground。　Although　this　matter　appears　self…evident　it　is　not　indifferent。　It　is　well　known　that　whenever　we　are　powerfully　influenced　by　one　thing；　things　of　little　intensity　are　either　not　experienced　at　all　or　only　to　a　very　small　degree；　and　are　therefore　neglected。　This　is　a　fact　which　may　indeed　be　shown　mathematically；　for　infinity　plus　one　equals　infinity。　When；　therefore；　we　undergo　great　pain　or　great　joy；　any　accompanying　insignificant　pain　or　any　pleasure　will　be　barely　felt；　just　as　the　horses　who　drag　a　very　heavy　wagon　will　not　notice　whether　the　driver　walking　beside　them　adds　his　coat　to　the　load　（cf。　Weber's　law）。　Hence；　when　we　criminalists　study　a　difficult　case　with　regard　to　the　question　of　proof；　there　are　two　things　to　do　in　order　to　test　the　premises　for　correctness　accord…　　ing　to　the　standards　of　our　other　experiences；　and　to　draw　logically　correct　inferences　from　these　premises。　If　it　happens　that　there　are　especial　difficulties　in　one　direction　while　by　some　chance　those　in　the　other　are　easily　removed；　it　becomes　surprising　how　often　the　latter　are　entirely　ignored。　And　hence；　the　adjustment　of　inferences　is　naturally　false　even　when　the　great　difficulties　of　the　first　type　are　removed　correctly。　Therefore；　if　the　establishment　of　a　fact　costs　a　good　deal　of　pains　and　means　the　expenditure　of　much　time；　the　business　of　logical　connection　appears　so　comparatively　easy　that　it　is　made　swiftly　andwrongly。

Mistakes　become；　at　least　according　to　my　experience；　still　more　frequent　when　the　difficulty　is　logical　and　not　empirical。　As　a　matter　of　honesty；　let　me　say　that　we　criminalists　are　not　trained　logicians；　however　necessary　it　is　that　we　shall　be　such；　and　most　of　us　are　satisfied　with　the　barren　remainder　of　what　we　learned　long　ago　in　the　Gymnasium　and　have　since　forgotten。　The　difficulties　which　occur　in　the　more　important　logical　tasks　are　intelligible　when　compared　with　the　lesser　difficulties；　and　when　one　of　these　larger　problems　is　by　good　fortune　rightly　solved；　the　effort　and　the　work　required　by　the　solution　make　it　easy　to　forget　asking　whether　the　premises　are　correct；　they　are　assumed　as　self…evident。　Hence；　in　the　review　of　the　basis　for　judgment；　it　is　often　discovered　that　the　logical　task　has　been　performed　with　care；　with　the　expenditure　of　much　time；　etc。；　only　to　be　based　upon　some　apparently　unessential　presupposition　which　contradicts　all　experience　and　is　hence　materially　incorrect。　Consequence；the　inference　is　wrong　since　the　premise　was　wrong；　and　the　whole　work　has　gone　for　nothing。　Such　occurrences　convince　one　that　no　judge　would　have　been　guilty　of　them　if　the　few　difficulties　concerning　the　fact　in　question　were　not；　because　treated　in　the　light　of　the　effort　required　by　the　logical　work；　quite　neglected。　Nor　does　this　occur　unconsciously；　or　as　a　consequence　of　a　sort　of　lapse　of　memory　concerning　the　meaning　or　the　importance　of　an　empirical　problem；　it　also　happens　at　least　half　consciously　by　way　of　a　characteristic　psychic　process　which　everybody　may　identify　in　his　own　experience：　i。　e。；　the　idea　occurs；　in　some　degree　subconsciously；　that　the　overgreatness　of　the　work　done　in　one　direction　ought　to　be　corrected　by　the　inadequacy　of　the　work　done　in　the　other　direction。　And　this　happens　in　lawyer's　work　often；　and　being　frequently　justifiable；　becomes　habitual。　If　I；　for　example；　have　examined　ten　unanimous　witnesses　concerning　the　same　event　and　have　completely　demonstrated　　the　status　of　the　case；　I　ought；　in　examining　the　last　two　witnesses；　who　are　perhaps　no　longer　needed　but　have　been　summoned　and　appear；　certainly　to　proceed　in　a　rapid　manner。　This　justifiable　neglect　is　then　half　unconsciously　transferred　to　other　procedures　where　there　is　possible　no　equalization　of　the　hypertrophy　of　work　in　one　direction　with　the　dwarfing　of　it　in　another；　and　where　the　mistake　causes　the　result　to　be　wrong。　However　I　may　have　been　bothered　by　the　multiplication　of　ten　groups　of　factors　and　whatever　accuracy　I　may　have　applied　to　a　task　can　not　permit　me　to　relax　my　attention　in　the　addition　of　the　individual　results。　If　I　do　I　am　likely　to　commit　an　error　and　the　error　renders　all　the　previous　labor　worthless。

Indeed；　it　may　be　asserted　that　all　logic　is　futile　where　the　premises　or　a　single　premise　may　be　wrong。　I　expect；　in　truth；　that　the　procedures　here　described　will　be　doubted　to　be　even　possible；　but　doubters　are　recommended　to　examine　a　few　cases　for　the　presence　of　this　sort　of　thing。


Section　27。　（e）　Analogy。

Analogy　is　the　least　negligible　of　all　methods　of　induction　because　it　rests　at　bottom　on　the　postulate　that　one　thing　which　has　a　number　of　qualities　in　common　with　another　will　agree　with　that　other　in　one　or　more　_*additional_　qualities。　In　cases　of　analogy；　identity　is　never　asserted；　indeed；　it　is　excluded；　while　a　certain　parallelism　and　agreement　in　specific　points　are　assumed；　i。　e。；　introduced　tacitly　as　a　mutatis　mutandis。　Consider　Lipps's　examples。　He　calls　analogy　the　transfer　of　judgment　or　the　transition　from　similar　to　similar；　and　he　adds　that　the　value　of　such　a　process　is　very　variable。　If　I　have　perceived　x　times　that　flowers　of　a　certain　color　have　perfume；　I　am　inclined　to　expect　perfume　from　flowers　of　the　same　color　in　x＋1　cases。　If　I　have　observed　x　times　that　clouds　of　a　certain　structure　are　followed　by　rain　I　shall　expect　rain　in　the　x＋1st　case。　The　first　analogy　is　worthless　because　there　is　no　relation　between　color　and　perfume；　the　second　is　of　great　value　because　such　a　relation　does　exist　between　rain　and　clouds。

Simply　stated；　the　difference　between　these　two　examples　does　not　consist　in　the　existence　of　a　relationship　in　the　one　case　and　the　absence　of　a　relationship　in　the　other；　it　consists　in　the　fact　that　in　the　case　of　the　flowers　the　relationship　occurs　now　and　then　but　is　not　permanently　knowable。　It　is　possible　that　there　is　a　natural　law　controlling　the　relation　between　color　and　odor；　and　if　　that　law　were　known　there　would　be　no　question　of　accident　or　of　analogy；　but　of　law。　Our　ignorance　of　such　a　law；　in　spite　of　the　multiplicity　of　instances；　lies　in　the　fact　that　we　are　concerned　only　with　the　converse　relationships　and　not　with　the　common　cause　of　perfume　and　color。　Suppose　I　see　on　the　street　a　large　number　of　people　with　winter　over…coats　and　a　large　number　of　people　with　skates　in　their　hands；　I　would　hardly　ask　whether　the　coats　are　conditioned　or　brought　out　by　the　skates　or　the　skates　by　the　coats。　If　I　do　not　conclude　that　the　cold　weather　is　the　condition　both　of　the　need　of　over…coats　and　the　utility　of　skates；　I　will　suppose　that　there　is　some　unintelligible　reflexive　relation　between　over…coats　and　skates。　If　I　observe　that　on　a　certain　day　every　week　there　regularly　appear　many　well…dressed　people　and　no　workingmen　on　the　street；　if　I　am　ignorant　of　the　fact　that　Sunday　is　the　cause　of　the　appearance　of　the　one　and　the　disappearance　of　the　other；　I　shall　try　in　vain　to　find　out　how　it　happens　that　the　working　people　are　crowded　out　by　the　well…dressed　ones　or　conversely。

The　danger　of　analogy　lies　in　the　fact　that　we　prefer　naturally　to　depend　on　something　already　known；　and　that　the　preference　is　the　greater　in　proportion　to　our　feeling　of　the　strangeness　and　ominousness　of　the　particular　intellectual　or　natural　regions　in　which　we　find　ourselves。　I　have　already　once　demonstrated＇1＇　how　disquieting　it　is　to　notice；　during　the　examination　of　the　jury；　that　the　jurymen　who　ask　questions　try　to　find　some　relation　to　their　own　trades　even　though　this　requires　great　effort；　and　seek　to　bring　the　case　they　are　asking　about　under　the　light　of　their　particul